

**Indicating and Referring:  
A Speech Act approach to  
communicative meaning**

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## *Declaration*

*I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself  
and that the research reported therein has been  
conducted by myself alone.*

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*March 5th, 1999*



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## Abstract

It is a standard and generally accepted view that semantics deals with context-independent truth-conditional meaning and pragmatics deals with context-dependent non-truth-conditional meaning. This thesis redefines the dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics on the basis of conventionality of meaning, and provides a theory of semantic meaning where meanings are described as what a speaker expresses by means of conventionalised linguistic devices.

In Chapter 1, the standard dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics is introduced from a historical perspective concerning how the field of pragmatics has been established, and problems of the dichotomy are discussed. A redefinition of the dichotomy based on the conventionality of meaning is proposed. In the extended semantic domain, not only does a speaker express an assertion about the world, i.e., truth-conditional meanings, but also indicates the speech situation which the speaker shares with the hearer. In the rest of the thesis, a theory of semantic meanings in this extended domain is developed.

Chapters 2 and 3 develop a theory which concerns the meanings a speaker expresses in asserting something about the world by means of linguistic conventions. In Chapter 2, important early theoretical contributions are surveyed and relevant later theories discussed. It is shown that the traditional dyadic approaches to meanings which are based on the concepts of reference and predication are not incompatible with triadic approaches where meanings are described as speech acts a speaker performs in asserting something about the world using linguistic conventions.

In Chapter 3, Austin (1950)'s model of communication is developed into a theory for analysing truth-conditional meaning whereby a speaker refers to an entity or situation by means of demonstrative conventions and describes it by means of descriptive conventions. We discuss the demonstrative conventions which correlate words with a particular entity or situation and the descriptive conventions which correlate words with types of entity or situation. It is also shown that there are four different types of speech act a speaker potentially performs by using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions in different ways.

Chapters 4 and 5 concern the development of the part of the theory which concerns the meanings a speaker expresses in indicating something about the speech situation. In Chapter 4 it is shown that non-truth-conditional meanings are conventionally expressed by linguistic devices. This type of meaning is described as the meanings a speaker expresses by using the linguistic devices which concern types of speech situation or types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer.

In Chapter 5 Japanese honorifics are discussed as examples of grammaticalised devices by which a speaker indicates that a social relation between the speaker and the hearer or the speech situation the speaker shares with the speaker is of a certain type. Using honorifics a speaker creates or highlights the speech situation which the speaker shares with a hearer or a social relation between the speaker and a hearer. There is another type of honorific, by which a speaker creates or reinforces social relations among participants in the particular situation described. In the last chapter the general conclusion is presented.

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# Chapter 1

## Semantics and Pragmatics

### 1.1 Introduction

It has for many years been generally accepted within linguistics that the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is based on the difference between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning. This is further reflected in the associated assumption that semantic meaning is context independent while pragmatic meaning is context dependent. For example, the following sentence is seen as, taken out of context, a statement that a car is coming:

- (1) There's a car coming,

This context-independent truth-conditional meaning is semantic meaning. In a particular context it might be a warning to a pedestrian not to step onto a road, or an expression of hope that the people invited to a dinner are at last arriving<sup>1</sup>. The latter context-dependent non-truth-conditional meaning is pragmatic meaning.

There is, however, meaning which is not incorporated well in the dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics; non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning. Consider the following examples:

---

<sup>1</sup>Matthews (1997:290).

- (2) a. The signboard says 'no vacancy', Sir.  
b. The signboard says 'no vacancy', stupid.
- (3) a. The old man passed away,  
b. The old man died,  
c. The old man kicked the bucket.
- (4) a. *Tu es le professeur,*  
b. *Vous êtes le professeur.*
- (5) a. *Yamada san ga ki mashi ta,*  
b. *Yamada san ga ki ta.*  
come past  
'Mr Yamada came'

<sup>2</sup>We will discuss vocatives in 4.3.1.

bucket' in (3c), on the other hand, shows that the speaker is very casual to the hearer by describing the person's death in a very casual way<sup>3</sup>.

The types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer are grammaticalised in some languages, for example, Japanese and French. The difference between the second-person pronouns *tu* and *vous* in French is correlated to different types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. *Tu* in (4a) shows that the speaker is casual and friendly to the hearer while *vous* in (4b) shows that the speaker is formal and respectful to the hearer<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, the Japanese auxiliary *mashi* in (5a) shows that the speaker is socially lower than the hearer, while the absence of *mashi* in (5b) shows that the speaker is socially equal to or higher than the hearer<sup>5</sup>.

These non-truth-conditional meanings are context independent. We know that the speaker of the sentence in (2a) is formal and respectful to the hearer by the vocative 'Sir' itself, not by the information which is specific to the particular context where the sentence is uttered. Similarly, the meaning that the speaker is socially lower than the hearer in sentence (5a) comes from the honorific auxiliary *mashi*, not from a particular element of the context.

Should we then analyse these context-independent non-truth-conditional meanings in the domain of semantics or that of pragmatics? Since the truth-conditionality of meaning is a dominant criterion in semantics and pragmatics as we will show in the following section (1.2), many semanticists and pragmatists would agree that these meanings should be analysed in the pragmatic domain. In the present thesis, however, we will defend the idea that it is not the distinction between truth-conditionality and non-truth-conditionality of

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<sup>3</sup>We will discuss slang in 4.3.3.1.

<sup>4</sup>Brown & Gilman (1960). We will discuss this point in 4.3.2.1.

<sup>5</sup>We will discuss Japanese honorifics thoroughly in Chapter 5.

meaning but the distinction between context-independency and context-specificity that is essential and useful for describing the nature of meaning. We will redefine the dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics accordingly. In the redefined dichotomy both truth-conditional meaning and context-independent non-truth-conditional meaning are analysed in the semantic domain, and only context specific meaning is analysed in the pragmatic domain. This redefinition is motivated by my conviction that the difference between truth-conditional meaning and context-independent non-truth-conditional meanings is not so significant. We can describe these meanings as the relations between types (types of states of affairs in the world, and types of speech situation) and words which are conventionally correlated to those types.

In the following section (1.2), we will introduce the definitions of semantics and pragmatics proposed by the linguists from Morris (1938) to Levinson (1983), and discuss the nature of meaning they try to explicate by distinguishing pragmatic meaning from semantic meaning. We will also discuss how the dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics based on the truth-conditionality of meaning is standardised. In 1.3, we will discuss problems with the standard dichotomy. We will claim that the semantic domain is too restricted and, therefore, truth-conditional semantics does not give a full picture of sentence meaning (1.3.1). As for pragmatics, we will claim that the pragmatic domain is too heterogeneous (1.3.2). In 1.4, we will present our definition of semantics and pragmatics.

## 1.2 The standard dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics

### 1.2.1 Early definitions of semantics and pragmatics


The threefold classification, pragmatics, semantics and syntactics (or syntax), is not a recent idea.

[It] goes back ultimately to Pierce, but was first clearly drawn and made more generally familiar by Morris (1938). It was taken up by Carnap (1942), ... and it was subsequently reformulated by Morris (1946) within the framework of his behaviouristic theory of signs (Lyons 1977b:114).

Morris (1938) was concerned with outlining the general shape of the study of signs, i.e., semiotics, and distinguished three distinct branches: syntactics—the study of the formal relation of signs to one another; semantics—the study of the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable (their designata); pragmatics—the study of the relation of signs to interpreters. The concept of ‘usage/users of signs’ features in Morris’s definition of pragmatics.

Interjections such as *Oh!*, commands such as *Come here!*, ... expressions such as *Good morning!* and various rhetorical and poetical devices, occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the language (Morris, 1938 (1971:48)).

We can show the distinction between semantics and pragmatics according to Morris (1938)’s definitions in the following diagram:



Later Morris (1946) revised his definitions within 'a behaviourally oriented semiotic' as follows:

Pragmatics is that portion of semiotic which deals with the origin, uses, and effects of signs within the behaviour in which they occur; semantics deals with the signification of signs in all modes of signifying; syntactics deals with combination of signs without regard for their specific signification or their relation to the behaviour in which they occur (Morris, 1946:218-9).

Carnap (1942)'s definitions of pragmatics and semantics are similar to Morris's but there seems to be a shift of emphasis. Although Morris's emphasis is on pragmatics, where the relations between signs and usage are studied, Carnap's emphasis is on a restricted field of semantics, where the relations of expressions to their designata are abstracted away from language users.

If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the user of the language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. ... If we abstract from the user of the language and analyse only the expressions and their designata we are in the field of semantics. And if, finally, we abstract from the designata also and analyse only the relation between expressions, we are in (logical) syntax (Carnap, 1942:9).

Carnap's definition of semantics fits well with semantic theories which are based on Tarski's correspondence theory (Tarski, 1944). According to the theory, a proposition is true if and only if it denotes or refers to a state of affairs which actually exists in the world that the proposition purports to describe. Tarski puts it in his standard example:

(6) 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

We will discuss Tarski further in Chapter 2 (2.2.2).

It is a logical consequence that Carnap's exclusive definition of semantics and Tarski's correspondence theory lead to the idea that semantics is the field where we study the




relations between sentences and states of affairs they purport to describe when they are true, while abstracting away from language users. This is how model-theoretic and truth-conditional semantics is established.

### 1.2.2 Dichotomy proposed by Gazdar (1979)

Gazdar (1979) states clearly the domain of semantics within truth-conditional theory and defines the domain of pragmatics in relation to the domain of truth-conditional semantics.

Pragmatics has as its topic those aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences uttered. Put crudely; PRAGMATICS = MEANING – TRUTH CONDITIONS' (Gazdar, 1979:2)<sup>6</sup>.

This is shown in the following diagram:



This gives a very clear dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics but the divisions of labour are totally uneven. Semanticists analyse only straightforward truth-conditional meanings, leaving to pragmatists all other aspects of meaning, which include deixis, uses of context-sensitive contentives, speech acts, conventional implicature, and conversational implicature. Then a question arises: does the theory which describes only straightforward

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<sup>6</sup>It is interesting to see a parallel between pragmatics and semantics, and semantics and syntax. Just as many semanticists try to idealise away from language users in their semantic domain, many syntacticians try to idealise away from meaning in their syntactic domain. In fact, we have witnessed structuralists' persistent disregard of meaning (cf. Harris (1951)). We can see this structuralists' influence on Chomsky's very early work.

truth-conditional meanings, from which language users and usage are idealised, give a proper picture of meaning? The implication which is made in a very restricted area of meaning might not apply for analysing meaning in a wider range.

However, Gazdar's idea about semantics and pragmatics is shared by many linguists and his dichotomy has in fact become a standard dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics. Semanticists do not hesitate to drive out the concept of 'use of a language' from semantics for the convenience of the theory, in spite of the fact that there is no such thing as 'an unused language'. This is the same spirit Wittgenstein (1958) was actively attacking with the well known slogan 'meaning is use'. Semanticists' indifference to language use might be explained by the tradition of the philosophy of language which is sometimes characterised by 'a disregard for the use of a language' or 'a distrust of the inaccuracies and vacuities of ordinary language'. This stems from Frege and Russell<sup>7</sup>. We will discuss Russell in Chapter 2 (2.2.1)

### 1.2.3 Dichotomy proposed by Levinson (1983)

Levinson (1983) discusses in great detail possible definitions of pragmatics and starts with a Morrisian general definition:

... in one sense there is no problem of definition [of pragmatics] at all: just as, traditionally, syntax is taken to be the study of the combinatorial properties of words and their parts, and semantics to be the study of meaning, so pragmatics is the study of language usage (Levinson, 1983:5).

Levinson does, however, present a more specific and workable definition of pragmatics:

---

<sup>7</sup>There are, of course, other schools of the philosophy of language which are represented by philosophers such as Austin whose ideas are traced to a long established Aristotelian tradition of concern for ordinary language usage at Oxford. See Levinson (1983:227 ff).

(7) Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are grammaticalised, or encoded in the structure of a language (Levinson, 1983:9).

By this definition, Levinson makes it clear that there is a type of meaning about context which is grammaticalised or encoded, which is one of the main points we advance in the present thesis. Levinson defines this type of meaning as pragmatic meaning, while we claim it should be analysed as semantic meaning. Levinson, however, rejects this definition later on the basis that conversational implicatures would lie outside the purview of a pragmatic theory.

Levinson then adopts the following definition whose scope varies considerably according to the kind of semantic theory adopted as he himself admits:

(8) Pragmatics is the study of all those aspects of meaning not captured in a semantic theory (Levinson, 1983:12).

This definition is almost identical to Carnap's (1942) and Gazdar's (1979), although Levinson's emphasis is on the receptiveness of the domain of pragmatics, while Carnap's and Gazdar's definitions emphasise the exclusiveness of the domain of semantics. By this definition Levinson could specify a reasonable pragmatic domain because it depends on what semantic theory he adopts. Levinson presents, as follows, a list of the elements of the communicational content of an utterance, somewhere in which a dividing line between semantics and pragmatics is to be drawn:

- (9)
1. Truth-conditions or entailments
  2. Conventional implicature
  3. Presuppositions
  4. Felicity conditions
  5. Conversational implicature—general
  6. Conversational implicature—particularised
  7. Inferences based on conversational structure
- (Levinson, 1983:14).

He suggests the possibility of including 1–4 above in semantics, leaving 5–7 to pragmatics:

... if the theorist is determined that semantics should deal with all the conventional content of an utterance's significance (however exactly that is to be determined), then semantic theory will deal with aspects 1 and 2, and quite likely 3 and possibly 4 as well (Levinson, 1983:14).

This is very close to our definition of semantics. He then dropped this possibility for the following reason:

The inclusion of presupposition is awkward, however, for if presupposition is conventional, then it is also defeasible or context-dependent, and matters of context are best left for pragmatics (Levinson, 1983:14).

Levinson's intention to leave matters of context for pragmatics might be justified to some degree, but it is doubtful that we could have a coherent theory of pragmatics if we put all the issues concerning the context in the pragmatic domain. Levinson (1983:14) claims that, if semantics includes the aspects of communicational content from 1 to 4 in (9) above, 'such a semantic theory will have to be built on heterogeneous lines to include phenomena with quite different properties.' But is the heterogeneity of the domain of pragmatics any better than the heterogeneity of the domain of semantics?

Finally, Levinson (1983:14-5) comes to the conclusion about the domain of semantics: a semantic theory is truth-conditional. This makes his definition identical to Gazdar's (1979). It is noteworthy that these two linguists with two distinctive linguistic interests—the formal and communicative side of language, agree completely about the domains of semantics and pragmatics.

### **1.3 Problems with the Dichotomy between Semantics and Pragmatics Based on Truth-conditionality**

#### **1.3.1 Problems with semantics**

On the truth-conditional semantic view, semantics concerns those aspects of meaning of a sentence which are independent of a particular user in a particular context, and the concept of semantic content is the link between a sentence and the information about the world which it succeeds in conveying—its propositional content<sup>8</sup>. So, on Gazdar (1979)'s view crudely expressed by the equation,  $\text{PRAGMATICS} = \text{MEANING} - \text{TRUTH CONDITIONS}$ , pragmatics is left with the aspects of meaning of a sentence which (i) varies according to a speaker and a context, and (ii) is not concerned with its propositional content.

One criticism against this view of semantics is that the propositional content of a sentence is not all truth-conditional, as truth-conditional semanticists would like to claim. We are going to demonstrate this point using the word 'even'.

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<sup>8</sup>See Cann (1993) and Kempson (1986).

### 1.3.1.1 Meaning of 'even'

There are some syntactic similarities between the words 'even' and 'only': both can occur in almost any grammatical position, and which position they occur in significantly alters the meaning of the containing sentence. Lycan (1991, 133-134) illustrates this, using the following examples:

- (10) (Even, Only) I hit him in the eye yesterday,  
I (even, only) hit him in the eye yesterday,  
I hit (even, only) him in the eye yesterday,  
I hit him (even, only) in the eye yesterday,  
I hit him in the eye (only, even) yesterday.

In spite of these similarities, the meaning expressed by 'even' cannot be described truth-conditionally in a straightforward sense, while the meaning of 'only' can be: it is a quantifier meaning 'none, except'. For example, the sentence 'I hit only him yesterday' can be paraphrased as 'I hit him and no-one else yesterday'. So what does the word 'even' mean and how should we describe it?

Francescotti (1995) claims it is generally accepted that the word 'even' makes some contribution to the meaning in which it figures. When we say:

- (11) Even Albert passed the exam,

we imply something more than what is implied by:

(12) Albert passed the exam.

Francescotti (1995) says:

The standard view is that whatever contribution 'even' makes, it does not affect the *truth-conditions* of a sentence. It is thought that 'even' makes a difference only in *conventional implicature* in much the same way that 'but' does over and above 'and' (Francescotti, 1995, 153).

The difference in meaning between the sentences in (11) and (12) above is the *unlikeliness* of Albert's passing. This is part of the meaning of the sentence in (11), but it is not a truth-conditional meaning. The meaning of unlikeliness of 'even' is usually analysed in terms of conventional implicature: when Albert's passing is not surprising at all in the above case, the sentence becomes inappropriate, rather than false.

However, it would be better if we could describe the meaning of unlikeliness of 'even' as a semantic meaning, because (i) the meaning does not vary according to a speaker and/or a context and (ii) 'even' is syntactically and semantically related to 'only', which is described in the semantic domain. However, the standard definition of semantics that only truth-conditional meanings are semantic meanings makes this extremely difficult.

Lycan (1991) tries a truth-conditional account of 'even' on the lines that, whereas 'only' is a quantifier meaning "none, except", 'even' is a quantifier meaning "every, including". Lycan claims that a sentence of the form 'Even *A* is *F*' is true just in case (i) there is some contextually determined group *G* that includes *A* and at least one item other than *A*, and (ii) everything in *G*, including *A*, is *F*. According to Lycan's account, 'Even Albert passed the exam' would be translated as:

(13) Everyone in the class passed the exam, and that includes Albert.

However, Francescotti (1995) shows that Lycan's account of 'even' does not work in the following example. Assuming that Granny is much more culinarily reserved than the average person, it would be felicitous to say:

(14) Even Granny tried the chilli.

On Lycan's account, we should paraphrase this sentence as:

(15) Everyone in the group tried the chilli, and that includes Granny.

However, the sentence in (14) would be true even if there were one or two people in the group who did not try the chilli. Therefore, the sentence in (15) is not an accurate paraphrase of the sentence in (14).

According to Francescotti (1995), Lycan (1991) noticed the problem and suggested the following modification: in the sentence 'Even  $A$  is  $F$ ', the word 'even' does not quantify over *all* items in the contextually determined reference-class, but only those that we would *reasonably expect* to be  $F$ . Having quantified over this more restricted class of item, the word 'even' is then used to imply that in addition to these items,  $A$  is also  $F$ . On this modified account, the sentence in (14) would be paraphrased as:

(16) Everyone in the group whom you would reasonably expect to try the chilli did, plus Granny tried the chilli.



However, Lycan's modified account of 'even' is not perfect, either. Berckmans (1993) presents the following counter-example:

(17) Evans kissed Mary even before he knew her name.

On Lycan's modified account, this sentence should be paraphrased as:

(18) All of the personal-relation-establishing events that you would reasonably expect to occur after Evans kissed Mary, happened after Evans kissed Mary, as did his learning her name.

The problem is that the sentence in (17) does not imply that all of these other events happened after Evans kissed Mary. The sentence in (17) would be true and felicitous even if Evans proposed and then kissed her.

Lycan's truth-conditional account of 'even' does not seem to be very promising. However, we should not hasten to give up the hope of analysing the meaning of unlikelihood of 'even' in the semantic domain. Lycan, to some degree, succeeds in specifying the meaning of 'even' truth-conditionally, as a meaning which is independent of a particular speaker and a particular context. We cannot explain this without hypothesising a type of meaning which is shared by both 'even' and other words whose meanings are usually described truth-conditionally. This strongly suggests that we should find a criterion for semantics which is less restricted than truth-conditionality of meaning thereby allowing the non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning to be in the semantic domain. Then we could describe related meanings in the same domain.

By suggesting this, we are not claiming that truth-conditionality of meaning is an unimportant criterion. On the contrary, it is an important one because the way a statement 'The cat is on the mat' goes wrong when the cat referred to is not on the mat is obviously different from the way a statement 'Even Albert passed the exam' goes wrong when Albert's passing the exam is not surprising at all. The former is concerned with a relation between a statement and a type of states of affairs in the world, which has been studied, since Russell, in terms of truth and falsity, while the latter is concerned with a relation between an indication and a type of context, which has been described in terms of appropriateness and inappropriateness, or felicity and infelicity. What we are claiming here is that the difference between these two types of meaning is not so significant that they can be described in the same linguistic domain. In the present thesis we defend the idea that truth-conditionality of meaning is too restricted a criterion for semantic meaning, and in 1.4<sup>9</sup> we will present an alternative criterion which is based on conventionality of meaning.

#### **1.3.1.2 Numerals: 'at least n' or 'exactly n'**

Another criticism on Gazdar's view of semantics and pragmatics is presented by Kempson (1986, 1988). In Gazdar's view, semantics concerns truth-conditional meaning, which is propositional content of a sentence and independent of a particular user in a particular context. However, Kempson (1986:77) claims that truth-theoretic content of the proposition that a sentence expresses is not completely independent of a particular context.

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<sup>9</sup> The tendency to analyse meanings of a wider range than straightforward truth-conditional meanings in the semantic domain is already obvious in recent literature on semantics, such as Kamp & Reyle (1993) and their followers.

One example is in the realm of numerals. According to Kempson (1986:80), numerals have two interpretations; 'at least n' and 'exactly n'. Consider the following examples:

- (19) a. Mark didn't eat three biscuits,  
b. John hasn't got two girlfriends.

It may seem that numerals behave as though they merely have the 'at least' understanding as part of their linguistically specifiable core meaning. However, (20) provides contrary evidence:

- (20) Mark didn't eat three biscuits: he ate four.

To keep the sentence from being a contradiction, only the 'exactly n' interpretation is allowed for the former numeral in (20) above. Kempson claims that truth-conditional content of the sentence changes according to which of the two interpretations is to be taken and it depends on the context.

The fact that sentences which contain a numeral are ambiguous is not an immediate threat to Gazdar's view on the dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics. There are ambiguous sentences, as is shown in the following classic example:

- (21) John went to the bank.

However, if there are too many sentences whose truth-conditional content depends on the context, context-independency does not serve as a good criterion for distinguishing semantics meanings from pragmatic meanings. Kempson posits this is so when she claims

that the problem extends to the whole set of scalar implicatures resulting in more ambiguous sentences than semanticists expected, as is shown by the following sentences (Kempson, 1986:81):

- (22)
- a. Mark didn't eat some of the biscuits: he ate all of them
  - b. She isn't competent at linguistics: she's masterly at the subject
  - c. He didn't sleep until noon: he slept until one
  - d. He isn't patriotic or chauvinistic: he's patriotic and chauvinistic
  - e. I didn't invite John to supper: I invited John, Mary and Susanna
  - f. The house is in a terrible mess. We didn't have Lily in to play today--we had the whole street in (as well as Lily)
  - g. She didn't lose a finger: she lost an arm
  - h. It's no longer a crime to hold left-wing views in Colombia: it's a crime to hold any views whatsoever<sup>10</sup>. (*The Times*)

Kempson (1986) then comes to the conclusion that to determine a truth-conditional content of a sentence, contextual parameters should be taken into consideration. She uses Relevance Theory<sup>11</sup> to explain how the truth-conditional content of a sentence is determined by the interaction between the linguistic meanings of expressions and contextual parameters.

The problem of context-dependency of the propositional content of a sentence demonstrated by Kempson has been known to philosophers for years. Austin showed this point as early as 1962, using the following example:

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<sup>10</sup>Horn (1985) calls 'metalinguistic negation' the kind of negation shown in (20) and (22), and claims that in this type of negation, a speaker is not asserting that some proposition is false, but is rather indicating his unwillingness to assert something in a given way or accept another's assertion of it in that way.

<sup>11</sup>Sperber and Wilson (1986).

(23) France is hexagonal.

Is [23] true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point; of course I can see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain intents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not for a geographer (Austin, 1962:143).

A similar point is made repeatedly by Putnam. Putnam claims that meanings of words, such as 'gold', have changed over the years and also they can be different from one community to another:

Meaning is interactional. The environment itself plays a role in determining what speaker's words or community's words refer to (Putnam, 1988:36).

The above argument strongly implies that sentence meaning is not exhausted by its truth-conditional propositional content which is always unambiguous and context-independent, as Gazdar would like to claim.

### 1.3.2 Problems with pragmatics

According to the dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics proposed by Levinson (1983), pragmatics is left with a large area of meaning to cover. Let us show Levinson (1983:14)'s list of meanings once again:

- (24)
1. Truth-conditions or entailments
  2. Conventional implicature
  3. Presuppositions
  4. Felicity conditions
  5. Conversational implicature--general
  6. Conversational implicature--particularised
  7. Inferences based on conversational structure<sup>12</sup>.

Only truth-conditions/entailments are included in semantics and therefore pragmatics is burdened by the elements from conventional implicature (in 2 above) to inferences based on conversational structure (in 7 above). Seeing these different types of communicative elements included in pragmatics, it is difficult to imagine how we can develop a coherent theory of pragmatics.

To describe conventional implicature, for example, we should analyse the relations between words like 'but' and the speaker's interpretation of the unlikeliness of two states of affairs such as being rich and being unhappy, as is shown in (25) below:

- (25) John is rich but unhappy.

Similarly, to describe the conventional implicature shown in (26), the relation between a word 'Sir' and a speaker's interpretation of the social relation between him and the hearer should be analysed.

- (26) The signboard says, 'no vacancy', Sir.

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<sup>12</sup>As a part of 'inferences based on conversational structure' in 7, meanings which come from discourse structure might be included.

Conversational implicature should be handled in a very different way. Consider the following example:

- (27) A: Do you like this music?  
B: I've never liked atonal music<sup>13</sup>.

To describe the meaning speaker B expresses, which is that he does not like the music speaker A refers to by 'this', we have to analyse the sequence of utterances. The exchange in (27) belongs to a speech event of asking a question, and the answer to the question asked is expected in the second turn. The expectation that speaker B's utterance is some kind of answer to speaker A's question, makes it possible to infer speaker B's meaning, which is 'no'.

Let us make another point about the differences between conventional implicature and conversational implicature. Conversational implicature represents general rules about communication between a speaker and a hearer. Therefore, the violation of these rules does not immediately cause a speaker to provide incorrect information about the world. Neither does the violation of these rules mean that a speaker violates the rules of a language, such as English or Japanese. Let us take one example from Grice's maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975, 1978). The example in (28) shows that a speaker violates the maxim of quantity, which is (i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange: (ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required. The speaker himself admits that he is mentioning the information which

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<sup>13</sup>The example is from Blakemore (1992:126).

is not required for the current purposes in saying, 'for some purposes which are of no interest to you I'm quite sure'. Nonetheless, the speaker does not provide any incorrect information about the world by uttering it. And we can hardly say that the speaker violates the rules of English.

(28) (the hotel reception)

This afternoon I have to visit the town for some purposes which are of no interest to you I'm quite sure. Nevertheless, I require your aid in getting me some sort of transport or some hire vehicle to get me to my first port of call<sup>14</sup>.

The violation of rules which concern conventional implicature, on the other hand, causes a speaker to provide incorrect information about the world. This clearly shows that a speaker does not follow one of the rules of the language, such as English or Japanese. If a speaker says, 'Even Granny tried the chilli' when Granny is very adventurous with food, the speaker violates the rule between using the word 'even' and the meaning it expresses. Because of this violation, the speaker provides incorrect information about Granny. Similarly, if a speaker of Japanese does not use an honorific auxiliary when he is speaking to his boss on a formal occasion, the speaker violates the rule between using/not using the honorific auxiliary and the meaning it expresses. Because of this violation, the speaker provides incorrect information about the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, and the speech situation.

The way the rules of meanings which concern 'even' or the honorific auxiliary are violated is very similar to the way the rules of meanings which concern truth-conditional meanings are violated. If a speaker uses the word 'hexagon' to describe the shape of the building of

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<sup>14</sup>*Fawlty Towers*, BBC.



the Department of Defence in the US, the speaker violates the rule between using the word 'hexagon' and the meaning it expresses. Consequently the speaker provides incorrect information about the world.

Although both conventional implicature and conversational implicature are non-truth-conditional meanings, they seem to be different types of meaning and so different approaches are required. It does not seem very promising to regard both meanings as the same type of meaning and try to develop a theory to explain both meanings in a coherent fashion.

If, as we claim, the pragmatic domain is too heterogeneous, what makes the domain heterogeneous? It seems that the heterogeneity is caused by the inclusion in the domain of all aspects of meaning which concern context. We should distinguish meanings which concern types of context expressed by conventional linguistic devices, from meanings which concern a specific context. We will explain the difference in the following section.

#### **1.3.2.1 Meanings of $CONTEXT_C$ and context-specific meanings**

Consider the following example:

(29) The door is open, Sir.


The propositional content of the above sentence, which is that there is a particular door and it is open, is not all the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence. The speaker expresses that a hearer is socially higher than him, by a vocative, 'Sir'. This might be symbolised as:

(30) HI(H,S),

where HI means ‘socially higher’, S ‘speaker’, and H ‘hearer’. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, meaning of ‘socially higher’ is language-specific/culturally specific.

The speaker, by uttering the sentence in (29), does two types of act at the same time: (i) he refers to a particular door and predicates something of it, and (ii) he indicates that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker. These two types of act are independent of each other. That is, referring to a particular door and predicating something of it does not affect indicating that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, and vice versa. This is to be shown in the following diagram:

(31)



The circle on the left symbolises a speech situation shared by a speaker and a hearer, and the small square on the right symbolises a situation in the world. Uttering a vocative

sentence like the one in (29), a speaker (i) indicates the type of the speech situation she shares with the hearer, and (ii) describes a situation in the world at the same time<sup>15</sup>.

Meanings which concern a speech situation are independent of a particular speaker and a particular context, just as meanings which concern situations in the world, i.e., truth-conditional meanings, are. Whoever utters the sentence in (29) and wherever she utters it, the meaning that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker never changes. We call ‘meaning of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$ ’ the meaning which concerns a speech situation (a context, in a wide sense), which is independent of a particular speaker and a particular context.

Meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  are highly grammaticalised in some languages. The distinction between the second-person pronoun *tu* and *vous* in French and the so-called T/V distinction in other languages<sup>16</sup> are one of those examples.

(32) *Vous êtes le professeur.*

The meaning of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  and the truth-conditional meaning of the sentence in (32) can be expressed in the following diagram:

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<sup>15</sup>We symbolise the attribute by which the speaker refers to an entity using small letters as in ‘door(x)’ and the predication of something of the referent using capitals as in ‘OPEN(x)’. We use Kamp and Reyle (1993)’s idea of showing meanings by symbols and boxes, which we will explain in 4.2.1.

<sup>16</sup>See Brown & Levinson (1978).

Diagram illustrating the relationship between a set and an element:

- On the left, an oval contains the text  $HI(H, S)$ .
- On the right, a rectangle contains the text  $x$ , followed by  $x = H$ , and  $PROFESSEUR(x)$  below it.

(34) Yamada san ga ki mashi ta.  
come past  
'Mr Yamada came'

Diagram illustrating the relationship between a noun phrase and a verb phrase:

- Left side (Noun Phrase): HI (H,S)
- Right side (Verb Phrase):
  - X
  - Yamada(x)
  - COME(x)
- Below the right side: PAST

We will describe Japanese honorifics in full length in Chapter 5.

Meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  shown above make a sharp contrast to the following non-truth-conditional meanings in context-specificity. The meaning of warning to a pedestrian not to step onto a road in (36) comes from the fact a hearer, i.e., the pedestrian, has stepped or is about to step onto the road. The meaning of Student Y's rejection of the proposal of going to the movies in (37) comes from the fact that in the previous turn Student X asked Student Y to go to the movies. To understand these meanings, one has to have knowledge about the specific context in addition to the general knowledge about the language, English in this case.

(36) There's a car coming.

(37) Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight

Student Y: I have to study for an exam (Searle, 1975:61).

The exchange in (37) is an example of so-called indirect speech acts. Searle (1975) explains indirect speech acts as a case where, while performing a speech act, a speaker performs another speech act indirectly. In the example in (37), Student Y rejects the proposal while stating that he has to prepare for an exam.

To analyse these context-specific meanings, we have to describe how a speaker relates a particular element of a context (or discourse) with her assertion about the world and expresses more than what she literally says. This needs a very different approach from analysing meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ , where the conventional relations between words and

types of social relation are described. To regard these meanings as the same type of meaning and analyse them on the same level only causes confusion.

#### **1.4 The dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics based on the conventionality of meaning**

We have distinguished three types of meaning; truth-conditional meanings, meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$ , and context-specific meanings. Traditionally, only truth-conditional meanings are described in the semantic domain and the other two are described in the pragmatic domain. Against this tradition, we have argued that the semantic domain is too exclusive to give a full picture of core sentence meanings, and that the pragmatic domain is too heterogeneous, including conventionalised or even grammaticalised meanings about types of context and meanings about particular context.

We redefine the dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics on the basis of conventionality of meaning. Truth-conditional meanings are conventional meanings: for example, the sentence 'The cat is on the mat', is correlated by conventions to a particular type of situation in the world, where there is a particular cat and it is on a particular mat. Therefore, a speaker cannot utter the sentence to mean that there is a particular dog, instead of a cat, and it is on a particular mat, except as a very private use of the language for himself. The connections between sentences and types of situation in the world are almost undetachable in spite of the fact that they are arbitrarily correlated. A type CAT is arbitrarily correlated to the word 'cat'.

Linguistic conventions are arbitrary rules which connect a meaning to a word. They are like rules of games. There is no a priori reason why the type CAT should be connected to the word 'cat', nor to the word 'gat' or 'cad'. Neither is there any a priori reason why salads should be eaten before the main course in, say, Britain or North America, and not after it, as it is in France<sup>17</sup>. They are just conventions. However, once conventions are made, participants must conform to them. Otherwise, there would be confusion<sup>18</sup>.

The meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  are also conventional meanings. A speaker cannot utter the sentence, 'The door is open, Sir', without meaning the hearer is socially higher than him. Neither can a speaker utter the sentence '*Yamada san ga ki mashi ta* ('Mr Yamada came')', without meaning that the hearer is socially higher than him. The vocative 'Sir' is conventionally correlated to a type of speech situation where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker. So is the honorific auxiliary *mashi* in Japanese.

Although both truth-conditional meanings and meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  are conventional meanings, they are different types of meaning. If there is a discrepancy between the actual situation in the world and a type of situation a speaker assigns to it, the speaker's statement is false: the speaker is blamed for giving a wrong picture for the actual state of affairs in the world. If, on the other hand, there is a discrepancy between the actual speech situation and a type of speech situation a speaker assigns to it, the speaker's indication is inappropriate or infelicitous and the speaker is blamed for doing something which endangers communication between him and the hearer.

Unlike truth-conditional meanings and meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ , context-specific meanings are not conventional meanings. A speaker can utter the sentence, 'There's a car coming',


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<sup>17</sup>Scollon & Scollon (1995).

<sup>18</sup>See Lewis (1969).

without expressing a warning to a pedestrian not to step onto a road. Similarly a speaker can utter the sentence, 'I have to study for an exam', without expressing a rejection.

Our redefined dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics is shown in the following diagram:



We analyse truth-conditional meanings, conventional implicature, presuppositions and felicity conditions in the semantic domain, and analyse conversational implicature in the pragmatic domain.

Our goal of describing semantic meaning is to describe linguistic conventions by which language users asserts something about the world and indicates something about a speech situation. In other words, we describe how language users communicate with each other about the world and a speech situation using conventional linguistic devices. In this way we can incorporate language use in the semantic theory, which Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1962) try to promote.

In the rest of the thesis, we will develop a theory of semantic meaning. In Chapter 2, we will review traditional concepts of referring and predicating and the debates about them. In Chapter 3, we will discuss how we incorporate truth-conditional meanings into the theory of conventional meanings as meanings which concern types of situation in the world. We



use Austin's concepts of demonstrative and descriptive conventions. In Chapter 4, we will develop the part of the theory which concerns meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  and describe these meanings in the theoretical framework. In Chapter 5, we will analyse Japanese honorifics as an example of grammaticalised meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ . Chapter 6 follows as a general conclusion of the thesis.

## Chapter 2

# Philosophical and Linguistic Issues about Referring and Predicating

### 2.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter we proposed to extend the domain of semantics. In the extended domain of semantics we describe conventional meaning, which includes truth-conditional meaning and non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning. To develop a coherent semantic theory, we have to find a way to describe both types of meaning in a consistent manner. One problem is that truth-conditional meanings are traditionally described dyadically between sentences and states of affairs in the world, and the dyadic approach to meanings does not work for non-truth-conditional context-independent meanings, which concern types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. We will defend the idea that these two types of conventional meaning can be described as what a speaker expresses in ‘pointing to’ something and giving a particular type to it: truth-conditional meaning is what a speaker expresses in ‘pointing to’ a person, thing, or situation and giving a type to it, while non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning is what a speaker expresses in ‘pointing to’ the present speech situation which he shares with the hearer and giving a type to it. ‘Pointing’ and giving a type are made possible by two types of linguistic convention, which Austin (1950) calls *demonstrative* and *descriptive conventions*: the demonstrative conventions correlate words with a person, thing, (historic) situation and the present speech situation, and the descriptive conventions correlate words with types of person, thing, (historic) situation and speech situation. To describe semantic meaning is to describe these linguistic conventions by which a speaker

asserts something about the world (truth-conditional meaning) and indicates something about the speech situation (non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning).

In the present chapter and the following chapter, we will develop a theoretical framework in which we describe truth-conditional meaning as a meaning which a speaker expresses by conventional linguistic devices. In the present chapter, we will discuss theoretical issues. We will show what aspect of meaning Russell and Tarski explicate by describing meaning dyadically between sentences and states of affairs in the world (2.2), and what aspect of meaning Austin and Strawson emphasise by describing meaning triadically in terms of language users, sentences and the world (2.3). In 2.2.1.1 we will present the debates between Russell and Strawson as a conflict between the dyadic and the triadic approach to meaning. In 2.3.2, by introducing Austin (1950), on which our theory is based, we will show that truth-conditional meaning can be described as a meaning which a speaker refers to a person, thing or situation by means of the demonstrative conventions, and describes it by giving it a type by means of the descriptive conventions. Following Austin (1953), we will also show that, if we define meaning as a linguistic act which a speaker performs about the world by means of these linguistic conventions, we can describe sentence meaning in a wider scope than that of truth-conditional meaning (2.3.3). According to Austin (1953), a speaker can potentially perform four types of speech act by uttering a sentence 'X is a Y'. This gives a reasonable explanation to linguistic factors which concern *genericity* and *attributive* and *referential* uses of definite descriptions. We will develop this point in chapter 3 (3.3). In 2.4, we will introduce linguists which take an approach which is in between the dyadic and the triadic approach.

## 2.2 Dyadic Approach to Sentence Meaning

### 2.2.1 Russell's view of sentence meaning

Russell analyses meaning as a relation between sentences and facts. Russell (1959:151) says:

I think one must say that there are *facts* and 'truth' consists in one sort of relation to facts while 'falsehood' consists in another sort of relation.

According to the Russellian view, sentences express propositions (since Russell did not distinguish propositions from propositional contents) and there are two types of relation between propositions and facts: truth and falsehood. In this view, true propositions are made true by the facts. In fact, Russell did not distinguish true propositions from facts: they are one and the same thing for him. For example, the proposition of the sentence, 'John is a bachelor', is correlated with a type of state of affairs, i.e., there is a person, John, and the person satisfies, 'x is a bachelor'. This type of state of affairs is regarded as a true fact when the sentence is true.

Although Russell, using the term 'true/truth', succeeds in explaining propositions of sentences as a relation between sentences and (types of) states of affairs, he cannot explain false propositions. According to Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Russell was convinced that true propositions are made true by the facts, but, since there were no such things as 'false facts' to make false propositions false, he found it hard to give an account of false propositions. This is an important problem of Russell's theory. We attribute this problem to Russell's exclusion of sentences as a token, i.e., utterances from his theory.

Russell analysed only sentences as types. To analyse a meaning of the sentence 'John is a bachelor' as a type is describe its difference from other sentences. The meaning of the sentence (as a type), 'John is a bachelor', is different from that of the sentence, 'Peter is a bachelor', in that the individual referred to is a bearer of the name 'John' and not the name 'Peter'. The meaning of the sentence 'John is a bachelor', is different from that of 'John is married' in that the individual is in the state of being unmarried.

Because Russell excludes sentences as a token, i.e., utterances, he cannot talk about a particular person or situation. The problem is that the concepts of truth and falsity essentially concern relations between a particular person or situation and a type (which is correlated with a word or a sentence) a speaker assigns to it. A statement is true if a particular person or situation is of the type which a speaker assigns to him/it, and if not, false. For example, by uttering the sentence, 'John is a bachelor', I assign a type, BACHELOR, to a particular person who is John. If this person is in fact of the type BACHELOR, my assertion is true. And if the person has a wife, my assertion is false.

Russell, however, does not use 'true/truth' and 'false/falsity' in a standard way: he uses 'truth' for the relation between sentences (as a type) and types of situation. This use of the word 'truth' is itself problematic, and as a result, causes unnecessary confusion among philosophers and linguists. In fact, a series of debates between Russell and Strawson (Russell (1905), Strawson (1950), and Russell (1957)), which we will discuss in the following section, was caused by Russell's use of the term 'truth' for sentences as a type. Ordinary-language philosophers were totally against the use of the term 'true' in this sense.

It is a fashionable mistake to take as primary '(The sentence) "S" is true (in the English language)'. Here the addition of the words 'in the English language' serves to emphasise that 'sentence' is not being used as equivalent to 'statement', so that it precisely is not what can be true or false (Austin, 1950:121).

The more serious problem for using the concepts of truth and falsity for the relation between sentences and types (of states of affairs) is that false propositions cannot be explained. In fact there is no such thing as false propositions in the sense Russell uses the term 'false propositions'. According to Russell, a sentence (as a type) is correlated with a type of state of affairs. The sentence (as a type), 'John is a bachelor' is correlated with a type of state of affairs where there is a person who is the bearer of the name 'John', and this person is of a type BACHELOR. The sentence (as a type), 'John is a bachelor', is not correlated with any other types of states of affairs which make the sentence false. Sentences (as a type) can be true in the special sense Russell uses the term 'true' but cannot be false. Only when a sentence (as a token) is uttered to make a statement about a particular person or situation, and the person or situation is not of the type correlated with the sentence, the sentence (as a token), more accurately, the statement, can be false. To explain falsity, a particular entity or situation, as well as a type of entity or situation, should be hypothesised. Since Russell excludes language use and sentences as a token from his theory of meaning, he cannot explain falsity.

In the following section, we will introduce the debates between Russell and Strawson. These debates show that Russell, a philosopher of the dyadic approach to meaning, and Strawson, a philosopher of the triadic approach to meaning, describe different aspects of meaning using the term 'sentence', 'true', and 'false' in their own sense.

### 2.2.1.1 Debates between Russell and Strawson

According to Russell (1905), every proposition expressed by a sentence whose subject refers to a non-existent object is false. Therefore, the following sentence is false:

- (1) The present king of France is bald.

Russell regards propositions of this type as false because, otherwise, the difficulties which are bound to occur seem unavoidable. According to Meinong (1904), any grammatically correct denoting phrases stand for an *object*. Thus, Russell says:

'The present King of France', 'the round square', etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not *subsist*, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult view (Russell, 1905:303).

However, Russell's main objection is:

... such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also not round; etc. But this is intolerable (Russell, 1905:303).

Therefore, Russell claims definite expressions such as 'the present king of France' in (1) above are not the logical subjects of the sentences. Only 'logically proper names' can occur as subjects of sentences which are genuinely of the subject-predicate form. Therefore, although grammatically the sentence in (1) has a singular subject and a predicate, it is not logically a subject-predicate sentence at all. The proposition it expresses is a complex kind of *existential* proposition, part of which might be described as a 'uniquely existential' proposition. The sentence in (1) expresses the following three propositions:

- (2) a. There is a king of France,
- b. There is not more than one king of France,
- c. There is nothing which is king of France and is not bald.

Therefore, the sentence is false: since the conjunction of three propositions, of which one is false, is itself false, the assertion as a whole would be false.

Strawson (1950) criticises Russell (1905) arguing that Russell is forced to say that definite expressions are not logical subjects of subject-predicate sentences because Russell does not distinguish sentences/expressions from uses of them. Strawson's argument is as follows. The sentence in (3) can be uttered by different people in different times, such as at the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV:

- (3) The king of France is wise.

In each *occasion of the use* of this sentence, an assertion/proposition is either true or false. But we cannot talk of *the sentences* being true or false. Similarly, although we can say that one *uses* the expression, 'the king of France' to *mention*, or refer to, a particular person in the course of using the sentence in order to talk about that person, the *expression* cannot be said to mention, or refer to, anything. That is, unless we know who the speaker refers to in using the expression, we don't know whether the sentence is true or false. Therefore, the sentences like the one in (3) are truth-valueless, if considered out of any context of utterance.



Strawson (1950:321) claims that the truth-valuelessness of the sentence in (3) is an intuitively correct interpretation. When someone utters the sentence in (3) and asks if the statement he has just made is true or false, one would most probably say that it is neither true nor false; the question of whether the statement is true or false simply doesn't arise, because there is now no such person as the king of France. Strawson (1950:321) then concludes that to say 'The king of France is wise' is to presuppose<sup>1</sup> that there is a king of France. According to Strawson, in response to the statement, we say, 'There is no king of France': we certainly should not say we were contradicting the statement that the king of France is wise. We are, rather, giving a reason for saying that the question of whether it's true or false simply doesn't arise.

Russell (1957)'s response is as follows. There are two separate issues about the definite expressions like 'the king of France': one is the issue of description and the other is the issue of egocentricity, i.e., which entity is referred to by the expression like 'the king of France' depends on time and place when/where a sentence is uttered. Strawson (1950) thinks they are one and the same issue. However, the issue raised in Russell (1905) is the issue of description, not that of egocentricity, and therefore the problem about description still remains. The use of a descriptive phrase where egocentricity is wholly absent, which is shown in (4), still causes one and the same problem which is described by the definite expression, 'the present king of France' in Russell (1905).

(4) The square-root of minus one is half the square-root of minus four.

The debates between Russell and Strawson did not reach a clear conclusion because they used the word 'sentence' in different senses and described different aspects of meaning.

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<sup>1</sup> Strawson did not use the term 'presuppose' until Strawson (1952). However, since 'presuppose' is a generally accepted term, we use the term henceforth.

This difference is in fact shown in the titles of their papers. The title of Russell (1905) is 'On denoting' and that of Strawson (1950) is 'On referring'. The issue Russell (1905) raises is that there is a case where the subject of a sentence (as a type) with a subject-predicate form fails to *denote* an entity because there isn't such an entity. However, since the sentence has a subject-predicate form, one has no choice but to say that there is a corresponding fact which makes the sentence true. The corresponding state of affairs, i.e. a fact, is that there is an entity which does not exist, and it is of a certain type. This is intolerable. To avoid this, one has to say either (i) such sentences are *meaningless* because there are not corresponding facts which make the sentences true, or (ii), as Russell (1905) claims, such sentences are false because they express a complex kind of *existential* proposition a part of which is false. Logical positivists took the option in (i). The central tenet of logical positivism was that 'unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be *verified* (i.e. tested for its truth or falsity), it was strictly speaking *meaningless*' (Levinson, 1983:227).

To Strawson, who takes a triadic approach to meaning, the problem Russell faces is not a problem. To Strawson, only a sentence as a token which is uttered, i.e., a statement, can be true or false, and a sentence as a type can never be true or false. When a speaker utters a sentence as a token, *referring* to a particular person by a certain expression and predicating something of him, the statement the speaker makes by uttering the sentence is true if the person the speaker *refers* to is of the type the speaker claims him to be. Some of the statements made by uttering a sentence as a token are true and others are false. If the speaker *refers* to someone who does not exist by uttering a sentence (as a token), the statement he makes is neither true nor false. Since the truth and falsity of a statement depends on whether the entity *referred* to is of the type which a speaker claims it to be, the issues of truth and falsity simply do not occur if a speaker fails to *refer* to a person. So

Strawson concludes that the sentence (as a type) like 'The present king of France is bald' presupposes that there is a king of France, and therefore, if there isn't a king of France, the sentence (as a token) is truth-valueless.

Strawson (1950) gives an account for what Russell (1957) calls the issue of egocentricity. The sentence (as a type) 'The king of France is wise' represents a type of state of affairs where there is a king of France (which is presupposed) and he is of a type WISE. Uttering the sentence (as a token), people make different assertions at different times in history, and some of them are true and others are false. When a sentence (as a token) is uttered when there is no king of France, a sentence (as a token) is neither true nor false. This account is, however, not very different from Russell (1905). Russell uses terms 'true' and 'false' as a technical term to explain a relation between a sentence (as a type) and a state of affairs, which is generally accepted now. While Strawson says that 'The king of France is bald' represents a type of state of affairs where there is a king of France (which is presupposed) and he is of a type BALD, Russell (1905) says 'The king of France is bald' expresses a complex kind of *existential* proposition, where (i) there is a king of France, (ii) there is not more than one king of France, and (iii) there is nothing which is king of France and is not bald.

Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950) emphasise different aspects of meaning. For Russell, who was engaged in describing true and false propositions throughout his life, the sentence 'The king of France is bald' (when there isn't a king of France) is false because there isn't a state of affairs which makes the sentence true. For Strawson, who was engaged in describing how language users use a sentence to express a meaning, the sentence, 'The king of France is wise' (when there isn't a king of France) is neither true

nor false. A speaker fails to refer to a person and, therefore, the speaker cannot go far enough to make a true or false assertion about the referent.

To emphasise the issue of the *description*, Russell (1957) presents sentences (as a type) in which referring to an entity by the expression is impossible in any time in history and in any place in the world. It is not possible for a speaker to refer to an entity by 'the square root of minus one' because there is no such thing, and, therefore, the statements made by uttering tokens of the sentence cannot be true. Strawson can still say that statements made by uttering sentences like the one in (4) are neither true nor false: if a speaker fails to refer to an entity, the speaker cannot go far enough to make a true or false assertion of the referent.

Russell tried to describe true and false propositions rigidly by using a relation between sentences and (types of) states of affairs, where he uses the terms of 'truth' and 'false' as a technical term:

Everybody admits that physics and chemistry and medicine each require a language which is not that of every day life. I fail to see why philosophy, alone, should be forbidden to make a similar approach towards precision and accuracy (Russell, 1957: 336).

Russell managed to describe meanings of sentences abstracting away from language users and each case of language use. Strawson thought that a relation between the proposition a sentence expresses and a particular type of state of affairs must be based on the pre-theoretic judgment of truth or falsity. However, it was not the case with Russell.

Mr Strawson gives the name 'S' to the sentence 'The King of France is wise', and he says to me 'The way in which he arrived at the analysis was clearly asking himself what would be the circumstances in which we would say that anyone who uttered the sentence S had made a true assertion'. This does not seem to me a correct account of what I was doing. Suppose (which God forbid) Mr. Strawson were so rash as to accuse his char-lady of thieving: she would reply indignantly, "I ain't never done no harm to no one". ... I was

concerned to find a more accurate and analysed thought to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which most people at most times have in their heads (1957: 336-337).

Russell (1957) claims that, if we analyse meaning in a triadic relation among a speaker and a hearer, sentences, and states of affairs in the world, we cannot analyse meaning accurately. I am not convinced by that. Meanings develop through use. Meanings are determined by the use in communication. As Wittgenstein (1958) says, 'meaning is use'. If we exclude language use from the theory of meaning, we cannot get a real picture of meaning. We have to find a way to describe meanings in a triadic relation without compromising accuracy.

### 2.2.2 Tarski's concept of truth

Like Russell, Tarski believes that a rigid language is necessary to define and describe issues such as truth. Tarski (1944:585) says:

*The problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a rigorous way only for those languages whose structure has been exactly specified<sup>2</sup>. For other languages—thus, for all natural, 'spoken' languages—the meaning of the problem is more or less vague, and its solution can have only an approximate character.*

Therefore, Tarski (1944) defines truth in the following way:

(T) X is true if, and only if, *p*.

We shall call any such equivalence (with '*p*' replaced by any sentence of the language to which the word 'true' refers, and 'X' replaced by a name of this sentence) an '*equivalence of the form (T)*'. ... It should be emphasised that neither the expression (T) itself (which is not a sentence, but only a schema of a sentence) nor any particular instance of the form (T) can be regarded as a definition of truth (Tarski, 1944:582).

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<sup>2</sup>Italicised by Tarski (1944).

A very precise conception of truth is embodied in (T), which is the so-called correspondence theory. According to the theory, X is true if and only if it denotes or refers to a state of affairs, *p*, which actually obtains. Consider Tarski's standard example:

(5) 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

The phrase 'Snow is white' on the left side of this equivalence in quotation marks belongs to an object language and the one on the right without quotation marks belongs to meta-language. The sentence of an object language 'Snow is white' is true if and only if 'snow' designates snow and snow satisfies the sentential function, 'x is white'.

In Tarski's theoretical framework, falsity, with which Russell struggled, does not cause any problem. The sentence, 'Snow is white' is false when 'snow' designates snow but it does not satisfy the sentential function, 'x is white'. For example, if 'snow' designates snow and it satisfies the function, 'x is pink', not 'x is white', then the sentence 'Snow is white' is false.

A true proposition is correspondence with reality and that a false proposition is not. ... the truth of a proposition depends upon the existence or reality of something outside the language or system in which the proposition is formulated (Lyons, 1977b:168).

Because Tarski hypothesises 'the existence or reality of something outside the language or system', truth and falsity are defined successfully in terms of sentences and the reality.

Tarski's theory has a problem of regress, because he uses the term 'object language' and 'meta-language' in a relative sense.

It should be noticed that these terms 'object-language' and 'meta-language' have only a relative sense. If, for instance, we become interested in the notion of truth applying to sentences, not of our original object-

language, but of its meta-language, the latter becomes automatically the object-language of our discussion: and in order to define truth for this language, we have to go to a new meta-language---so to speak, to a meta-language of a higher level. In this way, we arrive at a whole hierarchy of languages (Tarski, 1944:597-588).

Although Tarski does not think that a hierarchy of languages is a problem, it is a problem. A formula such as, 'X (in L1) is true if and only if X' (in L2)', and 'X' (in L2) is true if and only if X'' (in L3)', and 'X'' (in L3) is true if and only if X'''(in L4)', does not explain the nature of X unless the relations between an object language and a meta-language (such as L1 and L2) and between meta-languages (such as L2 and L3) are clearly specified. This problem was solved by Tarski's followers such as Montague.

Before we close this section, Montague's theory should be mentioned. In Montague (1970)'s, what we call sentences as types is clearly distinguished from what we call sentences as tokens. In Montague:

... logical relations hold not only between what W. V. Quine is accustomed to call 'eternal sentence'<sup>3</sup>, i.e. sentences the meaning of whose utterance does not depend, in general, upon the context and cotext in which they were uttered ..., but also between certain sentences that are context-dependent (indexical) (Bar-Hillel, 1970: 211).

For example, the meaning of the sentence (as a type) 'Alice is thirsty' is defined as a type of state of affairs where there is an entity who is the bearer of the name 'Alice', and the entity satisfies the function 'x is thirsty'. This meaning of the sentence (as a type) is context-independent. The sentence (as a token), 'Alice is thirsty', on the other hand, can be uttered by different speakers to refer to different individuals at different times and places. The sentence (as a token), 'Alice is thirsty' is true when an entity referred to by 'Alice' satisfies 'x is thirsty'. For example, when my friend, Alice, who is a regular runner, goes out for a run and comes back, the sentence (as a token) where Alice is

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<sup>3</sup> See, e.g. Quine (1960: 193f).



referred to by 'Alice', is true, because she is thirsty. At another time, the sentence (as a type) is false: when Alice and I are having a drink at home, the sentence (as a token), 'Alice is thirsty' is false, because she is not thirsty.

Montague does not exclude a speaker and a hearer from his theory. As the concept of 'index' shows, Montague hypothesises that sentences are uttered at a specific time and place, where a particular individual is referred to and something of her/him/it is predicated. As we explained above, to hypothesise a sentence (as a token), i.e., an utterance, whose meaning is context-dependent, one has to hypothesise that a speaker utters it to a hearer: it is because a sentence (as a token), i.e., an utterance, does not come into existence without someone who utters it. It is only sentences as a type which do not have to be uttered.

In formal semantics which adopts the correspondence theory of truth, 'propositional contents' are clearly distinguished from 'propositions'<sup>4</sup>: a sentence (as a type) expresses a type of state of affairs, which is a propositional content; a sentence (as a token) expresses a particular state of affairs, where a particular person is referred to and something of him is predicated, which is a proposition. In our triadic approach, we say that a sentence (as a type) expresses a type of state of affairs (a propositional content) and a speaker utters a sentence (as a type) to a hearer, referring to a particular person and describing something of him: the speaker expresses a proposition.

## **2.3 Triadic Approach to Sentence Meaning**

In the preceding section, we suggested that we can analyse truth-conditional meanings triadically hypothesising a speaker and a hearer, without conflicting too much with the

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<sup>4</sup> See Cann (1993: 14, 19).



framework of truth-conditional theories. However, there is a crucial difference between the proponents of the dyadic approach to meaning and those of the triadic approach to meaning. Truth-conditional semanticists believe that a sentence meaning is exhausted by its truth-conditions, while the proponents of the triadic approach to meaning believe that truth-conditional meaning is not the only type of meaning which can be expressed by a sentence. In the following section, we explain Austin's speech act theory (2.3.1) and Austin's model of meaning (2.3.2 and 2.3.3).

### 2.3.1 Austin's Speech Act Theory

Austin (1962) first introduces performative sentences as a special type of sentence which cannot be true or false in a straightforward sense. This type of sentence makes a contrast to constative sentences which are true or false. Austin (1962) later abolishes the distinction between performatives and constatives, because a speaker performs a speech act in uttering a constative sentence as well as uttering a performative sentence. This is a very crucial step in Speech Act Theory. The speaker promises something by uttering the sentence in (6):

(6) I promise to be there by 6 o'clock.

The speaker makes an assertion about the weather in Tokyo by uttering the sentence in (7):

(7) It is hot in Tokyo.

In both cases, the speaker does things by saying something. Austin (1962) describes both types of meaning as illocutionary acts. Austin (1962) does not show how 'performative'

sentences are different from 'constative' sentences in his extended idea of speech acts, i.e., illocutionary acts. However, considering Austin (1950) and Austin (1953), which we will show in the following sections (2.3.2 and 2.3.3), we can explain the difference in terms of referring and describing. When a speaker utters a 'performative' sentence, the speaker refers to the act which is brought out by the very act of referring and describing it. When a speaker utters a 'constative' sentence, on the other hand, a speaker refers to a thing in the world and describes it, where referring/describing does not affect how the thing is in the world. If we interpret 'constative' and 'performative' sentences in this way, Austin's model of illocutionary acts can be incorporated into the models of philosophers and logicians where meanings are described in terms of referring and predicating. Austin (1962) shows that just as an entity in the world is referred to and predicated, so can the action a speaker is doing to a hearer in the speech situation be 'referred to' and described. We will develop this idea in Chapter 4 (4.4.1).

It is generally accepted that Searle (1969) developed Austin (1962)'s Speech Act Theory. We, however, claim that Searle (1969) misrepresents Austin (1962)'s theory. Austin's theory was driven by the conviction that language users use a language to express different types of meaning, not only truth-conditional meanings. To describe these different types of meaning, Austin needs a concept of 'acts': by using it, Austin (1962) shows that language users use language to express different types of meaning. Owing to the concept of acts, meaning is successfully described triadically: the fact that a speaker communicates with a hearer using a language is successfully described in the model where a speaker performs a speech act to a hearer about the world by using a language (by uttering a sentence). In this framework, to analyse meaning is to describe linguistic conventions by which a speaker performs different types of speech act to a hearer about the world.

However, in Searle (1969), a speaker and a hearer are not emphasised as much as they should be, and therefore meaning is not described triadically. Searle (1969) focuses on describing sentence meaning by classifying sentences according to the types of speech act a speaker can perform by uttering them. Therefore, Searle essentially describes the relation between sentences and potential speech acts which can be performed by uttering the sentences, i.e., illocutionary forces, abstracting away from a speaker who performs a speech act and a hearer to whom a speech act is performed. This is why Searle (1969)'s Speech Act Theory does not serve to explain how a speaker communicates with a hearer by using a language. In this way, Searle (1969) misrepresents Austin (1962)'s Speech Act Theory. We will come back to this point in 4.4.2.

### 2.3.2 Austin's demonstrative and descriptive conventions

Austin (1950) presents a general model of meaning and communication. According to the model, two sets of conventions, together with *a stock of symbols* and *the world*, comprise communication.

If there is to be communication of the sort that we achieve by language at all, there must be a stock of symbols of some kind which a communicator ('the speaker') can produce 'at will' and which a communicatee ('the audience') can observe: these may be called 'words' ... There must also be something other than the words, which the words are to be used to communicate about: this may be called the 'world'. ... And finally there must be two sets of conventions:

*Descriptive* conventions correlating the words (= sentences) with the *types* of situation, thing, event, &c., to be found in the world.

*Demonstrative* conventions correlating the words (= statements) with the *historic* situations, &c., to be found in the world (Austin, 1950: 121-2).

Let us explain the two types of conventions, and *types* of situation and *historic* situations correlated by the two types of convention. The distinction between 'the words (= sentences) which are correlated by descriptive conventions with types of situation, thing,

event, &c.', and 'the words (= statements) which are correlated by demonstrative conventions with the historic situations, & c.', is like the distinction between sentences as types and sentences as tokens. The aspect of the meanings of sentences correlated by descriptive conventions express *types* of situation. For example, 'the cat is on the mat' expresses a type of situation where there is a cat and it is on the mat, where it matters how this type of situation differs from other types of situation, such as 'the dog is on the mat', 'the cat is under the mat' or 'the cat isn't on the mat', and so on. Since it is a *type* that this aspect of the meaning of the sentence relates to, questions such as 'Which cat do you mean?', and 'Where is the mat?' are not relevant to this aspect of meaning.

We use sentences to make a specific claim about the world. Owing to the demonstrative conventions, we can talk about a specific situation, thing, event, and so on, by uttering the sentence. In this case we talk about not a *type* of situation but a specific, actual situation which is at a particular time and place; a *historic* situation. I have used the sentence, 'the cat is on the mat', many times in my life to make different statements. Often I utter it in referring to my landlady's cat, Silver, and state that the cat is on the mat, which happens to be a green and blue Persian mat my landlady bought at the flea market. By uttering the sentence, 'the cat is on the mat', I refer to a *historic* situation at a particular time and place where Silver is (owing to demonstrative conventions) and state/assert that it is of the *type* of situation which is correlated (by descriptive conventions) with the sentence, 'the cat is on the mat'.

Austin (1950) admits that some words can be used for both a particular entity or situation and a type of entity or situation:

The trouble is that sentences contain words or verbal devices to serve both descriptive and demonstrative purposes (not to mention other purposes), often both at once (Austin, 1950: 122n).

For example, the word 'dog' is correlated with a type of entity which is canine but it is also used for a particular entity which is of the type. The word 'she' is correlated with a particular third-person which has been introduced or is salient in the speech situation, and a type of feminine is also attached to it. It seems that most words are either dominantly correlated with a particular entity (or situation) and, to a much lessor degree, correlated with a type of entity (or situation), or dominantly correlated with a type of entity (or situation), and, to a much lessor degree, correlated with a particular entity (or situation).

According to Austin (1950: 122):

... a statement is said to be true when the historic situation which is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions.

In the above example, my statement, 'the cat is on the mat' is true when the historic situation (where Silver is) which is correlated (referred to) by the demonstrative conventions is of a type with which the sentence 'the cat is on the mat' is correlated by the descriptive conventions.

This is a new interpretation of 'true/truth'. 'Truth' is not a relation between a sentence (as a type) and a state of affairs as Russell claimed, but a relation between a sentence which represents a type of state of affairs and an actual state of affairs in the historic situation a speaker describes. The statement is true if an actual state of affairs in the historic situation which (correlated by demonstrative conventions) a speaker refers to is of the type (of situation) which is correlated by descriptive conventions. As Austin (1950) points out, we



fail to see the difference between an actual state of affairs in the historic situation a speaker describes by uttering the sentence, and the type of state of affairs the sentence stands for, especially when the actual state of affairs in the historic situation is of the type the sentence stands for. However, the fact that I have a pain in my stomach can never be the same as saying 'I have (Etsuko has) a pain in my(/her) stomach', even though the actual state of affairs is of the type the sentence stands for. Uttering a sentence, a speaker refers to a historic situation and states/asserts to a hearer that an actual state of affairs in the historic situation is of the type which the sentence stands for.

Because we are interested in aspects of meaning that involve referring to factors of the speech situation, we will adopt Austin's theory of meaning in this thesis.

### 2.3.3 Austin's model of communication in Speech-situation $S_o$

In this section, we will introduce Austin (1953). Austin claims that even uttering a sentence as simple as 'X is Y', a speaker can potentially perform four types of speech acts. To explain basic speech acts Austin (1953) hypothesises what he calls 'Speech-situation  $S_o$ ': a simplified model of a situation in which we use a language for talking about the world. In  $S_o$ , the world consists of numerous individual items and each is of one definite type. Imagine the world consisting of numerous colour patches of the same pure red, the same pure blue or the same pure yellow, each of which has a number applied to it. Or imagine the world consisting of numerous pieces of paper in the shape of the same triangle, the same oval or the same rhombus, each of which has a number applied to it. The language in  $S_o$  permits only sentences of one form S:

(8) I is a T,

where 'I' stands for an item and 'T' stands for a type. The language contains an indefinite number of words inserted in the place of the 'I' or the 'T' in form S. Each of these words is either an I-word or a T-word in the language. For example, the following sentence is a grammatical sentence in the language:

(9) 1227 is a rhombus.

There are also two sets of semantic conventions. One is an I-convention, or a convention of reference, which fixes the item to which an I-word is to refer. The other is a T-convention, or a convention of sense, which correlates a T-word with the item-type<sup>5</sup>.

We may inaugurate T-conventions by one or other of two procedures of linguistic legislation: name-giving and sense-giving. Name-giving consists in allotting a certain word to a certain item-type as its 'name'<sup>6</sup>. Sense-giving consists in allotting a certain item-type to a certain word as its 'sense'. For example, we might give a word 'dog' to an item-type which is a canine as its 'name'. This is name-giving because the name 'dog' is given to the item-type. We might give an item-type, 'an animal of canine type', to the word 'dog' as its sense. This is sense-giving because the sense, 'an animal of the canine type', is given to the word<sup>7</sup>.

When either procedure has been gone through, a specific type is attached by convention to a certain word, i.e., a T-word, and its 'name' as the 'sense' of that word. Then a

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<sup>5</sup> I-conventions are simplified demonstrative conventions and T-conventions are simplified descriptive conventions (Austin, 1950).

<sup>6</sup> The usage of *name* in Austin (1953) is not the standard usage of the word. We more often use the word to mean a proper name. It is a little confusing to use *name* or *name-giving* in Austin's sense. We, however, use the word in Austin (1953)'s original sense to explain his model of communication.

<sup>7</sup> These examples are not original examples from Austin (1953).



satisfactory utterance (assertive) on any particular occasion will be one where the item referred to by the I-word (in accordance with the I-conventions) is of the type which matches the sense which is attached to the T-word (by the T-conventions).

Austin (1953) distinguishes four different speech acts, which are performed by the whole utterance of an assertion in the Speech-situation  $S_O$ : *placing* (*c-identifying* or *cap-fitting*), *stating*, *casting* (*b-identifying* or *bill-filling*), and *instancing*. How does this complexity arise? There is first a difference in direction of fit between fitting a name to an item and fitting an item to a name. The differences of fit here are as different as fitting a nut with a bolt and fitting a bolt with a nut. We may be given an item, and purport to produce a name with a sense which matches the type. Conversely, we may be given a name and purport to produce an item of a type which matches the sense of that name. There is also another distinction to be drawn. We fit the name to the item or the item to the name on the grounds that the type of the item and the sense of the name match. But in matching X and Y, there is a distinction between matching X to Y and matching Y to X. Austin calls this the difference in the onus of match.

These two distinctions generate four different performances in uttering the sentence, '1227 is a rhombus'. To explain first the choice of terms, we use the useful word *identify* in two opposite ways. We may speak of 'identifying it (as a daphnia)' when you hand something to me and ask me if I can identify it. We also speak of 'identifying a daphnia (or the 'identifying the daphnia') when you hand me a slide and ask me if I can identify a daphnia (or the daphnia) in it. In the first case we are finding a cap to fit a given object: hence the name 'cap-fitting' or 'c-identifying'. In other words, we are trying to 'place' it. But in the second case we are trying to find an object to fill a given bill: hence the name 'b-




identifying' or 'bill-filling'. In other words, we 'cast' this thing as the daphnia. We will explain the terms 'stating' and 'instancing' in the following.

*Placing* and *stating* have the same direction of fit, i.e., fitting names to given items. Also *instancing* and *casting* have the same direction of fit, i.e., fitting items to given names. *Placing* and *instancing* have the same onus of match: the type of the item is taken for granted and the question might be whether the sense of the T-word is such as really to match it. In both *stating* and *casting* the sense of the T-word is taken for granted and the question might be whether the type of the item is really such as to match it.

We will explain each of these speech acts, *stating*, *placing*, *casting*, and *instancing*. Let us start from the act of *stating*. Imagine someone asks: 'what is 1227?'. The speaker asks himself what item-type this item has.


(10)



Uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker refers to the item by '1227' and asserts that it is of the type on the right, which is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense. If someone disagrees with the speaker, the point of the dispute is that 1227 is not of this item-type but of another item-type.

When a speaker performs a speech act of *placing* by uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker refers to an item-type, not an item, by '1227' and, the question is: what T-word is correlated with this item-type, as in (11):


(11)



The speaker asserts that the word which is correlated with the item-type as its sense is 'rhombus'. If someone disputes the speaker, the point of the dispute is that it is not the word, 'rhombus', but the word, say, 'square', which is correlated with the item-type as its sense.

When a speaker performs a speech act of *stating* or *placing*, the direction of fit is producing a T-word to match the given item or item-type. In the act of *casting* and *instancing*, however, the direction of fit is the opposite: the speaker produces an item to match the given T-word. Let us start from *casting*. If someone asks: 'what is a rhombus?', the speaker asks himself what item-type is correlated with the T-word 'rhombus' as its sense.

(12)



By uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker asserts that the item-type which is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense is the diagram on the right, which is referred to by '1227'. If someone disputes the speaker, the point of dispute is that it is not the item-type shown in the diagram on the right in (12) above, but another item-type (say, the one on the diagram on the left) that is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense.

The last one is a speech act of *instancing*. Imagine someone asks the speaker, 'Which is a rhombus?' By uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker refers to an item by '1227' as the one with an item-type which is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense. If someone disputes with the speaker, the point of disputes is that it is not the item, which is referred to by '1227', but another item (say, the one which is referred to by '3327') that has the item-type correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense.

Austin (1953) restates these four speech acts as follows:

To *state* we have to find a pattern to match this sample to.

To *place* we have to find a pattern to match to this sample.

To *cast* we have to find a sample to match to this pattern.

To *instance* we have to find a sample to match this pattern to.

Since Austin (1953) does not clarify these four types of speech act any further, let us try to clarify them in the following diagram.

'1227 is a rhombus'	
A particular individual is described	A particular attribute is described
<i>stating</i> (answer to: 'What is 1227?')	<i>placing</i> From subject to predicate
<i>instancing</i> (answer to: 'Which is a rhombus?')	<i>casting</i> (answer to: 'What is a rhombus?') From predicate to subject

In 'real life' we are in a more complicated speech situation than Speech-situation  $S_0$ , but one of the important implications is that by using a referring expression, a speaker refers to an entity (in the case of the speech act of *stating* and that of *instancing*) and also to the type of entity (in the case of the speech act of *placing* and that of *casting*). For example, when a speaker utters the following sentence:

(14) The cat is a friendly animal,

the speaker can refer to a particular entity by 'the cat', and assert that the item-type this entity has is of a type which is correlated with the words 'friendly animal' (a speech act of *stating*). Uttering the same sentence, a speaker can also refer to the type, CAT, by 'the cat', and assert that the type is correlated with the words 'friendly animal' (as a speech act of *placing*). The sentence, 'The cat is a friendly animal' when it is uttered to perform the act of *placing*, is usually called a generic sentence. What a speaker refers to by 'the cat' is the type of character which is applicable to the majority of individuals which are cats.

It does not seem to be the case that by uttering any sentence of the form of 'X is a Y', a speaker can perform four different types of speech act. For example, uttering the following sentence, a speaker can perform the act of *stating*, but it does not seem to be possible for the speaker to perform the act of *placing*:

(15) John is a philosopher.

In the act of *stating*, a speaker refers to a particular individual by 'John', and asserts that the item-type this individual has is of the type which is correlated with the word 'philosopher' as its sense, i.e. the type PHILOSOPHER. However, it does not seem to be possible that a speaker refers to an item-type by 'John' and asserts that the item-type is correlated with the word 'philosopher'. Although 'the cat' (14) expresses not only a particular individual but the item-type which is the attribute that applies to the majority of individuals which are cats, 'John' only expresses an individual who is the bearer of the name 'John'. It is most probably because there is no item-type which is the attribute that applies to the majority of individuals who are bearers of the name 'John'<sup>8</sup>. It is generally true that the majority of individuals who are bearers of the name 'John' are male Westerners, but this is not the characteristics of the people who are John, but the characteristics of the name 'John': the name 'John' is mostly given to male Westerners.

We will describe sentence meaning in Chapter 3 using Austin's two types of convention (Austin, 1950) and different types of speech act (Austin, 1953).

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<sup>8</sup> Kripke (1972) says that proper names are 'rigid designators'.

## 2.4 Linguists who are in between Russell and Tarski, and Austin and Strawson

Many linguists (as well as philosophers) are influenced by both the Russellian and Tarskian concepts of truth, and the Austinian and Strawsonian concepts of truth. In this section, we describe how those linguists develop *referring* theories using Russellian and Tarskian, and Austinian and Strawsonian concepts of truth. In 2.4.1, we discuss Lyons (1977b) and in 2.4.2, we discuss early Situation Semantics.

### 2.4.1 Lyons' concept of referring

Lyons (1977b)'s definition of *reference* is based on Strawson (1950), but he also follows Russell (1905). Lyons follows Strawson (1950) in that it is a speaker, not an expression, who refers to an entity:

It should be noted that, according to this conception of the relation of reference, it is the speaker who refers (by using some appropriate expression): he invests the expression with reference by the act of referring (Lyons, 1977b:177).

Lyons, like Strawson, uses the term 'sentence' in the sense of sentence as a token, and, as we will describe below, describes clearly the context-dependent nature of the act of *referring*. However, for terminological convenience, Lyons allows the following way of saying: 'an expression refers to its referent (when the expression is used on some particular occasion and satisfies the relevant conditions)' (Lyons, 1977b:177)<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup>It is, however, doubtful whether terminological convenience is good enough a reason to allow this usage of *reference*. It is, at least, misleading.

Lyons (1977b)'s contribution to the description of the nature of *reference/referring* concerns two points. The first point concerns the existence of a referent. In Russell (1905), the existence of a king of France is entailed, and, therefore, the non-existence of a king of France makes false any utterance made by uttering the sentence, 'The king of France is bald'. In Strawson (1950), the existence of a king of France is presupposed and, therefore, a speaker must believe the existence of a king of France. However, Lyons (1977b) claims that the existence of a king of France or even the speaker's belief in it is not a necessary condition for a statement to be true. We can refer to, say, characters in fictions. It is quite possible for the following statement to be true, even though Sherlock Holmes' wife did not exist and a speaker does not believe that Sherlock Holmes' wife existed:

(16) Sherlock Holmes' wife went to school with my great-grandmother<sup>10</sup>.

Existence is a tricky concept, as Lyons admits. It depends on the definition of existence as to whether Sherlock Holmes' wife existed or not. However, the interesting point is that there is something which is not exactly an actual entity but not an entity-type (item-type in Austin (1953)), either. Characters in novels are not real people, and, in that sense, they do not exist. However, they are not purely types, i.e., they do not represent types, such as DOG, BACHELOR, or CHILDREN FROM MIDDLE-CLASS FAMILIES.

The second point concerns the context-dependent nature of *referring*. In Russell (1905), to utter the sentence, 'The king of France is bald' is to mean that there is not more than one king of France. However, Lyons (1977b:184) claims that, when someone utters the following sentence:

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<sup>10</sup> See McPherson (1996: 199).

(17) The cat has not been in all day,

he is by no means committed to the belief that there is only one individual that he can refer to by means of the expression, 'the cat'. According to Lyons, the speaker assumes that he will be understood to be referring to a definite individual and that the description he offers will be sufficiently specific, in the given context, to identify uniquely for the hearer the referent the speaker has in mind.

Therefore, Lyons (1977b:184) concludes that *referring* is relative to context. Lyons also claims that proper names are like definite descriptions, because they may be borne by several individuals, and, therefore, their uniqueness of reference is also relative to context. And so are the expressions like 'the Pope'. This is a very important point. It is true that when we refer to an entity as something unique, we assume that the entity is unique enough in the present speech situation, but not that it is unique in every speech situation.

Lyons (1977b) gives a new interpretation of the concept of *referring*. In Russell (1905) referring to an individual by a certain expression expresses that the individual who is correctly referred to by the expression exists. In Strawson (1950), to refer to an individual by a certain expression is for a speaker to select an individual who is *correctly* referred to by that expression. In Lyons (1977b), to refer to an individual by a certain expression is to select an individual who is correctly and/or *successfully* referred to by the expression:

If a distinction is drawn between correct reference and successful reference, one can perhaps maintain the general principle that we can refer correctly to an individual by means of a definite description only if the description is true of the individual in question. But successful reference does not depend upon the truth of the description contained in the referring expression. The speaker (and perhaps also the hearer) may mistakenly believe that some person is the postman, when he is in fact the professor of linguistics, and incorrectly, though successfully refer to him by means of the expression 'the postman' (Lyons, 1977b(vol. 1): 181-2).



Correct and incorrect *referring*, which is explicated in Strawson (1950), depends on whether or not a speaker selects an individual by an expression which is true of the individual. For example, the individual has a type, as in 'the gentleman' or 'the Prime Minister', or the individual is the bearer of a name, as in 'John'. Successful and unsuccessful *referring* depends on whether or not a speaker can select an individual by a certain referring expression so that the hearer can identify the individual. Correct *referring* can be unsuccessful when a speaker selects an individual by the expression which is true of the individual but is not specific enough for the hearer to identify the individual. For example, if a speaker refers to an individual by 'the gentleman' when the room is full of gentlemen, most probably *referring* is correct but unsuccessful: the hearer would ask: 'Which one?'

Incorrect *referring* can be successful when a speaker selects an individual by an expression which is not exactly true of the individual but near enough, or by the name which is not exactly the name of the individual but near enough, and the hearer manages to identify the individual. Imagine a speaker referring to an individual by 'the man over there with the champagne in his glass', though he actually only has water in his glass.

Now, even though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be another man in the room who does have champagne in his glass, the speaker *intended* to refer, or maybe, in some sense of 'refer', *did* refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in his glass (Kripke, 1972: 25).

In this case, it is more than possible that *referring* is incorrect but, nevertheless, successful: the hearer can identify the individual. Imagine also a speaker referring to an individual who is the bearer of the Japanese girl's name 'Yuko' by 'Yucca'. Since they sound similar, the hearer could identify the individual: *referring* is incorrect but successful.

In Chapter 3, we will describe the issue of *referring* at full length.

## 2.4.2 Early Situation Semantics: Austinian Truth

Early Situation Semantics is based on the wider concept of truth, by adopting Austin (1950)'s concept of truth, which we explained in 2.3.2 above. Barwise and Perry (1983) say:

Suppose my wife and I collaborate on cooking for a party. And suppose that at a certain point in the party I say, 'I am the cook', referring to *I*. Is what I have said true or not? The answer is, 'It depends on which situation I am describing' (Barwise and Perry, 1983: 159).

Situation Semantics, following Austin (1950), provides the interpretation that a statement is true when the historic situation  $sa$  which the statement is about, is a type of situation  $T_A$ .

According to Russell, the truth of a sentence, 'x is y', is that there is an entity which is correctly picked out by the referring expression, 'x', and the entity is of the type y. According to Austin, on the other hand, the truth of a sentence, 'x is y', is that the historic situation which is correlated (by demonstrative conventions) with the statement is of a type which is correlated (by descriptive conventions) with the sentence. Situation Semantics hypothesises that a historic situation and a type of situation are two components of a proposition.

While Austin did not use the term 'proposition', it seems in the spirit of his account to identify what we will call the *Austinian proposition* expressed by *A* with the claim that situation  $sa$  is of type  $T_A$ , and to individuate such a proposition by its two components, the situation referred to and the type of situation it is claimed to be. We call the first component the situation the proposition is about, *About* ( $p$ ), and the second component the proposition's constituent type, *Type* ( $p$ ) (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987: 29).

A type of situation  $T_A$  is identified with a Russellian proposition: there is an entity  $x$  and it is of a type  $y$ . In addition to Russellian propositions, Situation Semantics hypothesises propositions which ‘contain an additional contextually determined feature, namely, the situation they are about’ (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987: 29), i.e.,  $s_A$ . They call this type of proposition Austinian propositions.

As we explained in 2.3.2, Austin (1950) hypothesises a speaker and a hearer: a speaker refers to a historic situation (by demonstrative conventions) and describes the state of affairs *there* by assigning a certain type to it (by descriptive conventions). The state of affairs in the historic situation is independent of the type assigned to it. For example, that I have a pain in my stomach is independent of my describing it by assigning a type to it by saying, ‘I have a pain in my stomach’ or ‘I have a stomach-ache’. The actual state of affairs in the historic situation, i.e., my having a pain in my stomach is only conventionally correlated with the type of state of affairs expressed by the sentence, ‘I have a pain in my stomach’ or ‘I have a stomach-ache’, which is independent of a particular use.

Since a speaker and a hearer are not hypothesised in Situation Semantics, it claims that *propositions* include both a state of affairs in the historic situation (‘an additional contextually determined feature’) and a type of state of affairs. This is a difficult view: something is about a particular and, at the same time, it is a type which is independent of each instance.

It does not seem to be possible to explain the Austinian ‘truth’ without hypothesising a speaker who refers to a state of affairs in a particular historic situation and connects it to a type of state of affairs. However, the intention behind not hypothesising a speaker (and a

hearer) is obvious: Situation Semanticists want to analyse historic (or actual) situations as an issue of propositions, not as an issue of language use. Because of this, Situation Semantics allows sentences to be sentences as types and sentences as tokens (i.e. utterances) at the same time. For example, the sentence 'Etsuko had a good party on 17th August' expresses a type of situation where there is a person who is a bearer of the name Etsuko and she did an action which is of a type HAVE A GOOD PARTY (Russellian proposition), and also a past historic situation on 17th August where *I*, Etsuko Oishi, existed and I had a good party (Austinian proposition). This is a difficult view, because the *sentence*, 'Etsuko had a good party on 17th August', expresses a type of situation which is not correlated with a particular instance, and at the same time expresses a particular historic situation.

The contribution early Situation Semantics has made is to make it clear that the truth or falsity of a speaker's statement depends on which historic situation the speaker refers to. Just as we cannot decide whether the statement the speaker makes is true or false unless we know which individual the speaker refers to by, say, 'John', we cannot decide whether the statement the speaker makes is true or false unless we know which situation the speaker refers to/talks about by uttering, say, the sentence, 'it is very hot'. If the speaker refers to the state of affairs in Tokyo on the 20th of August, 1998, the statement is true. If the speaker refers to the state of affairs in Edinburgh on the 20th of August, 1998, it is not. This is an interesting claim about the nature of *referring*. However, to explain this nature, it is necessary to hypothesise a speaker who connects a particular state of affairs with a type of state of affairs. It is too unrealistic to hypothesise that a proposition by itself expresses these two types of state of affairs.

## 2.5 Another issue involving referring: Donnellan (1966)

There is another important claim about the nature of *referring* made by Donnellan (1966). Donnellan (1966) distinguishes ‘attributive use’ from ‘referential use’ of definite descriptions. By using a definite description, a speaker either refers to a particular actual entity or whoever/whatever is of the description. Consider Donnellan's famous example:

(18) Smith’s murderer is insane.

Donnellan (1966) explains the referential use of the description ‘Smith’s murderer’ as follows:

Suppose that Jones has been charged<sup>11</sup> with Smith’s murder .... Imagine that there is a discussion of Jones’s odd behaviour at his trial. We might sum up our impression of his behaviour by saying, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’(Donnellan 1966:103).

In the referential use of the definite description of ‘Smith’s murderer’, a speaker refers to a particular person, say, Jones, by ‘Smith’s murderer’ and claims that he is of the type, INSANE.

There is another use of the definite description of ‘Smith’s murderer’, which Donnellan (1966) calls the attributive use:

Suppose that we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable person in the world, we might exclaim, ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ (Donnellan 1966:102).

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<sup>11</sup> It is inappropriate to call Smith’s murderer someone who has been charged with Smith’s murder. Presumably, Donnellan meant ‘... Jones has been *convicted* of Smith’s murder.’

Donnellan's referential and attributive uses of the definite description show that we can refer not only to a particular entity but also to a type of entity. The attributive use of 'Smith's murderer' is more clearly brought out by paraphrasing the sentence in (19) as:

(19) Whoever killed Smith is insane<sup>12</sup>.

Donnellan (1966) points out an interesting consequence when these two types of *referring* fail. When the first type of referring, i.e. referential use, fails, the statement might still hold, but when the second type of referring, i.e. attributive use, fails, the statement does not hold. Suppose that the person who is referred to by 'Smith's murderer', i.e., Jones, is in fact not Smith's murderer. It is incorrect referring in the sense of Lyons (1977b): the entity is not Smith's murderer. However, it can be successful referring. Incorrect referring can be successful when a speaker refers to an entity by the description which is not true but close so that a hearer can identify the entity. If a hearer identifies the entity the speaker intended to refer by 'Smith's murderer' and the entity is in fact of the type INSANE, the statement the speaker makes by uttering the sentence in (18) is true.

However, the situation is different if referring to a type of entity, i.e. attributive use of the definite description, fails. Suppose the police found out that Smith had killed himself. The speaker then fails to refer to a type by 'Smith's murderer'. The type of person who kills a lovable person in a brutal way cannot be referred to by 'Smith's murderer' because Smith killed himself. As a consequence, the statement is about nothing. Russell would say the sentence is false because a type referred to does not exist: this is a similar case to 'The square root of minus one is half the square-root of minus four' (Russell, 1957). Strawson

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<sup>12</sup>See Lyons (1977b:185-186).

would say that the sentence is neither true nor false because a speaker failed to refer to a type and, therefore, cannot go far enough to describe it.

We will explain Donnellan's two types of use of a definite description in terms of two types of speech act, i.e., the act of *stating* and the act of *placing* in Chapter 3 (3.3.1).

## 2.6 Conclusion

Russell and Strawson explained two different aspects of sentence meaning. Russell explained successfully one aspect of sentence meaning, which concerns a type of state of affairs. A sentence expresses a type of state of affairs, which is differentiated from other types of state of affairs expressed by other sentences. The sentence, 'the cat is on the mat' expresses a type of state of affairs, and more or less the same type of state of affairs can be expressed by the Japanese sentence, '*neko ga matto no ue ni iru*' (although Japanese does not have a definite/indefinite article). This type of meaning is independent of a particular use. That is, the sentence, 'the cat is on the mat', expresses the type of state of affairs, which is not connected to a particular actual cat or situation. Russell used the term 'truth' to explain a relation between a sentence and a type of state of affairs.

Strawson explained another aspect of sentence meaning which concerns communication: a speaker refers to a particular actual entity or situation and describes it by uttering the sentence. When we utter the sentence, 'The cat is on the mat' typically we make a statement/assertion about a particular actual entity in the particular actual situation. In this case we connect 'the cat' to a particular actual entity which is a cat, and assert that it is in a particular state, i.e., being on the mat.



We can describe both aspects of meanings successfully by using Austin (1950)'s concept of communication: a speaker refers to an entity or situation (by means of the demonstrative conventions) and states/asserts that it is of a type (by means of the descriptive conventions). The demonstrative conventions correlate words with a particular entity or situation, and the descriptive conventions correlate words with types of entity or situation, although the same words often serve for both purposes. In this framework, we can describe the aspect of meaning which is about a particular entity or situation (which Strawson tries to describe) and the aspect of meaning which is a type of entity or situation which is not correlated with a particular instance of language use (which Russell tries to describe). In addition, we can describe meaning in use: we describe meanings as what a speaker expresses to a hearer by means of two types of linguistic convention.

In Chapter 3, we will develop Austin's model of communication into a workable model for linguistic purposes. We will make clear the concepts of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions by clarifying what types of word are correlated with a particular entity or situation, or a type of entity or situation by the demonstrative and descriptive conventions.

As Austin (1953) shows, the act of stating where a speaker refers to a particular entity (by the demonstrative conventions) and states/asserts that it is of a certain type by assigning the type to the entity (by descriptive conventions) is not the only type of speech act a speaker can perform by uttering a type of sentence, 'x is a y'. We will also develop four types of speech act in the following chapter.

As we have shown in the present chapter, meaning has different aspects. Philosophers and linguists tend to explicate one aspect of it and develop the theory of *meaning in*



*general* from it and try to explain everything in the theory. This does not seem to be a realistic approach to meaning. The reason Austin's theory is attractive is that different aspects of meanings are described as different types of speech act: using a language, i.e., linguistic conventions, a speaker performs to a hearer different types of speech act. In this theoretical framework, by describing what types of speech act a speaker performs and how a speaker performs those different types of speech act, we can explicate the elusive nature of meaning.

## Chapter 3

### Demonstrative and Descriptive Conventions

#### 3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we developed the framework of the semantic theory where both Russellian/Tarskian sentence meanings, i.e., truth-conditional meanings, and Strawsonian sentence meanings, i.e., meanings by which a speaker makes an assertion about a specific entity or situation, can be analysed. Following Austin (1950), we defined sentence meaning as what a speaker expresses to a hearer by ‘pointing to’ (referring to) something by means of the demonstrative conventions and describing it by means of the descriptive conventions. In the present chapter, we will explain the demonstrative and descriptive conventions, and describe how a speaker performs speech acts about entities and situations by using them. In 3.2, we will explain the demonstrative conventions which correlate words with entities (3.2.2) and the descriptive conventions which correlate words with types of entity (3.2.3), and describe how a speaker performs an act about a particular entity by using these conventions. In 3.3, we will discuss how a speaker performs an act about a particular historic situation by means of these conventions. To avoid confusion, we will only describe acts of *stating* in 3.2 and 3.3, and describe four different types of speech act, i.e., *stating*, *placing*, *casting*, and *instancing* about entities and situations in 3.4.

## 3.2 Speech Acts about Entities

### 3.2.1 Demonstrative conventions

Austin defines the demonstrative conventions as follows:

*Demonstrative* conventions correlating the word (= statements) with the *historic* situations, &c., to be found in the world (Austin, 1950:122).

Using these conventions, a speaker 'points to' an entity in the historic situation or a historic situation itself so that a hearer can identify it. To 'point to' an entity is to refer to him/her/it: for a speaker to 'point to' a particular entity by 'John' by uttering the sentence, 'John is a bachelor', is to refer to the entity by 'John'. Since there are cases where a speaker 'points to' a particular historic situation, an attribute of a thing or situation, or a speech situation he shares with the hearer, for which we cannot use the term 'refer to' in a standard sense, we use the term 'point to' rather than 'refer to'. The slight problem is that the usage is somewhat metaphorical, i.e., the speaker does not actually point to something, but, by uttering words or sentences, the speaker specifies what he is *talking about* as if he is physically pointing to it. However, since the term 'point to' does not seem to be ambiguous or misleading, we use it throughout the present thesis. For example, I 'point to' a particular entity, say, my friend Hideko, by an utterance of the word 'Hideko' so that the hearer can identify her. Or I 'point to' a particular historic situation, which is in Tokyo in the summer of 1998, by uttering the sentence, 'It is hot in Tokyo', so that the hearer can identify it.

### 3.2.2 Demonstrative conventions which concern ‘pointing to’ an individual entity

One can talk about almost any entity in the world. The speaker can, for example, talk about the entity which does not exist in the physical space shared by the speaker and the hearer, the entity which does not exist in the world any more, or the entity which is not visible. For example, by ‘my brother’, I can talk about my brother, who is in Japan, in the conversation I have with my friend in Edinburgh. By ‘Austin’ I can talk about the late philosopher. By ‘the air in this room’, I can talk about something invisible. To explain the fact that the speaker can specify the entity she talks about by a word/words so that the hearer can identify it, we hypothesise, as Austin did, the demonstrative conventions which correlate words with entities in the world.

The fact that words/expressions are correlated with entities has been explained by the concepts of *reference/referring* and *denotation/denoting* in both truth-conditional and other theories of meaning, as we discussed in Chapter 2. There are different ways in which words/expressions are correlated with entities. For example, (i) names are correlated with the bearers of the names, (ii) demonstratives are correlated with people/objects which are proximate to or distant from the speaker (or the hearer), (iii) personal pronouns are correlated with the speaker, the hearer, or the third person(s), and (iv) descriptive expressions are correlated with people/objects of certain types. This shows that words and entities have different types of semantic relation. These different semantic relations can be explained well by Austin’s demonstrative conventions: words are correlated with entities by the demonstrative conventions, and different types of word are correlated with entities in different ways. By using these demonstrative conventions, a speaker specifies a particular entity, and specifies it in a particular way.

Although Austin never emphasised the hearer's role in his theory, we have to incorporate it to explain how a speaker specifies a particular entity by means of the demonstrative conventions. Even if the speaker follows the linguistic conventions which correlate a word with an entity correctly, he cannot specify the entity by the word if the hearer cannot identify it. Imagine the speaker 'pointing to' a particular person by 'John'. Even if the speaker 'points to' this person following the linguistic conventions which correlate the name with the bearer of the name correctly, i.e., 'John' is the person's name, the speaker cannot specify this person when the hearer does not know the person's name. This strongly suggests that the demonstrative conventions by which the speaker performs a speech act about a particular entity to a hearer concern not only the relations between words and entities but also the ways in which the speaker specifies the entity for the hearer. To describe this, we will adopt the distinction between *appropriate* and *inappropriate* 'pointing', as well as the distinction between *correct* and *incorrect* 'pointing'.

'Pointing' is *correct* when a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by the word which is linguistically correlated with the entity. 'Pointing' is *appropriate* when a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by the word so that the hearer can identify the entity, without making the hearer uncomfortable. The distinction between *correct* and *appropriate* 'pointing' is similar to Lyons (1977b)'s distinction between *correct* and *successful referring*, which we discussed in 2.4.1: if an entity is referred to by an expression which is true of him/her/it, *referring* is *correct*, and if the hearer identifies the entity described by the expression, *referring* is *successful*. We use the terms *appropriate/inappropriate* rather than *successful/unsuccessful* because we want to include a social aspect of 'pointing' (referring). As we will explain in the following, there are cases where the hearer identifies

the entity the speaker 'points to' by certain words, but is uncomfortable about the speaker's 'pointing to' the entity by those words because of the social relation or the shared information. We will describe these cases as *inappropriate* 'pointing'.

In the following, we will describe the demonstrative conventions by which a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by his/her/its name (3.2.2.1), a personal pronoun or a demonstrative (3.2.2.2), and a descriptive expression (3.2.2.3). By describing *correct* and *appropriate* 'pointing' for each, we will show (i) how each type of word is linguistically correlated with the entity, and (ii) how the speaker specifies the entity by each type of word in order for the hearer to identify it.

### 3.2.2.1 'Pointing to' an entity by name

One can 'point to' a particular entity by his/her/its name. Uttering the sentence, 'Sam is a businessman', I can 'point to' a particular person, who is my friend in Scotland, by correlating the name 'Sam' with him. 'Pointing to' a particular entity by name is *correct* when a speaker 'points to' the entity by his/her/its name. If I 'point to' Sam by 'Peter', my 'pointing' is *incorrect*: the name 'Peter' is not correlated with the entity Sam because this is not his name. The demonstrative conventions correlate names with entities as bearers of the names.

'Pointing' is *inappropriate* when a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by his/her/its name and a hearer cannot identify the entity by the name, because the hearer does not know the entity or the name of the entity. This suggests that *appropriate* 'pointing' is the case where the hearer knows the entity and the name of the entity, i.e., the hearer knows the entity as a unique individual who has a proper name. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by

his/her/its name is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity as a unique individual who has a proper name that the hearer as well as the speaker knows of.

There is a social element in *appropriate* pointing. If a speaker 'points to' an entity by a name, and a hearer, though she identifies the entity, is uncomfortable about the speaker's 'pointing', 'pointing' is *inappropriate*. Consider the following example:

(1) A: John was driving a Vauxhall last Sunday.

B: You mean my father? Could you please call him 'Mr Dove'?

The hearer (Speaker B) identifies the entity the speaker (Speaker A) 'points to' by 'John', i.e., her father, but she is not happy about the speaker's 'pointing to' her father by his first name. We will discuss a social aspect of 'pointing to' an entity by different forms of his/her/its name in Chapter 4 (4.3.3.2).

The violations of the demonstrative conventions which concern 'pointing to' entities by names cause miscommunications or communication breakdowns. If a speaker 'points to' an entity *incorrectly*, he ends up giving the hearer the wrong picture of states of affairs in the world. If the speaker 'points to' an entity whose name is 'Peter' by uttering the following sentence:

(2) John is a bachelor,

he, as a result, fails to 'point to' the entity he intends to 'point to', i.e., Peter. Does the speaker 'point to' the entity whose name is 'John' or the entity whose name is 'Peter' in

this case? The answer is that the speaker does not 'point to' either of them. The speaker does not 'point to' the entity whose name is 'Peter', because he says 'John' instead. We are not happy to say that the speaker 'points to' the entity whose name is 'John', because the entity is not the one the speaker intends to 'point to'. Even if there is another person whose name is John, and the person happens to be a bachelor, we wouldn't say that the speaker makes a true statement: it is not John but Peter who the speaker means. Because the speaker does not follow the demonstrative conventions *correctly*, he 'points to' neither John nor Peter.

If the speaker utters the sentence in (2) *incorrectly* to 'point to' the entity whose name is 'Peter', the hearer naturally believes that the speaker 'points to' the entity whose name is 'John'. There is no reason why the hearer should think that the speaker 'points to' the entity whose name is 'Peter', when the speaker uses the word 'John'. In this case, the hearer either (i) cannot identify the entity whose name is 'John' or, (ii) picks out, wrongly but naturally, an entity whose name is 'John', and believes that the speaker asserts that he is a bachelor. If the hearer finds it out later that the person, John, is not a bachelor, she will blame the speaker for making a false assertion. However, it is not clear that the speaker made a false assertion, because he did not mean to make that assertion. Something goes wrong on a more fundamental level, that is, the level of conventions. The assertion was made by the speaker who used the conventions *incorrectly*, and as a result, the assertion the hearer thinks the speaker made is not the assertion that the speaker intended to make.

If a speaker 'points to' an entity *inappropriately* and the hearer cannot identify the entity the speaker 'points to', the communication between them might stop, as is shown in the following example:



(3) A: John is a bachelor.

B: Who is John?

Or the hearer might reconstruct the entity as a type of entity who has the name. For example, if the speaker utters the following sentence and the hearer does not know the person whose name is 'Chris':

(4) Chris is a pilot,

the hearer may reconstruct the entity as a type of entity whose name is 'Chris'. When the hearer reconstructs the entity as a type of entity whose name is 'Chris', she might add some characters to the entity using the information that the entity's name is 'Chris' and the entity is a pilot. The hearer might reconstruct the entity as a male person. Let us take another example. Imagine that the speaker uttering the following sentence where the hearer does not know the entity whose name is 'Hideko' (but knows that 'Hideko' is a Japanese girl's name):

(5) Hideko loves *sushi*,

The hearer may reconstruct the entity as a Japanese female person (the hearer might be convinced by this because of the speaker's assertion that the entity loves *sushi*). However, the entity 'pointed to' by 'Chris' in (4) does not have to be a male person at all, and the person 'pointed to' by 'Hideko' in (5) does not have to be a Japanese female at all, but could be American.

When a hearer reconstructs the entity the speaker *correctly* but *inappropriately* ‘points to’ by his/her/its names, she might reconstruct the entity as a ‘stereotypical’ individual who has that name. However, the features the hearer assigns to this unknown entity as a stereotypical individual who has the name do not have to be true of the entity. By ‘pointing to’ an entity by his/her/its name, the speaker does not assert in the least that the entity has stereotypical features as a bearer of the name: the speaker simply picks out the entity by his/her/its name. This suggests that the demonstrative conventions which concern ‘pointing to’ an entity by name are conventional relations between names and the bearers of the name, by which a speaker picks out an entity without describing any features of him/her/it.

Kripke (1972) calls names *rigid designators* in the sense that they designate the same objects in every possible world. For example, ‘although someone other than the US President in 1970 might have been the US President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ (Kripke, 1972: 48). Kripke (1972) is correct. When a speaker ‘points to’ (refers to) an entity by name, the speaker does not *describe* the entity in any sense. As we explained above, the speaker does not describe the entity as a stereotypical individual who has the name. The speaker does not describe the entity as, say, strange or the one with red hair in ‘pointing to’ (referring to) the entity by ‘Strange’ or ‘Redhead’. By the name the speaker picks out the entity as a unique individual with a proper name, without relying on any contingent fact the entity has certain attributes. In other words, names are dominantly correlated with the demonstrative conventions of ‘pointing to’ entities.

### 3.2.2.2 'Pointing to' an entity by a personal pronoun or a demonstrative

Unlike 'pointing to' an entity by his/her/its name, 'pointing to' an entity by a pronoun or a demonstrative is dependent on the contingent and transient fact that the entity happens to be the speaker or proximate to the speaker. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by a pronoun or demonstrative is deictic. Lyons (1977b) defines deixis as follows:

By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee (Lyons, 1977b: 637).

An entity is picked out by 'this' because the entity is proximate to the speaker and an entity is picked out by 'you' because the entity is the person being spoken to. Lyons (1977b) describes this feature of 'pointing'/referring as egocentricity.

The canonical situation-of-utterance is egocentric in the sense that the speaker, by virtue of being the speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates everything to his viewpoint. He is at the zero-point of the spatiotemporal co-ordinate of what we will refer as the deictic context (Lyons, 1977b:638).

The demonstrative conventions which concern personal pronouns and demonstratives are the relations between entities and roles in the speech situation<sup>1</sup> or locations in relation to the spatiotemporal location of the speech situation. Using these relations, the speaker specifies a particular entity so that the hearer can identify it.

#### 3.2.2.2.1 Personal pronouns

According to Lyons (1977b:638), the grammatical category of person depends upon the notion of participant-roles, and the origin of the traditional term 'person' illustrates the

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<sup>1</sup>We will explain *speech situations* in 4.2.2.

connection of participant-roles: the Latin word ‘persona’ (meaning “mask”) was used to translate the Greek word for “dramatic character” or “role”.

#### 3.2.2.2.1.1 First-person pronouns

When a speaker ‘points to’ herself by the first-person pronoun, ‘I’, she projects herself as a person who is playing a role of the speaker at the time of utterance. The speaker can make the hearer realise that she is talking about herself by highlighting the role of the speaker. The demonstrative convention which concerns the first-person pronoun is the relation between an entity and a role of the speaker in the speech situation. Using this convention, one, when speaking, ‘points to’ oneself as an individual who is playing the role of the speaker.

‘Pointing’ is *correct* when the speaker ‘points to’ herself by the first-person pronoun. It seems unlikely in a normal situation that the hearer cannot identify who the speaker is. Lyons (1977b: 645) says: ‘the distinction that we drew ... between correct and successful reference cannot seriously be drawn in relation to first-person pronouns’. There are, however, unusual cases where ‘pointing’ is *inappropriate*. For example, if a person is walking in the building and hears the voice from one of the rooms saying:

(6) I’ll be back by three,

the person would not know who will be back by three. This shows that, if the speaker and the hearer do not share the speech situation in which they communicate, ‘pointing’ is *inappropriate*. In other words, ‘pointing to’ an entity using the first-person pronoun is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity in terms of the

participant role of the speaker in the speech situation where who is playing the role is clear.

#### 3.2.2.2.1.2 Second-person pronouns

‘Pointing to’ an entity by the second-person pronoun is also dependent on the transient fact that the entity is being spoken to/addressed at the time of utterance. As the following example shows, the entity ‘pointed to’ by the second-person pronoun can change at any moment:

(7) Not you, not you, not you, you, go.

‘Pointing to’ is *correct* when a speaker ‘points to’ by the second-person pronoun the entity she is speaking to/addressing at the time of utterance. The demonstrative conventions which concern the second-person pronoun are the relations between entities and the participant role of the hearer.

‘Pointing’ by the second-person pronoun can be *inappropriate*. When a group of people forms a speech situation and the speaker does not make it clear by gesture or eye-contact to whom he is speaking, other participants might not identify which one of them is actually being spoken to. That is, ‘pointing to’ an entity by the second-person pronoun is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity in terms of the participant role of the hearer in the speech situation where who is playing the role is clear.

One function of ‘pointing to’ an entity by the first-person or second-person pronoun is obviously to specify the entity the speaker talks about, but there is another function which

concerns communication itself. To communicate is to accept the role of the speaker or the hearer which changes at every turn. As the term 'person' shows, it is to play a 'drama' of communication. In the drama of communication, the speaker picks out things in the outer world and talks about them, and invites the hearer to comment on them indicating his point of view. By 'pointing' to himself or the person he is speaking to in terms of participant roles, the speaker emphasises that they are playing roles in communication and co-operatively creating communication.

In some languages, 'pointing to' oneself or the entity one is speaking to is further differentiated in terms of the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. Since we will discuss socially differentiated pronouns fully in Chapter 4 (4.3.2.1), we just overview some important points here. As the distinction *tu* and *vous* in French shows, some languages have socially differentiated pronouns. Using one of these pronouns, a speaker not only emphasises the fact that he and the hearer are playing a role of the speaker or the hearer in communication, but also specifies the social relation between them. In specifying the relation between him and the hearer as a close/informal type or a distant/formal type, the speaker characterises the present communication. For example, if the speaker 'points to' the hearer by *tu*, the speaker characterises the present speech situation as a close and informal type. If the hearer is not comfortable with having the close and informal type of communication with the speaker, the hearer signals that to the speaker. 'Pointing to' the hearer by *tu* is *inappropriate*. In other words, 'pointing to' an entity the speaker is speaking to/addressing by *tu* is correlated with specifying the entity as the hearer who shares a close and informal type of speech situation with the speaker. If the speech situation is not of this type, 'pointing to' the hearer by *tu* is *inappropriate*.

### 3.2.2.2.1.3 Third-person pronouns

The speaker can 'point to' by a pronoun an entity that plays neither the part of the speaker nor that of the hearer: the speaker 'points to' the entity as the one that plays a part of the third person. 'Pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is *correct* when the entity is neither the speaker nor the hearer. 'Pointing' by the third-person pronoun is subject to further differentiation in term of gender and animacy. The masculine/feminine distinction is represented by the contrast between 'she' and 'he' in English, and the animate/inanimate distinction is represented by the contrast between 'it' and 'she/he'. 'Pointing to' an entity by 'she' is *correct* when the entity is neither the speaker nor the hearer, and feminine. 'Pointing to' an entity by 'it' is *correct* when the entity is neither the speaker nor the hearer, and inanimate. The demonstrative conventions which concern the third-person pronouns are the relations between entities and the participant role which is neither the role of the speaker nor the hearer, which is further differentiated in terms of gender and animacy.

Since all entities in the world which do not play the role of the speaker or the hearer are in principle the third persons, 'pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is not specific enough for the hearer to identify it. It seems that 'pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is correlated with saliency of the entity in the speech situation. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is *appropriate* when the entity is salient in the speech situation. The entity is salient when it is already introduced to the speech situation. This is an anaphoric use of pronouns. Consider the following example:

- (8) Mary bought a cake and she ate it.

Both 'she' and 'it' are anaphoric in the sense that they are interpreted as being co-referential with 'Mary' and 'a cake' respectively.

'Pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is also *appropriate* when the entity is by itself salient in the speech situation. In such a case, the third-person pronoun is deictic. According to Lyons (1977a), one can utter the following sentence to express one's condolences to a friend, whose wife has just been killed in a car crash:

(9) I was terribly upset to hear the news: I only saw her last week.

In these circumstances, there is no need for the speaker to specify who the referent of 'she' is (Lyons 1977a: 101).

Blakemore (1992: 66) gives a similar example. The speaker can utter the sentence in (10) after, say, Ben has left the room.

(10) He looked tired.

The speaker may have nodded his head to Ben's direction, but there is no linguistic expression, i.e., antecedent, necessary.

If the entity is not salient in the speech situation, say, the hearer does not notice Ben in the case in (10) above, the speaker's 'pointing' becomes *inappropriate*. 'Pointing to' the entity by the third-person pronoun is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity as a salient entity in the speech situation (because it has been introduced (anaphoric use) or it is by itself salient (deictic use)).



### 3.2.2.2.2 Demonstrative pronouns

Demonstrative pronouns like 'this' and 'that' in English are primarily deictic:

They are to be interpreted with respect to the location of the participants in the deictic context. Roughly speaking, the distinction between 'this' and 'that' ... depends upon proximity to the zero-point of the deictic context (Lyons, 1977b: 646).

'Pointing to' an entity by the demonstrative pronoun is *correct* when the entity is in a specified distance to the zero-point of the location of the speech situation. As for English demonstrative pronouns, 'pointing to' an entity by 'this' is *correct* when the entity is proximate to the zero-point, and 'pointing to' an entity by 'that' is *correct* when the entity is remote from the zero-point. The distinction of proximity is language-specific. Some languages, like English, have a two-way distinction of proximity, and others have a three-way or more distinction. According to Frei (1944), Malagasy has a six-way distinction. Japanese has a three-way distinction; *kore*, *sore*, and *are*. The speaker 'points to' an entity which is proximate to the zero-point where the speaker is by *kore*, and an entity which is remote from it by *are*, and an entity which is neither proximate to nor remote from it by *sore*. The distinction among *kore*, *sore*, and *are* is also concerned with the entity's proximity to the location where the hearer is. The speaker 'points to' an entity by *sore* when it is proximate to the hearer. In this respect, Japanese demonstrative pronouns are similar to Latin demonstrative pronouns: the entity which is proximate to the speaker is 'pointed to' (referred to) by *hic*, the entity which is proximate to the hearer/addressee is 'pointed to' (referred to) by *is(te)*, and the entity which is remote from both the speaker and the hearer/addressee is 'pointed to' (referred to) by *ille* (Lyons, 1968: 278-9).

'Pointing to' an entity by the demonstrative pronoun is not specific enough for the hearer to identify unless the speaker makes it salient by gesture or eye-movement or it is in itself salient. Imagine the speaker 'points to' an entity by 'this' by uttering the following sentence:

(11) This is a beautiful 17th century Chinese vase.

If the speaker utters the sentence in the situation where there are many vases around, looking away from the entity he 'points to' and not physically pointing to it, the hearer cannot identify it. 'Pointing' then becomes *inappropriate*. In other words, 'pointing to' an entity by the demonstrative pronoun is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity as a salient entity which is in a specified distance from the location of the speech situation (where saliency might be given by the speaker's gesture or eye-movement).

Japanese demonstrative pronouns are differentiated by another dimension: the honorific/non-honorific dimension. There are two sets of demonstrative pronouns, *kore*, *sore*, and *are*, and *kochira*, *sochira*, and *achira*. The latter set is marked with social superiority. As we will discuss fully in Chapter 5, Japanese words are often subject to further differentiation with respect to social superiority and inferiority. By *kochira*, a Japanese speaker 'points to' an entity not only as the one which is proximate to her, but also as the one who is socially higher than her (or as the one which is a belonging of the person who is socially higher than her). Therefore, 'pointing to' an entity by a demonstrative pronoun in Japanese can be *inappropriate* socially. If the speaker 'points to' a person by a non-honorific demonstrative pronoun, say, *kore*, and the person is socially higher than the speaker, 'pointing' becomes socially *inappropriate*. 'Pointing to' an entity

by the demonstrative pronoun in Japanese is correlated with specifying the entity as a salient entity which is in a specified distance from the location of the speech situation, which is either socially higher than or lower than/equal to the speaker.

Like proper names, personal pronouns or demonstrative pronouns are dominantly correlated with the demonstrative conventions: primarily *entities* are 'pointed to' by them. To a much lesser degree, they are correlated with the descriptive conventions: *attributes* of the entities are described. The distinction between 'he' and 'she', for example, concerns masculine/feminine, which is an attribute of the entity 'pointed to'. Other distinctions, say, between 'I' and 'you', and 'this' and 'that' concern *relations* between entities and roles in or proximity to the speech situation, by which the entities are 'pointed to'.

### **3.2.2.3 'Pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression**

When a speaker 'points to' an entity by a descriptive expression, 'pointing' is dependent on the contingent fact that the entity is of a particular type. For example, if a speaker 'points to' an entity by 'the student' and 'pointing' is correct, it is dependent on the contingent fact that the entity is of the type, STUDENT. It could be of a different type, say, ACTRESS (in one of the possible worlds). 'Pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression is not deictic. The type a speaker assigns to the entity by means of a descriptive expression does not differ from one speech situation to another as the entity 'pointed to' by 'I' does.

### 3.2.2.3.1 Correct 'pointing'

There are two different ways in which 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression becomes *incorrect*. One is solecism against the descriptive conventions and the other is against the demonstrative conventions. Although there is no a priori reason for using the word, 'dog' for a type of canine animal, the word ('dog') and the type (DOG) are conventionally correlated. If a speaker uses (like Humpty-Dumpty) the word 'dog' for a type other than the type of canine animal (DOG) and 'points to' an entity using the word 'dog' in this private sense, 'pointing' becomes *incorrect*. This is what we call solecism against the descriptive conventions (in 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive convention). 'Pointing' is also *incorrect* if a speaker 'points to' an entity by the type which is not the attribute of that entity. For example, if I 'point to' my landlady's pet by 'the dog', my 'pointing' is *incorrect*; because she is not of the type DOG, but of the type CAT. This is what we call solecism against the demonstrative conventions (in 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive convention). That is, 'pointing' is *correct* when a speaker specifies the entity by the words which are conventionally correlated with the type which is the attribute of the entity.

As for what we call *incorrect* 'pointing', Russell and Strawson described different aspects. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Russell (1905) says if the object the definite expression denotes does not *subsist*, the sentence is false. The case which Russell (1905) tried to exclude from his analyse of sentence meaning is the one, in our framework, where the speaker does not 'point to' any entity at all by the definite expression, although it superficially looks as if the speaker is performing the act of *stating*. If the speaker does not have any particular person at all in his mind but still 'performs' a speech act of *stating* by uttering:

(12) The present king of France is bald,

we cannot describe successfully the meaning the speaker tries to express. In such a case, the violation of linguistic conventions is so severe that it excludes the possibility for the speaker to express meaning conventionally.

Strawson (1950)'s point is that the speaker's failure of 'pointing to' any entity by 'the present king of France' does not exclude the *possibility* that a speaker at a different time in history 'points to' a particular entity by 'the present king of France' and makes a true assertion about him. There exists a conventional relation between the expression 'the present king of France' and a particular type or a particular person of the type, and it is independent of whether or not such a person exists at the time of utterance.

If a speaker has a particular person in mind, even *incorrect* 'pointing to' the person by a wrong expression might be *successful*. For example, if someone utters the following sentence:

(13) The king of Japan is in London,

I automatically ask in reply:

(14) You mean the emperor of Japan?

Whether the person, Akihito, is the king or the emperor depends on the institution of Japan, and it is not difficult to imagine that the person who does not know Japan well

believes mistakenly that Japan is a monarchy. If the speaker of the sentence in (13) has the Emperor Akihito in mind and uses *incorrectly* the expression 'the king of Japan', the hearer might be able to identify the person the speaker intended to 'point to'. The speaker then might be able to make a true assertion about the Emperor Akihito by uttering the sentence in (13). This shows, as Russell (1905) claims, that (in the act of *stating*) to 'point' by a descriptive expression is to specify a particular entity by the expression, and therefore, even if the speaker uses the wrong expression, the hearer tries to identify the person the speaker intends to 'point to', considering possible mistakes the speaker can make about 'pointing to' the person. This also shows, as Strawson (1950) claims, truth/falsity of the speaker's assertion depends on which entity the speaker 'points to' or intends to 'point to' by the correct, or even incorrect, expression.

#### 3.2.2.3.2 Appropriate 'pointing'

'Pointing' is *correct* when the speaker 'points to' the entity by the descriptive expression which is conventionally correlated with the type which is the attribute of the entity. *Correct* 'pointing' becomes *inappropriate* when the description is not specific enough for the hearer to identify the entity. For example, if the speaker 'points to' an entity by 'the dog' in the park where there are many dogs, the hearer might not be able to identify the entity the speaker 'points to', and ask: 'Which one?'. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the descriptive expression is correlated with specifying the entity as a salient entity which has a particular attribute.

When a speaker specifies the entity in terms of his/her/its position such as 'the head of the department' or 'the President of the US', 'pointing' is *correct* if the speaker 'points to' the entity by the descriptive expression which is conventionally correlated with the position

which the entity occupies. For example, before 15th July 1998, I could *correctly* 'point to' Ryutaro Hashimoto by 'the Prime Minister of Japan'. If I 'point to' him by 'the Prime Minister of Japan' now ( August in 1998), my 'pointing' is *incorrect*. Ryutaro Hashimoto is not in the position of Prime Minister of Japan any more, and someone else (Keizo Obuchi) is in the position.

For 'pointing to' a person by the descriptive expression of the position to be *appropriate*, a hearer must know who is in the position. If the hearer does not know the resignation of the former Prime Minister for some reason (for example, she was abroad), the person the speaker 'points to' by 'the Prime Minister of Japan' and makes an assertion about, i.e., Keizo Obuchi, is not the person the hearer believes that the speaker 'points to' and makes an assertion about, i.e., Ryutaro Hashimoto. *Appropriate* 'pointing to' a person by the descriptive expression of the position is the case where the hearer knows who is in the position. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the descriptive expression of this type is correlated with specifying the entity as an entity which occupies a specific position at the time of utterance that the hearer knows of.

To 'point to' an entity by a descriptive expression (in the act of *stating*) is to specify a particular person by the attributes or position of the person. How is it different from specifying a particular person by name? A simple answer to it is that by a descriptive expression a speaker specifies an entity by its attributes or position, whilst by names a speaker specifies an entity as an individual who has a proper name. Let us discuss it further by analysing the cases where 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression rather than a proper name becomes *inappropriate*.

If I utter the following sentence to my friend, Akiko:



(15) My supervisor at the college is retiring next year,

she identifies the person I 'points to' by the expression 'my supervisor at the college', but definitely gets puzzled with my use of the expression. She and I went to the university together and did the postgraduate course there together and the person I 'point to' by 'my supervisor at the college' was her supervisor, too. In short, my friend knows the person I 'point to' personally. So Akiko doesn't understand why I try to specify the person by her attributes (and my relation to her) when I know that she knows the person personally. A typical response might be:

(16) You mean Professor Ueda? Why don't you say so?

This example shows that 'pointing' by a demonstrative expression becomes *inappropriate* when both the speaker and the hearer have a personal, social relation with the person 'pointed to'. In other words, 'pointing' by a demonstrative expression rather than a proper name is *appropriate* when either the speaker or the hearer does not have a personal, social relation with the person 'pointed to'. If a speaker does not have a personal, social relation with the person 'pointed to' and does not know the person's name, the speaker cannot 'point to' the person by name. If a speaker knows that a hearer does not have a personal, social relation with the person the speaker intends to 'point to', the speaker knows that the hearer cannot identify the person by name.

There are cases where the speaker 'points to' a person by a descriptive expression because the speaker does not want to emphasise the social, personal relation between the speaker and the person he 'points to', or the speaker wants to emphasise the certain attributes of



the person he 'points to'. In these cases, 'pointing' by a descriptive expression becomes *appropriate* even though both the speaker and the hearer have a personal, social relation with the person 'pointed to'. For example, Hillary Clinton might 'point to' her husband by 'the President' when she speaks to his spokesman in uttering the following sentence:

(17) The President is very concerned.

By uttering the sentence the speaker asserts that a person who is in the position of President. i.e., Bill Clinton, is in the state of being concerned. And, by 'the President', the speaker can emphasise the aspect of the person which is in the position of President of the US, not an individual, Bill Clinton.

Let us take another example. If a student in the linguistic department is looking for a subject for the experiment of tone, a lecturer might utter the following sentence to 'point to' me, although both know me personally and know my name.

(18) That Japanese person will do,

It is my being a Japanese person, not my being an individual with the name Etsuko Oishi that the speaker wants to emphasise in 'pointing'.

To sum up, there are two cases where a speaker can *appropriately* 'point to' an entity by a descriptive expression, rather than by name. First, a speaker does not know the person personally as an individual with a proper name, or a speaker believes that a hearer does not know the person as an individual with a proper name. In these cases, a speaker specifies an entity in terms of her/his/its generic type, physical appearances, or position,

or the speaker's relation to her/him/it so that a hearer can identify the entity. Second, although a speaker knows the person personally and knows that a hearer also knows the person personally, the speaker emphasises a particular attribute of the person which is important for the present speech situation between the speaker and the hearer. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the descriptive expression is correlated with specifying the entity as (i) an entity who either the speaker or the hearer does not know personally, who has a particular attribute or occupies a specific position, or (ii) an entity who has a particular attribute or occupies a specific position which is significant for the present speech situation the speaker and the hearer share.

While 'pointing to' an entity by his/her/its name or a personal or demonstrative pronoun is dominantly concerned with the demonstrative conventions, 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression is concerned with the demonstrative and descriptive conventions equally. The descriptive conventions are concerned with 'pointing' by a descriptive expression because a speaker 'points to' an entity by a type which is correlated with a particular word. The demonstrative conventions are concerned with 'pointing' because a speaker 'points to' an individual who has the type.

#### 3.2.2.3.3 Functions of 'pointing'

Let us talk about another difficult issue which concerns 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression. Is the attribute of the entity by which the entity is 'pointed to' a part of an assertion? For example, if the speaker utters the following sentence:

(19) The man is very tall,

the entity is picked out by its generic type MAN. Is it a part of the assertion that the entity is of the type MAN? One might argue that the attribute of the entity of being a male human being is used for the hearer to identify the entity, but it is not a part of what a speaker asserts.

It seems that attributes of the entity by which the entity is 'pointed to' is not a part of assertion. Consider the following example:

(20) This gentleman is my wife.

Let us imagine that there is a fancy-dress party and a person utters the sentence 'pointing to' his wife who dresses like Chaplin. The speaker 'points to' a person by her temporary attribute that she looks like a gentleman, and asserts that the person is the speaker's wife. The speaker does not seem to assert that the entity is of both the type GENTLEMAN and the type WIFE (to the speaker). There seem to be a difference between uttering the sentence in (20) and the sentence in (21) in the following:

(21) This is a gentleman and my wife.

However, one might argue that the difference is not so obvious. This is because a speaker is expected to 'point to' an entity by a descriptive expression which is true of the entity, i.e., a speaker is expected to 'point to' the entity correctly. If it is the case, a state of affairs the speaker correctly asserts by uttering the sentence in (20), i.e., there is an entity which is proximate to the speaker and of the type GENTLEMAN, and this entity is a type WIFE of the speaker, is not very different from the state of affairs a speaker correctly

asserts by uttering the sentence in (21), i.e., there is an entity which is proximate to a speaker, and this entity is of both a type GENTLEMAN and a type WIFE of the speaker.

However, some distinction will show up when the entity is not a gentleman. In the case of uttering the sentence in (20) when the person is not a gentleman but dresses like a gentleman, the speaker's 'pointing' is not exactly *correct*, but the hearer most probably understands why the speaker 'points to' the person by 'this gentleman' and identifies the person. It is possible that the assertion is true if the person is the speaker's wife. However, if the person is not a gentleman, the assertion the speaker makes by uttering the sentence in (21) is not true, even if the person is the speaker's wife.

In the act of *stating*, a speaker 'points to' an entity in the subject position, and describes it by giving a certain type to it in the predicate part. The function of 'pointing to' an entity in the subject part is to make it clear to a hearer who/what a speaker talks about. If 'pointing' is too *incorrect*, the speaker cannot specify the entity she talks about so that the hearer can identify her/him/it. However, if 'pointing' is *incorrect* but not too *incorrect*, and the speaker manages to specify the entity so that the hearer can identify it, we might be able to say that the speaker makes a true assertion. The function of 'pointing' in the act of *stating* is to specify the entity a speaker talks about.

If the function of 'pointing' is to specify the entity a speaker talks about, why does the following sentence sound strange?

(22) That pretty baby is really ugly.

If the speaker 'points to' the entity correctly, being a pretty baby is true of the entity the speaker 'points to', or at least the speaker believes that it is true of the entity. The speaker picks out the entity by its attribute of being a pretty baby, and assigns the type UGLY, which is opposite type of PRETTY. This means that the speaker has a contradictory belief that the entity is pretty and ugly at the same time.

If a speaker does not commit himself to the belief that the entity has the attribute by which the speaker 'points to' it, the sentence sounds less strange. Consider the following example:

(23) Those so-called 'handicapped' children are not really handicapped.

In uttering the sentence, the speaker does not commit himself to the belief that those children are handicapped: the speaker picks out the entities by their attribute by which the people in general identify them, i.e., being handicapped. The speaker then asserts that those people are not HANDICAPPED in the sense she uses the term 'handicapped'.

Descriptive expressions are supposed to express the attributes of the entity by which a speaker can specify the entity so that a hearer can identify the entity: the attributes of the entity which are obvious to a speaker and a hearer, or agreed by them. However, a speaker might cleverly 'point to' an entity by the attributes of the entity which are neither obvious to a hearer nor agreed by him to make the hearer believe that that is an attribute of the entity. Imagine that you are a witness for the murder trial. In an earlier statement you said that the man who is charged with murder might have been a little drunk. Then the barrister says:

(24) That drunken man was walking to the victim's house. Is that true? Could you answer by just 'yes' or 'no', please?

You saw the man the speaker 'points to' by 'that drunken man' walking to the victim's house and he might have been a little drunk, but he was not in the state of being drunk. If you answer by 'yes' for the reason that the person 'pointed to' was walking to the victim's house, you contribute to the picture the speaker wants to make about the event: the man was drunk and walking to the victim's house.

This case shows that descriptive expressions such as 'that man' or 'that drunken man' are not always used to purely 'point to' a particular entity. When the entity is already introduced in the speech situation or salient in the speech situation, a full description is not necessary for the hearer to identify the entity. Even an inaccurate description might do. In those cases, a speaker can express some belief about the entity. The speaker does not express this belief as a form of statement, i.e., he does not assert, but indicates that he has that belief. In the above case, if you answer 'yes' to the barrister's question, you commit yourself not only the fact that the person was walking to the victim's house, but also the belief that the person was drunk.

When an entity is already introduced in the speech situation or salient in the speech situation, the point of assertion is whether or not it is really this entity which is of a type or does/did a type of action which is expressed in the predicate. In the example in (24), the point is whether or not it is really that person, who is charged with the murder, that was doing a type of action WALK to a specific house, which is victim's. This type of speech act is the act of *instancing* in Austin (1953)'s classification of four types of speech act. We will discuss the act of *instancing* about an entity and situation in 3.4.1.

### 3.2.2.4 Summary of 'pointing' to an entity

To 'point to' in the act of *stating* is to specify the entity the speaker talks about so that the hearer can identify it. To 'point to' a person by his/her/its name is to specify the entity as an individual with a proper name, and it implies that the speaker knows the person personally and believes that the hearer knows the person so as to identify the person by his/her/its name. 'Pointing to' a person by his/her/its name serves to stress a social relation between the speaker and the person 'pointed to'. To 'point to' an entity by a personal or demonstrative pronoun is to specify the entity in terms of participant roles in the speech situation or proximity to the location of the speech situation. To 'point to' a person/object by a personal or demonstrative pronoun is to relate the person/object in the world to the speech situation the speaker and the hearer share. To 'point' to an entity by a descriptive expression is to specify the entity in terms of the attribute or position of the entity. This implies that (i) either a speaker or a hearer (or both) does not know the entity enough to specify/identify it as an individual with a proper name, or (ii) that emphasising the attribute or position of the entity is of some significance in the speech situation.


By the concept of the demonstrative conventions, we have successfully described different types of relation between entities and words/expressions by which the speaker refers/'points' to them. In our theory, we have described not only the relations between entities and words/expressions to refer/'point' to them, which have been studied by Russell (1905), Strawson (1950) and others, but also how the speaker specifies the entity so that the hearer can identify it, emphasising a certain element of the entity or the speech situation. We have described the former relations by *correct/incorrect* 'pointing' and the

latter by *appropriate/inappropriate* ‘pointing’, a part of which is what Lyons (1977) describes by the concept of *successful/unsuccessful referring*.

### 3.2.3 Descriptive conventions


As we discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3.3), in the act of *stating*, a speaker ‘points to’ an entity by the demonstrative conventions and describes one of idiosyncratic features of the entity by assigning a type to it. For example, if you look at the picture below:

(25)



and describe the diagram on the right, you ‘point to’ the entity by ‘1227’ and describe its feature, which is:

(26)



To describe this feature linguistically, you have to find a word whose sense is correlated with this type of shape by the descriptive conventions. It is the word ‘rhombus’ in English and *hishigata* in Japanese. You then perform the act of *stating* about the entity by uttering the following sentences:



- (27) 1227 is a rhombus.  
(28) 1227 *wa hishigata da*.

Uttering these sentences, you 'point to' the entity by '1227' by means of the demonstrative conventions and assert that the features of the entity are of a type which is correlated with the word 'rhombus' in English and *hishigata* in Japanese by the descriptive conventions. Your assertion is true in this case because, as the picture in (25) shows, the entity you 'point to' is of the type you claim it to be.

The descriptive conventions correlate types of thing in the world with words. In other words, things in the world are categorised, and each differentiated/categorised type is correlated by the descriptive conventions with a particular word. As a result, differences of categories/types are represented by the contrasts between words, say, 'rhombus' and 'circle' or *hishigata* and *maru*. Each language has its own categorisation of things in the world, which is represented by contrast between words and sense-relations among words. Categorisations of unrelated languages do not seem to differ too greatly to make translation impossible. There are, however, some differences in categorisation among languages. For example, the ways the colour spectrum is divided and categorised are different in some languages. Pinker (1994) says:

Languages differ in their inventory of colour words: Latin lacks generic 'gray' and 'brown'; Navajo collapses blue and green into one word; Russian has distinct words for dark blue and sky blue; Shona speakers use one word for the yellower greens and the greener yellows, and a different one for the bluer greens and the nonpurplish blues (Pinker, 1994:62).

The division and categorisation of the colour-spectrum can differ even among the speakers of the same language. Many Japanese speakers in my parents' generation and those older

than them use the word *ao* ('blue') for a much wider range of the colour-spectrum than the younger generations use the word for, which includes the range for which the younger generations use a different word *midori* ('green'). The speakers of older generation understand the range of the colour-spectrum which the word *midori* ('green') stands for and possibly use the word, but they usually don't distinguish the range of the colour spectrum the word *ao* ('blue') covers from the one the word *midori* ('green') covers, and use the word *ao* ('blue') for the combined range. So the type to which the word *ao* ('blue') is correlated in the use of those speakers of Japanese is different from the type of AO for the majority of the speakers of Japanese. This sense of *ao* ('blue') still remains in Japanese culture, and even the speakers who constantly distinguish the range the word *ao* ('blue') covers from the one the word *midori* ('green') covers describe the colour of the traffic signal as *ao* ('blue') as a standard expression, although it looks obviously green.

This shows that things in the world are categorised into certain types, which differ cross-linguistically and, in some cases, even within a language, and those types are arbitrarily but conventionally correlated to words as their senses. The conventions which correlate each of these types with a particular word are descriptive conventions. In the present section, we discuss how language users use the descriptive conventions to perform and understand linguistic acts.

For an act of *stating* to be successful, the speaker and the hearer have to use the same descriptive conventions. Let us consider the following case. My mother is one of the speakers who do not distinguish the range word *ao* ('blue') from that of the word *midori* ('green'). If my mother utters the following sentence:

- (29) *kondo kat ta fuku wa ao yo,*  
 this time buy Past clothes  
 'The clothes (I) bought this time are *ao*'

I assume that the entity she 'points to' as the clothes she bought is of the type *AO* in my sense, i.e., which is the same as the type *BLUE* in English. It is, however, more than possible that she asserts that the entity is *ao* in her sense, and her new clothes are green. If her new clothes are green, does she assert something false? It is unfair to blame her for a false assertion. My mother makes a true assertion in the sense she uses the word *ao*: being *ao* is true of the entity she 'points to' in the sense she uses the word. The gap between the type which I think my mother asserts and the type of the entity which I think correct is caused by our uses of different descriptive conventions about the word *ao*. Miscommunication on this level is the miscommunication of the level of conventions.

If a speaker and a hearer share the same demonstrative conventions, the truth or falsity of the speaker's assertion matters. In the act of *stating*, an assertion is true if the entity 'pointed to' is of the type which the speaker claims it to be. If it is not, an assertion is false. If the speaker utters the sentence in the following:

- (30) It's a gorgeous Victorian townhouse in absolutely perfect condition,

and the hearer later finds out that it's an ugly London flat with no character which needs a lot of refurbishment, the assertion is false.

To make a true assertion in the act of *stating* is to give a correct picture of a particular part of the world to the hearer who might not know of the state of affairs there. Using the

demonstrative conventions the speaker 'points to' a particular entity and, using the descriptive conventions, describes it by giving it a particular type so that a hearer can get a good picture of the features of the entity. If the speaker does not use the descriptive conventions *correctly*, he gives the hearer a wrong picture of the features of the entity, which is a case of a false assertion. In the example in (30) above, the hearer naturally reconstructs the features of the entity according to the type the speaker assigns to it: the entity is of a type of TOWNHOUSE which was built in Victorian era, and is of a type GORGEOUS, and so on. The hearer reasonably assumes that the entity is of this type or at least the speaker believes that the entity is of this type. If the hearer later finds out that the entity is not at all of the type, the hearer blames the speaker for giving him the wrong picture of the features of the entity. The level of the (mis)communication which concerns *correct/incorrect* describing has been described in terms of truth/falsity, which concerns the relation between the type the speaker assigns to a particular entity and actual features of the entity.

There seems to be another level of communication, however. Things in the world are not always exactly of a type, and most of them have different aspects. Imagine someone describes me, Etsuko Oishi. However fine-grained the description of me is, it is still an approximation of my attributes: the speaker cannot create Etsuko Oishi linguistically, who is the same as real Etsuko Oishi. Detailed descriptions do not always serve better for the hearer to understand the features of the entity. Sometimes a hearer understands the entity better by a metaphoric description than by a detailed scientific description.

A speaker describes the entity he 'points to' so that a hearer can understand the attributes of the entity. How approximate a description of the entity the speaker should give to the

hearer depends on the hearer's knowledge or a type of speech situation the speaker and the hearer share. Consider the following example from Austin (1962):

(31) France is hexagonal,

Austin (1962: 143) says, if the speaker utters the sentence in (31) to a top-ranking general, assigning the type of being hexagonal to the country France might be good: it is a rough but interesting approximation of the shape of France. It is obviously not good for a geographer, who would think that assigning the type of being hexagonal to France is too rough to give any serious consideration.

Does this mean that the sense of the word, 'hexagonal' changes from one speaker to another or from one speech situation to another? It does not seem to be the case. The speaker who utters the sentence in (31) does not believe that France is exactly hexagonal, and he does not say that, either. That is, it is not the case that the speaker believes the shape of France is exactly of the type which the word 'hexagonal' is correlated to by the descriptive conventions. The speaker himself knows that being hexagonal is rough approximation for the type of the entity.

Metaphoric use of word is of the same kind. Imagine someone uttering the following sentence:

(32) Diana was a rose.

Being a rose might be a good, inspiring description of the attributes of the person Diana for a hearer who wants a general picture of the character of the person. However, the

speaker does not assert that the person Diana was in fact a rose, but metaphorically attributes rose-like properties to the individual<sup>2</sup>.

We might be able to analyse this nature of describing the entity by the contrast between *appropriate* and *inappropriate* describing. Describing is *appropriate* when a speaker describes the features of the entity by the words which specifies the features of the entity to the degree which is required in the speech situation. In other words, describing the features of the entity is correlated by the descriptive conventions with specifying the features to the degrees which is required in the speech situation.

It seems that there is another level in which describing the features of entity becomes *appropriate* or *inappropriate*. For example, if the speaker utters the following sentence:

(33) It is hot in here,

the speaker does not express a positive or negative judgment by the word 'hot': the type HOT is differentiated from other types in terms of temperature. If the speaker, on the other hands, utters the following sentences:

(34) It is stuffy in here,

(35) It is cosy in here,

the speaker expresses a negative judgment (in (34)) and a positive one (in (35)). In Mill (1843)'s sense, the word 'stuffy' has a negative connotation and the word 'cosy' has a positive one. These examples show that some words are subject to further differentiation

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<sup>2</sup>See Lakoff & Johnson (1980).

as to negativity or positivity, and those differentiation are conventionalised. If the speaker describes, say, the features of the room by uttering the sentence in (34), the hearer naturally believes that the speaker is uncomfortable to be there. If, on the contrary, the speaker finds it comfortable to be there, describing the features of the room by 'stuffy' is *inappropriate*. This shows that the descriptive conventions correlate not only words to particular types of entity, but also words with particular ways of specifying the entity, such as specifying it as positive or negative. We will develop this in Chapter 4 and 5, where we will describe the descriptive conventions which correlate words with specifying the entity socially.

In the present section we have described the descriptive conventions on the three levels. On the level of conventions, we described the relations between words and types of thing, which are differentiated and categorised within a language. On the level of truth/falsity, we described, by using the concept of *correct/incorrect* describing, the relations between the feature of the entity 'pointed to' and the type which the speaker assigns to the entity. They have been analysed by the traditional concepts of truth/falsity. *Correct* describing is the case where the feature of the entity 'pointed to' is of the type which the speaker assigns to the entity, which makes the whole act of *stating* true. On the level of communication between the speaker and the hearer, we described, by using the concept of *appropriate/inappropriate* describing, the relations between words and the ways how the speaker specifies the feature of the entity in the speech situation. *Appropriate* describing is the case where the speaker specifies by the word the feature of entity to the degree which is required in the speech situation, or specifies by the word non-truth-conditional aspect of the entity. By analysing the meanings the speaker expresses by predicating something of the entity referred to (in our terminology, by assigning a type to the entity 'pointed to') we

have succeeded in describing meaning in a wider scope than that of truth-conditional semantics.

### **3.3 Talking about a situation**

In the preceding section, we discussed how a speaker ‘points to’ a particular entity and describes features of it by using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions. In the present section we will show that we can describe meaning about a particular historic situation in the same way as we describe meanings about a particular entity.

The demonstrative and descriptive conventions which concern making an assertion about a particular entity are not very different from the demonstrative and descriptive conventions which concern making an assertion about a particular historic situation. If the speaker identifies a particular entity in a spatiotemporal location and describes it or its action, the speaker makes an assertion about a historic situation (where the particular entity is). For example, when the speaker ‘points to’ an entity and asserts that it is of a type by uttering the following sentence:

(36) Patricia is a Ph.D. student,

a speaker assumes that the attribute of the entity she describes as ‘a Ph.D. student’ is the attribute the entity has at the time and place of utterance (unless specified otherwise), which might be different at different time (and space).

We perceive changes of states of affairs in the world. We know that it is possible that people and objects have some attributes at one point in time and space, and cease to have



them at a different point in time and space. And a speaker can talk about not only the attributes people and objects have at the time and place of the utterance, but also the attributes they have/had at a different point in time and place. For example, a speaker can talk about the time when an entity had particular attributes (as is shown in (37)) and the place where an entity has particular attributes (as in shown in (38)).

(37) Catriona was a Ph.D. student two years ago.

(38) Yuli is a Ph.D. student in Switzerland.

In English, temporal location which is prior to time of utterance is grammatically marked (by 'was' in (37)) but physical location is not. This is the same in Japanese.

(39) *patorisia wa Ph.D. no gakusei desu,*  
student

'Patricia is a Ph.D. student'

(40) *katoriina wa ni nen mae Ph.D. no gakusei deshita,*  
two year ago student past

'Catriona was a Ph.D. student two years ago'

- (41) *yuli wa suisu de Ph.D. no gakusei desu.*<sup>3</sup>  
 Switzerland in student

‘Yuli is a Ph.D. student in Switzerland’

When a speaker talks about the attributes the entity has/had at the time and place which is not the time and place of the utterance, the speaker has to not only specify the entity she talks about, but also specify the spatiotemporal location where the entity has/had the features. Just as ‘pointing to’ an entity, the speaker ‘points to’ a particular spatiotemporal location, i.e., a historic situation, so that a hearer can identify it.

A speaker can specify the temporal location of a historic situation by a deictic word/expression, assuming the temporal location of the speech situation as a deictic centre. In the sentence in (37), the speaker specifies the temporal location of a historic situation where the entity, Catriona, had the particular features of being a Ph.D. student at a temporal distance from the time of the utterance; ‘two years ago’. Or a speaker can specify the location calendrically:

- (42) Sue was a student in 1991.

Similarly, a speaker can specify the physical location by the name of the place, as ‘in Switzerland’ in (38), or by the physical distance from the deictic centre where a speaker and a hearer are. Consider the following example:

<sup>3</sup> To express this meaning, the following sentence, which has continuous present form *shite iru/imasu*, sounds better:

*yuli wa suisu de Ph.D. no gakusei wo shite imasu.*  
 Switzerland in student  
 ‘Yuli is (being) a Ph.D. student in Switzerland’

(43) The weather is good 500 miles north from here.

These examples show that words/expressions are correlated to the physical and temporal location of a historic situation by the demonstrative conventions. There are different types of relation between the physical and temporal locations and words/expressions. For example, 'pointing to' a historic situation by a deictic expression is correlated with specifying the historic situation in terms of the location of the speech situation. 'Pointing' by a deictic expression is *correct* when a historic situation is in a specified distance from the speech situation. 'Pointing to' by a deictic expression is *appropriate* when the speaker and the hearer share the speech situation so that the hearer can identify the historic situation the speaker 'points to'.

If, in the historic situation the speaker 'points to', the entity the speaker 'points to' has/had the feature he claims it to have, the speaker's assertion is true. Austin (1950) says:

A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type<sup>4</sup> with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions (Austin, 1950: 122).

For example, uttering the following sentence:

(44) Yuko saw a play yesterday,

the speaker 'points to' the entity by 'Yuko' and also 'points to' the historic situation which is one day prior to the time of utterance by 'yesterday' and the past tense of the verb, and

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<sup>4</sup> Austin (1950: 122n) specifies the sense he uses the expression 'is of a type with which' as 'is sufficiently like those standard states of affairs with which'.

asserts the action of the entity 'pointed to' is of the type SEE A PLAY (which is correlated by the descriptive conventions with the words 'see/saw a play'). If I utter the sentence in (44) to someone now (on 31st of August, 1998), 'pointing to' my friend by 'Yuko' and 'pointing to' 30th of August in 1998 by 'yesterday', my describing the historic situation is *correct* because my friend Yuko saw the play which was a part of Edinburgh Festival on 30th August in 1998. This makes my whole act of *stating* about the particular historic situation true.

If I utter the sentence in (45) instead 'pointing to' the same person by 'Yuko' and the same historic situation by 'yesterday':

(45) Yuko went to a concert yesterday,

my describing is *incorrect* because Yuko did not go to the concert on the 30th of August in 1998. This makes my whole act of *stating* about the particular historic situation false: the action of the entity in the historic situation 'pointed to' is not of the type GO TO A CONCERT (which is correlated by the demonstrative conventions to 'go/went to a concert') the speaker claims it to be.

In the present section, we have shown that we can analyse the act of *stating* about a historic situation in the same way as we analyse the act of *stating* about a particular person. In the act of *stating* about a historic situation, a speaker by means of the demonstrative conventions 'points to' a particular entity and the particular spatiotemporal location where the entity is/was, and asserts by means of the descriptive conventions that the entity is/was of a certain type or the action of the entity is/was of a certain type. It is the relations between an actual state of affairs in the historic situation 'pointed to' and the type

of state of affairs the speaker assigns to it that Austin (1959) describes by the concept of truth. As we discussed in Chapter 2 (2.4.2) early Situation Semantics adopts Austin's concept of truth in this sense.

We have described the demonstrative conventions on three levels; (i) the conventional level where the relations between words/expressions and physical and temporal locations of historic situation are concerned, (ii) the level of *correct/incorrect* 'pointing' where the relations between words/expressions and the location of a particular historic situation the speaker talks about are concerned, and (iii) the level of *appropriate/inappropriate* 'pointing' where the relations between words/expressions and the ways the speaker specifies the location of the particular historic situation are concerned. The descriptive conventions by which a speaker performs the act of *stating* about a particular historic situation can be also described on three levels; (i) the conventional level where the relations between words and types of state of affairs are concerned, and (ii) the level of *correct/incorrect* describing where the relation between an actual state of affairs in the historic situation and the type of state of affairs the speaker assigns to it are concerned. Although we did not develop it above, there is a level of *appropriate/inappropriate* describing where words/expressions and the ways the speaker specifies features of the historic situation are concerned. We will discuss the relations between words/expressions and the ways of specifying socially features of the historic situation in Chapter 4 and 5.

Using Austin's ideas of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions and concept of truth, we have developed the semantic theory where meanings are described not only in the dyadic relation between words and entities or historic situations, or words and types of entity or situation, but also in the triadic relation where a speaker 'points to' a particular entity or historic situation and describes it by assigning a type. By using the concept of

*appropriate/inappropriate* ‘pointing’ and describing, we have incorporated in the theory another aspect of meaning, which concerns how the speaker specifies in the speech situation a particular entity or historic situation, or features of the entity or situation ‘pointed to’.

### **3.4 Different Types of Speech Act**

In 3.2 and 3.3 we have described how a speaker performs a speech act of *stating* about a particular entity or a particular historic situation. In the act of *stating* about a particular entity, a speaker ‘points to’ the entity by the demonstrative conventions and describes idiosyncratic features of it by assigning it a particular type by means of the descriptive conventions. In other words, the purpose of the act of *stating* is to give a hearer a picture of a particular entity and its idiosyncratic attributes. Similarly, in the act of *stating* about a particular historic situation, a speaker ‘points to’ a situation by demonstrative conventions, while specifying the entity and the spatiotemporal location, and describes it by assigning it a particular type by means of the descriptive conventions. The purpose of the act of *stating* about a historic situation is to give a hearer a picture of a historic situation and the state of affairs there.

As Austin (1953) says, this type of speech act is not the only type of act. There are three other types of act, as is shown in the following diagram, which we discussed in Chapter 2:

(47)

A particular individual is described

A particular attribute is described

stating

placing

From subject to predicate

instancing

casting

From predicate to subject

In the rest of 3.4 we discuss differences between the different types of speech act a speaker performs by using the two types of convention. In 3.4.1 we explain the difference between the act of *stating* and that of *placing*, and in 3.4.2 we explain the acts of *instancing* and *casting*.

### 3.4.1 *Stating* and *placing*

#### 3.4.1.1 Generic and non-generic sentences

In the act of *stating*, a speaker talks about a particular entity or a particular historic situation and describes it by assigning a certain type to it. However, we do not always talk about a particular entity or a particular situation. Consider the following example:

(48) The lion is a friendly beast,

By using the expression 'the lion', the speaker not only 'points to' a particular entity which is of the type LION but 'points to' a type of entity which is a lion (that is, a type of entity which is of the type LION). In the latter use of 'the lion', a speaker does not 'point to' this individual or that individual, but 'points to' an attribute of the individual which is not accidental but permanent, which is applicable to many other individuals of the same class. Lyons (1977b) calls generic propositions what a speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (48) while using 'the lion' to say about ('point to') a type of entity which is a lion:

... a generic proposition: i.e., a proposition which says something, not about this or that group of lions or about any particular individual lion, but about the class of lions as such (Lyons, 1977b: 194).

There are two types of speech act a speaker can perform by uttering the sentence in (48). A speaker can 'point to' a particular individual by 'the lion' and describe the idiosyncratic attribute of it by assigning it a particular type, where the particular individual is described. This is the act of *stating*. A speaker can also 'point to' an attribute of a class by 'the lion' and describes the attribute by assigning it a type, where the particular attribute is described. This is the act of *placing*.

The difference between the act of *stating* and the act of *placing* shows when the speaker makes a false assertion in each act. If the speaker performs the act of *stating* by uttering the sentence in (48), the assertion becomes false when the particular entity is not of the type, FRIENDLY BEAST. If the speaker performs the act of *placing*, on the other hand, the assertion does not become false immediately when there is an individual which is a LION and not a friendly beast. Since the point of argument is whether or not the attribute of being a type of LION is of a type, FRIENDLY BEAST (in other words, whether or not a typical individual with the attribute of being a type of LION is of a type FRIENDLY BEAST),



the existence of the individual which is a LION and not a friendly beast does not immediately make the speaker's assertion false. The speaker's assertion becomes false when a typical individual which is of the type LION is not of the type of FRIENDLY BEAST.

The similar contrast exists when the speaker 'points to' a situation. Dahl (1975) gives a following example:

- (49) a. A dog is barking,  
b. A dog barks,

Krifka et al. (1995: 16) explain the above sentences:

Here [49a] is a particular sentence about a particular (specific) dog, and [49b] is a characterising sentence which is not about a particular (specific) dog but, intuitively speaking, about dogs in general. Thus, although *a dog* may be either specific or nonspecific in and of itself, [49a] cannot be interpreted as a particular sentence about the kind *Canis familiaris* (or the class of dogs) stating that they happen to bark at the moment, and [49b] cannot be interpreted as a characterising sentence about a particular dog, stating, say, that Rover barks.

Let us explain the difference between the sentences above as different types of speech act. Uttering a sentence in (49a), the speaker 'points to' an individual by 'a dog' and a particular historic situation by present continuous tense, and describes the action of the entity in the situation by assigning it the type BARK. By uttering the sentence in (49b), on the other hand, the speaker 'points to' a type of entity by 'a dog' and a typical situation where the type of entity exists, and describes it by assigning it the type BARK. If the speaker utters the sentence in (49a) and the particular entity in the historic situation the speaker 'points to' does not do the type of action BARK, the speaker's assertion is false. If the speaker utters the sentence in (49b) and the situation where the type of entity does the type of action BARK is not a typical situation, the speaker's assertion is false.

In Carlson (1989) and Krifka et al. (1995) the distinction between a historic situation and a habitual situation is regarded as a generic and non-generic distinction. Consider the following example from Krifka et al. (1995):

- (50) a. John is smoking,  
b. John smokes.

We can explain the difference between the habitual sentence (in (50b)) and the sentence of a historic situation (in (50a)) in the same way as we described the difference between the generic sentence (in (49b)) and the non-generic sentence (in (49a)). By uttering the sentence in (50a), a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by 'John' and a particular historic situation by present continuous, and asserts that the individual in the historic situation does the action which is a type of SMOKE. By uttering the sentence in (50b), a speaker 'points to' a particular individual by 'John' and a typical situation where the individual is, and asserts that the entity typically does an action which is the type of SMOKE.

By introducing the distinction between the act of *stating* and the act of *placing*, we do not have to describe *generic* sentences as special cases. And the explanation that a speaker 'points to' an attribute of entity or situation by uttering a generic sentence is better than the one that a speaker refers to ('points to') all entities in the class, which is often given to generic sentences. This claim is often too strong for the meanings of some generic sentences:

(51) Beavers make dams<sup>5</sup>.

The sentence does not mean that all beavers makes a dam. Even if there are beavers which do not make a dam, the sentence still can be true.

### 3.4.1.2 Referential use and attributive use of the definite descriptions

We purport to explain the difference between referential use and attributive use of the definite description in term of the difference in speech acts. Let us have Donnellan (1966)'s example again.

(52) Smith's murderer is insane.

According to Donnellan (1966), there are two interpretations for the sentence in (52). One interpretation is that a speaker refers to a particular person, say, Jones, and asserts that he is insane. The other is that a speaker refers to whoever is Smith's murder and asserts that he is insane.

Let us correlate Donnellan (1966)'s referential use of the definite description with Austin (1953)'s act of *stating* and Donnellan (1966)'s attributive use of the definite description with Austin (1950)'s act of *placing*. The speaker can perform the act of *stating* by uttering the sentence in (52). The speaker 'points to' a particular entity by 'Smith's murderer': the speaker specifies the entity as the one who is a type MURDERER of a particular person who has a proper name 'Smith'. And the speaker asserts that the idiosyncratic attribute of this entity is of a type INSANE. If the attribute of the entity 'pointed to' is not the type of

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<sup>5</sup>Carlson (1977).

INSANE, the assertion is false: the speaker does not give the correct picture of the attribute of the particular entity so that a hearer can understand the entity. If the person is not of the type MURDERER of a particular person who has a proper name 'Smith', i.e., the entity is not guilty of the murder, 'pointing' is *incorrect*. However the assertion still can be true if the attribute of the entity is of the type INSANE.

The speaker can perform the act of *placing* by uttering the sentence in (52) as well. The speaker 'points to' the attribute of being a murderer of a particular person named 'Smith', whoever is in fact the person of the attribute, and describes it by assigning the type INSANE to it. If the attribute of being a murderer of a particular person named 'Smith' is not of the type INSANE, the assertion is false. For example, if the murdered person, Smith, is the most vicious and cruel person in the world killing many kind and lovable people, the attribute of being a murderer of him might not be of the type INSANE. In this case, the assertion is false: the speaker gives a hearer a wrong picture of the attribute of being the murderer of the person Smith. If Smith killed himself, the attribute of being the murderer of the person Smith does not exist. This makes the speaker asserts something about nothing, and there is no meaning conveyed.

We have described related but different sentences/readings in terms of the two different types of speech act, i.e. *stating* and *placing*, and what assertion a speaker makes to a hearer in each act. We have shown that we can explain successfully a difference between generic and non-generic sentences/readings and a difference between referential use and attributive use of the definite description in terms of these two types of speech act.

### 3.4.2 *Instancing and casting*

In the acts of *stating* and *placing*, a speaker ‘points to’ a particular entity or a particular attribute and describes it by assigning a certain type to it. In these cases, an entity or an attribute of an entity is taken for granted and the *point* of question is what idiosyncratic attribute the entity has (in the act of *stating*) or what linguistic type the attribute corresponds to (in the act of *placing*). In both acts, the direction is from entities or attributes of entities to linguistic types.

There is another direction. The speaker believes that (i) the hearer knows that some entity has a certain idiosyncratic type but doesn’t know which entity it is, or (ii) that the hearer knows that some attribute is of a certain type but doesn’t know what attribute it is. In the former case, the speaker ‘points to’ an entity as the one whose attribute is of the type in question, so that a hearer can identify the entity. This is the act of *instancing*. In the latter case, the speaker ‘points to’ an attribute as the one which corresponds to the type in question, so that the hearer can identify the attribute. This is the act of *casting*.

#### 3.4.2.1 **A-type and B-type utterances**

Burton-Roberts (1986) notes the different interpretations of the sentence in (53) and describes it in terms of difference in discourse. He says that, when ‘Max’ in the following utterance is not a theme, the utterance is either about a person who is dandy or ‘dandiness’:

(53) Max is a dandy.

The difference is made clear when we put the utterance in different discourses; (54) and (55):

(54) A: Who is a dandy?

B: Max is a dandy.

(55) A: What is a dandy?

B: Max is a dandy.

Burton-Roberts explains the difference in terms of what he calls propositional and pragmatic (in)equivalence to the utterance, 'A dandy is what Max is'. Consider the following examples:

(56) A: Who is a dandy?

B: !A dandy is what Max is.

(57) A: What is a dandy?

B: A dandy is what Max is.

Uttering the sentence, 'Max is a dandy' in (55) is equivalent to uttering the sentence, 'A dandy is what Max is' as is shown in (57), while uttering it in (54) is not, as is shown in (56). Burton-Roberts (1986) calls the type of utterance in (54) Type A and the type in (55) Type B and distinguishes a discourse where an A-type utterance is to be uttered from the one where B-type utterance is to be uttered.

Furthermore, Burton-Roberts (1986) notices that a question that initiates a B-type discourse, say, 'What is a dandy?' in (55) constitutes a canonical means of requesting a definition:

Canonical answer to that question should supply, or purport to supply, definitions, or at least partial definitions (Burton-Roberts, 1986:55).

The act of *instancing* corresponds to a sentence which can be an answer to the A-type utterance, 'Who is x?'. In (54), the speaker B performs the act of *instancing*: the speaker B 'points to' a particular entity by 'Max' as the entity whose idiosyncratic attribute is of the type DANDY. The act of *casting* corresponds to a sentence which can be an answer to the B-type utterance, 'What is x?'. In (55), the speaker B performs the act of *casting*: the speaker B 'points to' a particular attribute through an individual who has the attribute by 'Max' as the one which corresponds to the linguistic type DANDY.

The ways the act of *instancing* and that of *casting* go wrong are different. Imagine the speaker uttering the sentence in (53) to 'point to' an entity by 'Max' and asserts that this is the entity whose idiosyncratic attribute is of the type DANDY (performing an act of *instancing*). If the entity Max in fact does not have the attribute which is of the type DANDY, the assertion is false. For example, the entity 'pointed to' by 'Max' never wears nice clothes and is never stylish, the speaker's assertion is false: this individual does not have the attribute in question.

Imagine the speaker uttering the sentence in (53) to 'point to' an attribute through an individual who has the attribute by 'Max' and asserts that this attribute is of the type DANDY (performing an act of *casting*). We find out the attribute is not of the type DANDY: the attribute does not correspond to a sense that we use the word 'dandy' for. In this case,

we assume either (i) the speaker makes a false assertion: he knows the sense of the word 'dandy' but wrongly explained it correlating the wrong attribute to it, or (ii) the speaker uses the word 'dandy' in a different sense.

In performing the act of *casting*, a speaker 'should, or purport to supply, definition, or at least partial definitions' (Burton-Roberts, 1986:55). The act of *casting* can be structurally marked by 'x is what y is', say, 'A dandy is what Max is'. It is not surprising at all that to utter the sentence in (53) to perform a speech act of *casting* is to give a definition of 'dandy'. This is what a speaker does to give an *ostensive* definition. If the speaker utters the sentence:

(58) This is a dandy.

the speaker 'points to' the attribute and asserts that this attribute corresponds to the linguistic type DANDY. In the act of *casting*, a speaker asserts something about the language not about the world. In asserting that a particular attribute corresponds to the linguistic type in question, the speaker does not give the hearer any information about the world, while the speaker gives the hearer information about the world in the act of *instancing*: say, a particular entity in the world is of the attribute in question.

A speaker can perform a speech act of *instancing* not only about a particular entity but also about a particular situation. Consider the following example:

- (59) A: You are a caring mother,  
B: I was (a caring mother) ten years ago.



Speaker B 'points to' a particular historic situation in the past by 'ten years ago' and the past tense, and asserts that that was a situation when the entity, herself, is of a type of CARING MOTHER. The speaker's assertion is false when the particular historic situation 'pointed to' is not the situation where the entity, the speaker herself, is of the type of CARING MOTHER.

A speaker can perform the act of *casting* about a situation. Consider the following example:

- (60) A: What is it like if life goes wrong?  
B: The life of your uncle Tom goes wrong.

The speaker 'points to' an attribute of a situation through the situation where a particular entity is, and asserts that the attribute is of the type of situation where LIFE GO WRONG.

### 3.5 Conclusion

In the present chapter, we have successfully described truth-conditional meanings using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions. The demonstrative conventions correlate words with a particular entity or a particular historic situation. The descriptive conventions correlate words with types of entity or situation. Using these two types of conventions a speaker can perform different types of speech act about a particular entity and an attribute of entities, and a particular situation and an attribute of situations. We have shown how four types of speech act are made possible by these two types of conventions, and described them in correlating them with linguistic factors such as *genericity*, *referential/attributive* uses of the definite description, and *A-type* and *B-type* utterances.

By using the concepts of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions and speech acts which are made by these conventions, we have developed the semantic theory where we can describe in a coherent manner different types of meaning which are in a wider scope than straightforward truth-conditional meanings. In Chapter 4, we will develop the theory so that non-truth-conditional conventional meanings can be incorporated and described fully in a coherent manner.

## Chapter 4

### Indicating and Meanings of Context<sub>C</sub>

#### 4.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, we developed the theory where meanings are described as what speaker asserts about the world, using Austin (1950)'s concepts of demonstrative and descriptive conventions. We have also developed Austin (1953)'s four types of speech act. We have shown that by uttering a sentence a speaker potentially performs four types of speech act; *stating*, *placing*, *instancing*, and *casting*. We have succeeded in analysing truth-conditional meaning in the theory as what the speaker expresses in performing an act of *stating*.

As we showed in Chapter 1, there is another type of meaning, which is *indicated* rather than *asserted*, where *appropriateness/inappropriateness* rather than *truth/falsity* (or *correctness/incorrectness*) is concerned. This type of meaning concerns the speech situation the speaker and the hearer share, especially the social aspect of the speech situation. We call these meanings meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub>. Meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> are conventional, not context-specific. By means of linguistically conventionalized devices, the speaker indicates that the speech situation is of a certain type or that the social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation is of a certain type. The conventions which enable the speaker to indicate something about the speech situation are linguistic conventions, just as the conventions which enable the speaker to assert something about a particular entity or historic situation are. Therefore, the violation of both types of conventions causes miscommunication. However, as we will show in the present chapter, they cause different types of miscommunication. If the speaker violates the conventions about *asserting*, the

speaker gives the hearer a wrong picture of the entity or historic situation in the world. In this case, the speaker's act becomes *incorrect*, and the whole statement becomes *false*. If the speaker violates the conventions about *indicating*, on the other hand, he fails to create a speech situation where he and the hearer communicate with each other at a comfortable social distance. In this case, the speaker's *indicating* becomes inappropriate.

In the present chapter, we will develop Austin's two types of convention so that we can describe meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  as conventional meanings in our theory of meaning. In the following section (in 4.2) we will discuss meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  and develop the theory, while clarifying some concepts, such as meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$ , speech situations, *indicating*, and the demonstrative and descriptive conventions in the act of *indicating*. In 4.3, we will discuss lexical and grammatical devices which are conventionally correlated with meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$ , and describe different meanings expressed by them. In 4.4, we will discuss related issues.

## 4.2 Meanings of $\text{CONTEXT}_C$

### 4.2.1 Meanings of $\text{CONTEXT}_C$


In Chapter 1, we have defined meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  as context-independent non-truth-conditional meanings. Consider the following example:

- (1) I am awake, silly.

The meaning which concerns 'I am awake' can be described as a meaning the speaker asserts about the world. Let us assume that the speaker performs the act of *stating* by uttering the sentence. According to the theory we developed in the previous chapter,

the speaker 'points to' a particular entity by the first-person pronoun 'I', i.e., the speaker 'points to' himself, and asserts that this entity is of a type AWAKE. This meaning, which the speaker expresses in performing an act of *stating* about the entity, i.e., a truth-conditional meaning, can be shown in the following diagram:

(2)



where 'x' is a particular entity and 'S' is a speaker, and the square expresses a historic situation where this particular entity exists. We use Kamp and Reyle (1993)'s idea of showing meanings by symbols and boxes, but we do not follow their Discourse Representation Theory in details. Our main purpose of using diagrams is to show that there are two different types of meaning the speaker expresses by uttering a sentence.

The meaning about the historic situation shown in the diagram in (2) is not all the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (1). The speaker expresses a different type of meaning by the vocative 'silly'. By the vocative 'silly', the speaker *indicates* that the speaker and the hearer share a certain type of speech situation, rather than *asserts* as the fact that the hearer is of a type SILLY. Let us compare the meaning of the sentence in (1) with the meaning of the sentence in (3), where the speaker *asserts* as a fact in the world that the hearer is of the type SILLY.

(3) I am awake, and you are silly.

The difference between them becomes clear when we compare the ways uttering each sentence goes wrong. Uttering the sentence in (3) goes wrong when the hearer is not

of the type SILLY: the speaker describes the feature of the entity, i.e. the hearer *incorrectly* and, in doing so, gives a wrong picture of the world. Uttering the sentence in (1), on the other hand, goes wrong when the speaker does not have a certain social relation to the hearer which allows the speaker to assign the silliness to the hearer. The hearer might not mind being addressed by 'silly' by her family or close friend, but she might as well resent being addressed by it by a stranger. The hearer might not mind being addressed by 'silly' in a private, informal situation, but she might as well resent being addressed by it in a serious, formal situation. That is, if the speaker and the hearer do not have the social relation which allows the speaker to assign silliness to the hearer, uttering the vocative 'silly' is *inappropriate*. The speaker makes the hearer uncomfortable by it.

The vocatives in the following examples express more clearly meanings of types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer or types of speech situation they share.

- (4)    a. I'm awake, darling,  
          b. I'm awake, Sir.

In (4a) legitimacy of addressing a hearer by the vocative 'darling' does not depend on whether or not the hearer is of a type DARLING, but whether or not the speaker and the hearer share a certain type of social relation, i.e., whether or not the speaker is socially close to the hearer. Similarly, in (4b), legitimacy of addressing the hearer by the vocative 'Sir' depends on whether or not the hearer is socially higher than the speaker or the speech situation the speaker shares with the hearer is formal, not on whether or not the hearer is the type SIR. In fact the word 'Sir' is not normally used to predicate something of the referent (to describe the entity 'pointed to', in our theoretical framework), as is shown in the following:

(5) ?You are Sir.

Meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ , which directly concern the social relation between the speaker and the hearer or the speech situation they share, are as important as meanings asserted as a fact in the world, i.e., truth-conditional meaning. Imagine that in the Northern Ireland peace talks one addresses a person in the opponent group by the vocative 'you terrorist':

(6) You should hand in your weapons, you terrorist!

By addressing the hearer by 'you terrorist', the speaker *indicates* that the speaker and the hearer share a type of speech situation which allows the speaker to assign a very negative, insulting attribute to the hearer. In doing so, the speaker endangers communication itself. The hearer might think there is no reason at all why he should accept such an insulting speech situation, and stop communicating. The *appropriateness/inappropriateness* of addressing the hearer by 'you terrorist' is no less important than the truth/falsity of assigning to the historic situation a type expressed by, 'you should hand in your weapons'.

We propose to describe these meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  as types of speech situation and social relation in the speech situation. Just as the speaker 'points to' a particular entity or historic situation and *asserts* that it is of a certain type, the speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation or the social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation is of a certain type. In the following sections (4.2.2 and 4.2.3), we will develop the framework of the theory where we can describe meaning of  $CONTEXT_C$  as a meaning the speaker expresses about the speech situation by using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions.

### 4.2.2 Speech situations

When two people share the situation where they can reasonably assume that the other person understands his spoken or written message and is willing to respond to it, they are in the speech situation<sup>1</sup>. So if two people are communicating, they are already in the speech situation. Sharing the speech situation, however, is not accompanied automatically by one's sending a message to another, as it might superficially look. Suppose you go to Japan without any knowledge of the language. You cannot share a speech situation with a monolingual Japanese: he does not understand you. Your uttering a sentence is no more effective than making a meaningless sound. Even in your own community, you might not be able to share a speech situation with another person. If you speak to the person and he refuses to respond, you cannot share a speech situation with him.

To communicate with someone by uttering something is to create a speech situation where two people are willing to accept roles of the speaker and the hearer, and exchange opinions about the world. This implies that a speech situation exists between the speaker and the hearer even when the speaker utters a sentence whose meaning does not concern the speech situation. Consider the following sentence:

(7) John is a bachelor.


If we want to describe accurately the fact that the speech situation exists even when the speaker doesn't actually *indicate* anything of it, the model of the meaning of the sentence in (7) should be as follows:

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<sup>1</sup>Because both spoken and written communication are concerned, the term 'speech situation' is not appropriate. However, since the term is widely used and it gives us a clear idea, we use the term without excluding written communication.



(8)



The square on the right signifies the historic situation where the entity who is the bearer of the name 'John' exists and the entity is of the type BACHELOR. The circle on the left signifies a speech situation. However, since the meaning of the sentence in (7) does not concern types of speech situation, there isn't any practical reason why we should show the speech situation in the diagram. When a meaning is not directly related to the speech situation, we can describe it without hypothesising the speech situation. This is what all decontextualized approaches to meaning do.


The meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (9), on the other hand, directly concerns the type of the speech situation the speaker shares with the hearer.

(9) The door is open, Sir.

When the speaker utters the sentence in (9), we know that the speaker *indicates* that the hearer is socially higher than him or the speech situation is formal. To explain this, we hypothesise the conventional relation between addressing the hearer by 'Sir' and a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker in the speech situation or the speech situation itself is formal. Using this conventional relation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation by assigning it this type. That is, by uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. This meaning as well as the meaning about the particular historic situation, where the speaker 'points to' a

particular entity by ‘the door’ and describes it by assigning it the type OPEN, are shown in the following diagram:

(10)



‘HI(H,S)’ in the circle means that a hearer (H) is socially higher than a speaker (S). ‘F’ means that a speech situation is formal. In the following section, we will explain the conventions by which the speaker specifies the present speech situation which he shares with the hearer.

#### 4.2.3 Indicating and the demonstrative and descriptive conventions

When the speaker utters a vocative, such as ‘Sir’ ‘silly’, ‘darling’, and ‘stupid’ as a part of the sentence, the hearer knows, as we do, the speaker assigns a certain type correlated with the vocative to the present speech situation. This shows that addressing a hearer by a certain vocative is correlated by convention with a type of speech situation, and using those conventions the speaker creates a particular type of speech situation between him and the hearer.

The speaker’s ‘pointing to’ the present speech situation is like his ‘pointing to’ a particular entity or situation in the act of *asserting*. There are, however, some important differences. When the speaker ‘points to’ the speech situation, he does not pick it out as he picks out an entity or historic situation. The only speech situation he can pick out is the speech situation he shares with the hearer at the time of utterance, while the speaker can pick out almost any entity or historic situation in the world. For

example, the speaker cannot 'point to' the speech situation he shared with the different hearer two days ago by uttering the vocative 'Sir'. For the reason that the speaker cannot 'point to' any speech situation but the present one, we prefer the term 'highlight' to 'point to' for the speech situation.

Another difference is that, while 'pointing to' an entity or situation and assigning a type to it are clearly distinguished in *asserting*, highlighting the present speech situation and assigning a type to it are not in *indicating*. For example, addressing the hearer by the vocative 'Sir', there is no clear distinction between a component of highlighting the present speech situation and a component of assigning it a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. This is like a road sign 'Stop', where there is no clear distinction between pointing at the place and describing it as the place to stop. As for vocatives, Lyons (1977b:225) says, 'One might even argue the stronger claim that the distinction between naming and describing is never absolutely clear in vocative expressions<sup>2</sup>'.

What are the functions of act of *indicating*? It seems to be to specify social parameters of the present speech situation. By using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions, the speaker assigns a certain social type to the present speech situation highlighted, and in doing so, specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation. For example, by the vocative 'Sir', the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. If the present speech situation is not of the type, *indicating* becomes *inappropriate*. This makes the hearer uncomfortable communicating with the speaker, which might lead to communication breakdown.

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<sup>2</sup>We will discuss this point into detail in 4.3.1.2 in the present chapter.

Another important function of *indicating* is a performative function. The speaker specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation while already communicating in the very speech situation. In a sense, the speaker is making a case of communicating in the type of speech situation by uttering the sentence in which he specifies the speech situation by that type. To explain this performative function of *indicating*, we use the term 'create': the speaker does not just specify the present speech situation as a certain type, but creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer. This is like the speaker creating a particular type of speech act by uttering a performative sentence. If the speaker specifies the present speech situation by an *inappropriate* type, and accordingly creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer *inappropriately*, the hearer most likely rejects it. Then creating the type does not count. This is similar to the case where uttering the performative sentence, 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow' becomes infelicitous when no one accepts the offer saying something like 'Done'<sup>3</sup>.

In the following section, we will analyse the demonstrative and descriptive conventions which concern vocatives, personal pronouns, and honorifics, and describe what type of speech situation the speaker creates by means of those conventions.

## **4.3 Descriptive Conventions and Different Meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub>**

### **4.3.1 Vocatives**

A surprisingly small number of studies have been done on vocatives in English. It seems to be the case that traditional analyses of meanings which are based on reference

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<sup>3</sup>See Austin (1963:9)

and predication do not apply to vocatives in a straightforward sense. We will introduce analyses of vocatives by McCawley (1981) and Lyons (1977b) in the following. McCawley (1981) describes vocatives in term of what he calls 'pragmatic presupposition', and Lyons (1977b) describes vocatives in terms of reference and predication.

#### **4.3.1.1 Vocatives in McCawley (1981)**

It is a standard interpretation that the meanings expressed by vocatives do not contribute to propositional contents of the sentences. McCawley (1981:237-239) demonstrates this point by the following example:

- (11) You know, Sam, China is industrializing rapidly.

According to McCawley, if the addressee is not called Sam, the utterance is inappropriate, though the proposition which it expresses is true or false depending on whether China is or is not industrializing rapidly, regardless of the name of the person to whom the utterance is addressed. McCawley explains the meaning expressed by 'Sam' in terms of presupposition; it is presupposed that the addressee is Sam. He describes this type of presupposition as 'pragmatic presupposition' and distinguishes it from semantic presuppositions, which are shown in the following examples:

- (12) a. Cecil is aware that Marcia is pregnant,  
b. Marcia is pregnant.
- (13) a. The Senator<sub>i</sub> didn't reveal that he<sub>i</sub> had spent the winter in Monaco,  
b. The Senator spent the winter in Monaco.

- (14) a. It's odd that Oliver didn't kiss Pauline,  
b. Oliver didn't kiss Pauline.
- (15) a. The public doesn't realize that Nauru threatens our security.  
b. Nauru threatens our security.

According to McCawley, in each pair, the proposition expressed by the first sentence can reasonably be held to semantically presuppose the proposition expressed by the second sentence, that is, for the first sentence to be either true or false, the second sentence must be true. Semantic presupposition is thus described as a relationship between two propositions. Whereas a relation between the sentence in (11) and the meaning that the addressee is Sam is a pragmatic presupposition because that is 'a relation between an utterance and a proposition' (McCawley, 1981:237-238).

McCawley says pragmatically presupposed meaning is described in terms of appropriateness and inappropriateness. The sentence in (11) pragmatically presupposes that the addressee is Sam, and if it is not the case, the utterance becomes inappropriate. Similarly the following sentence pragmatically presupposes that the addressee is the President, and, if it is not the case, the utterance becomes inappropriate:

- (16) Mr. President, I order you to give me all your tapes.

The important point McCawley (1981) makes is that (i) meanings expressed by vocatives are not a part of propositional contents of the sentences, and (ii), if there is something wrong with the use of a vocative, the sentence becomes inappropriate rather than false. Because McCawley follows the traditional dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics, where only truth-conditional meanings are semantic meanings, he

describes the meanings expressed by 'Sam' and 'Mr President' as pragmatic meanings. We, however, analyse those meanings expressed by vocatives in the extended scope of semantics as we discussed in Chapter 1.

#### 4.3.1.2 Analysis of vocatives in Lyons (1977b)

As the relation between the title of Lyons (1977b) and its contents shows, Lyons uses the term 'semantics' in a wider sense than truth-conditional semanticists do. Lyons (1977b) includes the analysis of vocatives in the scope of semantic meaning.

The interesting point Lyons makes is that 'the lexeme which denotes the class can also be used to address an individual member of the class' (Lyons, 1977b:224). Compare the following sentences:

(17) Come here, dog,

(18) Come here, Fido.

Lyons says, although the former is analysed as 'Come here, you who are a dog' and the latter as 'Come here, you who are named Fido', the distinction between the predicative function of the statement 'It's a dog' and the appellative<sup>4</sup> function of the statement 'It's Fido' is not clear in vocative expressions.

This point concerns our former discussion about an intrinsic difference between an act of *asserting* and an act of *indicating*. In the act of *asserting*, 'pointing at' an entity or historic situation is clearly distinguished from assigning a type to it (predicating something of it). In the act of *indicating*, however, highlighting the present speech

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<sup>4</sup>Lyons uses the term 'appellative' for uses of names to mean their bearers which are not referential use: for example 'John' and 'John Smith' in the sentences, 'This is John' and 'He is called John Smith'. See Lyons(1977:217).

situation is not clearly distinguished from assigning a type to it. Both the type of word, like 'Fido', which is predominantly related to the demonstrative conventions in the act of *asserting* (e.g., 'Fido' in 'Fido is a dog') and the type of word like 'dog', which is predominantly related to the descriptive conventions in the act of *asserting* (e.g., 'dog' in 'Fido is a dog') can be used as a vocative.

This difference is reflected by the ways in which specifying the present speech situation by vocatives becomes *inappropriate*. Specifying the present speech situation by the vocative 'Gill':

(19) I'll call you tonight, Gill,

becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not Gill, but, say, Tessa: the name is wrong. However, specifying the present speech situation by the vocative 'blondie':

(20) Here you are, blondie,

becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not of the type: she is not blond.

Lyons describes the distinction between referring and describing as different types of lexeme, that is, proper names and common nouns. According to Lyons, 'Fido' is a proper name, and 'dog' is a common noun. However, there are a number of borderline cases:

[I]s 'the sun' a proper name (like 'The Hague') or an expression containing a common noun? Once we use 'sun' in the plural (as in the sentence 'There may be other suns in the universe as well as our own') we may be inclined to say that it is a common noun. But a nominalist might argue that cases like this can still be analysed like sentences containing proper names in the plural ('There are other Peters in the room') (Lyons, 1977b:225)<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup>See also Quine(1960).



There are borderline cases in vocatives, too. Consider the following examples:

(21) Judge, may we approach the bench?

(22) The dinner is ready, my Lord.

Does the speaker use the vocative 'Judge' in (21) in a similar way as he uses 'Fido' in (18)? Or does the speaker use it in a similar way as he uses 'dog' in (17)? It is difficult to decide. The vocative, 'Judge' is like 'Fido' in (18) in the sense that a particular entity is addressed by the word. It is also like 'dog' in (17) in the sense that the entity has to be of a particular type: if the entity is not a judge, he cannot be addressed by 'Judge'. For the same reason, it is difficult to say which way 'my Lord' in (22) is used.


It seems that in these borderline cases, the function of 'pointing to' an individual and that of 'pointing to' an attribute are mixed. As we discussed in Chapter 3, most words are either (i) principally correlated with 'pointing to' an entity or historic situation (by demonstrative conventions), and correlated with, to a much lesser degree, types of entity or historic situation (by descriptive conventions), or (ii) dominantly correlated with types of entity and situation (by descriptive conventions), and correlated with, to a much lesser degree, 'pointing to' an entity or historic situation (by demonstrative conventions). That is, the demonstrative conventions and descriptive conventions do not exclude each other. So we can reasonably assume that vocatives are also correlated with both types of convention. Some meanings more concern the hearer as a particular person, and other meanings more concern the hearer as a person of a type, and there are also mixed cases.

#### 4.3.1.3 Vocatives in our model

In both McCawley (1981) and Lyons (1977b), meanings expressed by vocatives are analysed as meanings about a hearer<sup>6</sup>. In Lyons (1977b), two types of vocative are differentiated. One is a proper name type: addressing the hearer by this type of vocative becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not the individual who is the bearer of the name. The other is a common noun type: addressing the hearer by this type of vocative becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not of the type the common noun correlated with. The vocative 'Sam' in (22a) in the following is an example of the proper name type, and 'stupid' in (22b) is an example of the common noun type. Let us show the meanings of the sentences in (22a) and (22b) in the diagrams in (23) and (24) respectively.

- (22) a. China is industrializing rapidly, Sam,  
b. China is industrializing rapidly, stupid.


(23)



'H=SAM' means that the hearer is the bearer of the name 'Sam', and by assigning this type to the present speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a hearer who is a particular individual with a proper name 'Sam'. We will describe the meanings expressed by the vocatives of the proper name type in the following section (4.3.1.3.1).

<sup>6</sup>The term 'addressee' is a more accurate word. However, we use the term 'hearer' because it is more widely accepted.

(24)



'S:stupid(H)' means that the speaker assigns stupidity to the hearer, and by assigning this type to the present speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker and a hearer share such a hostile relation that the speaker does not mind giving the hearer a negative and offensive type. We will describe the meanings expressed by the vocatives of descriptive type in 4.3.1.3.2<sup>7</sup>. In 4.3.1.3.3, we will describe the meanings expressed by the vocatives of other types.

#### 4.3.1.3.1 Proper name type

By uttering the vocative 'Sam' in (22a), the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a hearer who is a particular person with the name 'Sam'. In doing so, the speaker creates this type between him and the hearer. If the speaker addresses the hearer by a wrong name, the speaker's specifying the present speech situation as this type is *inappropriate*. The speaker cannot create this type of speech situation between him and the hearer because the hearer with whom the speaker is communicating does not have the name 'Sam'. The hearer most probably responds to the speaker by saying something like 'I'm not Sam'. This is similar to one of the cases where uttering a performative sentence becomes infelicitous, which Austin (1962) calls 'misapplication'. This is violation of the

<sup>7</sup>Since we also analyse adjectives which are used as a vocative, we use the term of 'the vocatives of the descriptive type', instead of Lyons' term of 'the vocatives of the common-name type'.

condition that 'the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved' (Austin, 1962: 15).

The linguistic conventions which concern addressing the hearer by his/her name seem to be further differentiated in terms of the social relations between the speaker and the hearer. Consider the following sentences.

- (25) a. There's a car at the door, Professor Johnson,  
b. There's a car at the door, Robert,  
c. There's a car at the door, Bertie.

Imagine the hearer is Professor Robert Johnson. If the appropriateness of specifying the present speech situation by addressing the hearer by his/her name entirely depends on who the hearer is, utterances of sentences in (25a) to (25c) are equally appropriate whoever utters it. However, this is not the case. These sentences can be *inappropriate* even if the hearer is Professor Robert Johnson.

If the wife of Professor Johnson utters the sentence in (25a), it sounds *inappropriate*, unless she says it jokingly or ironically. Similarly, if the student of Professor Johnson utters the sentence in (25c), it sounds *inappropriate*, unless they are in a specially close relation. This shows that specifying the speech situation by addressing the hearer by his/her name is further differentiated in terms of the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. A vocative of title plus last name is correlated with a type of distant relation between a speaker and a hearer, a vocative of first name is correlated with a type of close relation, and a vocative of diminutive form of the first name is correlated with a type of very close relation. By means of these linguistic conventions, the speaker specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation he shares with the hearer.

By addressing the hearer by title plus last name, the speaker specifies the present speech situation by a type where a speaker is communicating with a person to whom the speaker is socially distant. In doing so, the speaker creates this type of speech situation between him and the hearer. If the present speech situation is not of this type, addressing the hearer by title plus last name is *inappropriate*. The speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer *inappropriately*, which makes the hearer uncomfortable. The speaker can, however, intentionally specify the present speech situation by the *inappropriate* type: although the speaker knows that it is not the type of the present speech situation, he assigns the certain type to the present speech situation to be amusing (or to mean something else). For example, the wife of Professor Johnson can utter the sentence in (25a) above ironically: she knows the type where a speaker is socially distant to a hearer is not the type of the present speech situation she shares with her husband, but intentionally specifies the present speech situation as such.

By addressing the hearer by first name, on the other hand, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a person to whom the speaker is socially close. By addressing the hearer by a diminutive form of the first name, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a person to whom the speaker is socially very close. In doing so, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.


Different ways of addressing the hearer by name are also correlated with types of speech situation, i.e., formal and informal types of speech situation. Imagine the couple work for the same university. Even if they address each other by a diminutive form of the first name at home, they address each other by title plus last name at the board meeting of the university. This shows that addressing a hearer by a name is not

only correlated with the types of social relation, but also types of speech situation. Addressing a hearer by title plus last name is correlated with a formal type of speech situation. Using this relation, the speaker specifies the present speech as a formal type by addressing the hearer by title plus last name. Similarly there are conventional relations between addressing a hearer by first name and an informal type of speech situation, and between addressing a hearer by a diminutive form of the first name and a very informal type of speech situation. Using these relations, the speaker specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation he shares with the hearer.

It is possible that there are competing social elements in the speech situation. There are cases, for example, in which the speaker and the hearer are socially close but they are in a formal situation, or the speaker and the hearer are socially distant but they are in a very informal situation. By which type the speaker specifies the present speech situation in these cases is culturally specific. Describing these culturally specific elements are, however, beyond the scope of the present thesis.


Let us demonstrate meanings of the sentences in (25a) to (25c), where the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a certain type by addressing the hearer by 'Professor Johnson', 'Robert' or 'Bertie', in the diagrams in (26), (27) and (28).

(26)




'D(S,H)' means 'the speaker is socially distant to the hearer', and 'F' means 'the speech situation is formal'.

(27)



'C(S,H)' means 'the speaker is socially close to the hearer', and 'IF' means 'the speech situation is informal'.

(28)



'C+(S,H)' means 'the speaker is socially very close to the hearer', and 'IF+' means 'the speech situation is very informal'.

#### 4.3.1.3.2 Descriptive type

By addressing the hearer by a vocative of the descriptive type, the speaker specifies the type of the present speech situation in terms of his assigning a particular type to the attribute of the hearer. And in doing so, the speaker creates the type of speech situation.

#### 4.3.1.3.2.1 'Stupid' type

By addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid', the speaker specifies the present speech as a type where a speaker is assigning stupidity to a hearer. Consider the following example:

(29) You're standing in my foot, stupid.

Assigning the negative type of stupidity to the hearer seems to be correlated with a type of speech situation in which a speaker is offensive to a hearer. That is, by addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid', the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is offensive to a hearer.

There seem to be two different ways in which addressing the hearer by 'stupid' becomes *inappropriate*. It becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not of the type STUPID. If one has a brother who always addresses him by 'stupid', he might one day protest as follows:

(30) A: Let's go, stupid.

B: Don't call me stupid. I am not stupid.

Addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid' becomes also *inappropriate* when the speaker and the hearer do not share the speech situation where the speaker should/can be offensive to the hearer. Imagine someone utters the sentence, 'You're standing in my foot, stupid' to you, and it is not you who are standing in the speaker's foot. You would claim that the speaker should/can not be offensive to the hearer, i.e., you, because you are not standing in the speaker's foot. You might respond to the hearer in the following way:



(31) A: You're standing in my foot, stupid.

B: Don't call me stupid. I'm not standing in your foot.

Addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid' is correlated with the type of speech situation where a hearer is of the type STUPID and a speaker is offensive to a hearer. Using this relation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation he shares with the hearer as such by addressing the hearer by 'stupid'.

However, as the following example shows, in addressing the hearer by 'stupid' the speaker can specify the present speech situation as a type which is not offensive:

(32) I love you, stupid.

Addressing the hearer by 'stupid' is indirectly correlated with a type where a speaker assigns a hearer a negative type non-offensively, i.e., a type where giving a hearer a negative type is not counted negative because of the close and affectionate social relation between a speaker and a hearer. In short, addressing the hearer by 'stupid' is indirectly correlated with a type where a speaker is close and affectionate to a hearer. The relation between addressing the hearer by 'stupid' and this type of speech situation is not as conventional as the more straightforward relation between addressing a hearer by 'stupid' and the offensive type of speech situation (as in (29)). Therefore, the speaker has to mark 'non-offensiveness' so that the hearer can understand that the speaker creates a close and affectionate type of speech situation by addressing the hearer by 'stupid'. The speaker might mark 'non-offensiveness' by intonation, a content of assertion (as in 'I love you' in (32)) and so on, unless non-offensiveness is unmistakably obvious between the speaker and the hearer.

Not every word of the descriptive type is used as a vocative. Consider the following example:

- (33) a. Well done, clever.  
b. ?Well done, intelligent.

Addressing a hearer by 'clever', the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of the speaker's assigning cleverness to the hearer. That is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is of the type CLEVER and a speaker admires a hearer (about his quick understanding or skillfulness). However, addressing the hearer by 'intelligent' is not conventionally correlated with a particular type of speech situation. A potential type of speech situation where a speaker admires a hearer about his intellectual ability is not conventionalized in English.

#### 4.3.1.3.2.2 'Darling' type

There is a type of vocative which is directly correlated with types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. Consider the following examples:

- (34) a. I'm ready, darling,  
b. I'm ready, sweetheart.

The vocatives 'darling' and 'sweetheart' are correlated with a type of speech situation where a speaker is very intimate and affectionate to a hearer. Using these conventional relations, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as such by addressing the hearer by 'darling' or 'sweetheart'. In doing so, the speaker creates this type of speech situation between him and the hearer. Addressing the hearer by 'darling' or 'sweetheart' becomes *inappropriate* when the speaker does not have a close and

affectionate relation to the hearer or the hearer does not want to share this type of speech situation with the speaker. The hearer might express this as follows:

(35) A: Nice weather, darling.

B: Don't call me darling. I'm not your darling.

#### 4.3.1.3.2.3 'Blondie' type

There is another type of vocative. Consider the following examples:

(36) a. Here you are, blondie.

b. Here you are, biggie.

By 'blondie' or 'biggie', the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of assigning a particular type to a hearer's prominent physical attribute. That is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is of the type BLOND or BIG and a speaker is frank and friendly to a hearer. If the word has a negative meaning, addressing the hearer by the word can be abusive or insulting.

Consider the following Japanese examples:

(37) b.     *ashi wo       fun de iru yo,   chibi .*  
              foot           stand in                   short

'(You) are standing in (my) foot, short'

a.     *ashi wo       fun de iru yo,   hage,*  
              foot           stand in                   bald

'(You) are standing in (my) foot, bald'

*Chibi* in (37a) is a slang word for 'short' (*se-ga-hikui* is a standard expression for 'short') and expresses a negative meaning. By addressing the hearer by *chibi*, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is of the type SHORT and a speaker is abusive or insulting to a hearer. In doing so, the speaker creates an abusive type of speech situation between him and the hearer. Similarly, by addressing the hearer by *hage* ('bald') (in (37b)), the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is of the type BALD and a speaker is abusive or insulting to a hearer.

There is an interesting difference between addressing the 'stupid' type of vocative and addressing the 'blondie' type of vocative. By addressing the hearer by 'stupid', the speaker creates an offensive type of speech situation even though the hearer is not of the type. If, for example, the speaker utters, 'You're standing in my foot, stupid', the speaker creates an offensive speech situation between him and the person he speaks to. This is so, even if the person is not of the type STUPID. If the speaker, on the other hand, addresses the hearer by 'blondie' where the hearer does not have blonde hair, the speaker cannot create a friendly type of speech situation between him and the hearer. This is the case of misapplication in Austin's term: the hearer is not appropriately addressed as 'blondie'.

This difference between 'stupid' type of vocative and 'blondie' type of vocative comes from the difference in lexical meaning of each type of word. Words such as 'stupid' and 'clever' express judgmental value. Therefore, if the speaker uses this type of word, she cannot avoid expressing her positive or negative judgment. When the speaker uses this type of word as a vocative to specify the present speech situation, the speaker expresses positive or negative judgment about the speech situation she shares

with the hearer, or the hearer himself. Even if addressing the hearer by the vocative is *inappropriate*, the speaker expresses her positive or negative judgment about the present speech situation or the hearer all the same. On the other hand, words such as 'blond' and 'big' express non-judgmental descriptive value (although being blonde or big can be given some social value). When the speaker uses words such as 'blondie' and 'biggie' as a vocative, he specifies the present speech situation in terms of his giving a non-judgmental description of the attribute of the hearer. Therefore, if the description is wrong, the speaker cannot specify the speech situation.

Addressing the hearer with blonde hair by 'blondie' becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer does not share a frank and friendly type of speech situation with the speaker. If a blonde school teacher is addressed by 'blondie' by her student, she might as well respond as follows:

(38) A: Good morning, blondie.

B: Don't call me blondie. I am Miss Shalliday.

#### 4.3.1.3.3 Other types

##### 4.3.1.3.3.1 'Judge' type


There is a type of vocative which is in between the proper-name type and the descriptive type. As the capital letters of 'Judge' and 'President' show, the vocative of 'Judge' or 'Mr President' is correlated with the hearer as a particular individual. And it is also correlated with the hearer as a person in a particular position.

(39) a. Judge, the witness is in the court.

b. Mr. President, I order you to give me all your tapes.

By addressing the hearer by 'Judge' or 'Mr President', the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of the speaker's communicating with a particular individual who is specified in terms of his/her position. That is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a person in a specified position, which is of some importance. In doing so, the speaker creates this type of speech situation between him and the hearer. Specifying the present speech situation by this type of vocative becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not in the position or the hearer's being in the position is not important. For example, addressing the hearer by 'Judge' is *inappropriate* when the hearer is not in the position. Addressing the hearer by 'Judge' becomes also *inappropriate* when, for example, the speaker is an old friend of the hearer, and they communicate with each other as friends. Addressing the hearer by this type of vocative is also correlated with a formal type of speech situation (where the position of the hearer is of importance). Let us show in the following the meaning the speaker *asserts* (about the historic situation) and *indicates* (about the speech situation) by uttering the sentence in (39a):

(40)




#### 4.3.1.3.3.2 'Sir' type

By addressing the hearer by 'Sir', the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, or a formal type of speech situation. In doing so, the speaker creates either type of speech situation between him

and the hearer. Let us show the meaning the speaker *asserts* and *indicates* by uttering the sentence in (41) in the diagram in (42) .

(41) There is a car at the door, Sir.

(42)



Addressing the hearer by 'Sir' becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is not socially higher than the speaker and the speech situation is not formal. For example, if the speaker addressing the hearer who is his inferior by 'Sir' in a drinking session, his addressing the hearer by 'Sir' is *inappropriate*.

The hearer might reject this type of speech situation the speaker created for the reason that he does not want to emphasise that social element of the speech situation. Imagine a Ph.D. student addressing her supervisor by 'Sir' in the meeting. Her supervisor might feel more comfortable with an academic type of speech situation where communicators exchange their opinions freely without worrying too much about their social ranks. Then he might respond as the second utterance in the following exchange:

(43) A: This is the paper I wrote, Sir.

B: You don't have to sir me.

By uttering 'You don't have to sir me', the speaker B rejects the type of speech situation the speaker A created, and suggests a more informal type.

This shows that if there are several competing social elements in the speech situation, to assign the present speech situation as a certain type is to emphasise that element of the speech situation, and create the type of speech situation accordingly. This is an important point about specifying the present speech situation by a vocative. We should, however, analyse the conventions which concern this type of meaning on a different level. These conventions are between specifying the present speech situation by a certain vocative rather than others and the element of the speech situation the speaker emphasises, rather than specifying the present speech situation by a certain vocative and a type of speech situation.

#### 4.3.1.3.4 Summary for vocatives

So far we have distinguished three types of vocative and analysed types of speech situation the speaker creates by addressing the hearer by them. They are vocatives of the proper-name type, those of descriptive type, and those of the mixed type. Let us show in the following example different types of vocative and different types of speech situation the speaker creates by them:

(44)

	VOCATIVES	TYPES OF SPEECH SITUATION
(I)	Proper-name type	A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a particular individual with a proper name
	(i) Title + last name	A speaker is socially distant to a hearer or the speech



- |       |                    |  |
|-------|--------------------|--|
|       | e.g. Prof. Johnson | situation is formal                                      |
| (ii)  | First name         | A speaker is socially close to a hearer or the speech    |
|       | e.g. Robert        | situation is informal                                    |
| (iii) | Diminutive form    | A speaker is socially very close to a hearer or the      |
|       | e.g. Bertie        | speech situation is very informal                        |
|       |                    |  |
| (II)  | Descriptive type   | A speaker gives a certain type to a hearer's attribute   |
|       |                    |  |
| (i)   | judgmental         | A speaker expresses a certain judgment about a hearer's  |
|       | e.g. stupid        | particular attribute                                     |
| (ii)  | social relational  | A speaker and a hearer are in a certain social relation  |
|       | e.g. darling       |  |
| (iii) | descriptive        | A speaker describes a certain physical attribute of a    |
|       | e.g. blonde        | hearer   |
|       |                    |  |
| (III) | Mixed type         |  |
| (i)   | position           | A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a particular |
|       | e.g. Judge         | person who is in a position, and the speech situation is |
|       |                    | formal   |
| (ii)  | social relation    | A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a person     |
|       | e.g. Sir           | who has a certain social relation to the speaker, or the |
|       |                    | speech situation is formal                               |

In the present section, we have shown that vocatives (in English) are conventional devices which characterise the communication between the speaker and the hearer in terms of certain elements of the hearer or the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. By means of these conventional devices, the speaker differentiates types of communication (types of speech situation, in our terminology) and specifies the

present communication (the present speech situation, in our terminology). This is independent of differentiating types of things in the world, and *referring* to a particular entity and *predicating* something of it ('pointing to' a particular entity and assigning a type to it, in our theory).

#### 4.3.2 Grammatical Meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub>

In the present section, we discuss meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> expressed by grammatical devices. Before we go into it, let us define grammatical meanings and lexical meanings. A lexical meaning of a word, say, 'man' is defined as its difference from meanings of sense-related words, such as 'woman', 'animal', 'machine', 'God', 'wife' and so on. In a sense, the meaning of 'man' has different aspects and each aspect of meaning stands out when compared with a particular antonym or synonym. For example, when 'man' is compared with 'wife' in the expression 'man and wife', it becomes clear that the aspect which is a synonym of 'husband' is meant. In other words, it is not always clear which aspect of the meaning of a word is called for until it is in a certain context or compared by a certain antonym or synonym.

It is reasonably clear what contrast a grammatical meaning makes. For example, it is clear that an inflectional morpheme '-s' in 'boys' is differentiated in terms of number, which makes a contrast with 'boy' without '-s'. Similarly an inflectional morpheme '-ed' in 'walked' is differentiated in terms of tense, which contrasts with 'walk' without '-ed'. Contrasting in terms of a certain meaning applies over most words which are involved. For example, we find in most count nouns in English the distinction between plurality which is expressed by the inflectional morpheme and singularity expressed by the absence of the morpheme. Similarly we find in most verbs the distinction between past tense which is expressed by the inflectional morpheme and the present tense expressed by the absence of it. So we know that in the sentence in

(45) the speaker refers to more than one boy, and the speaker refers to a past situation in (46).

(45) The boys are in the playground.

(46) Jeremy walked out of the room.

If we define grammatical meanings like this, the meaning expressed by the distinction between *tu* and *vous* in French is a grammatical meaning: in referring to a hearer by *tu*, a speaker contrasts it with referring to her by *vous*. The distinction is concerned with types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer. In the following section, we describe how different personal pronouns are correlated with types of speech situation.

#### **4.3.2.1 Personal pronouns**

##### **4.3.2.1.1 T/V pronouns**

The T/V distinction in the second-person pronoun is well known to linguists. Brown and Gilman (1960) first drew attention to the generality of the pattern of exchange: in relations of intimacy, A and B exchange T pronouns; in relations of social distance (or non-intimacy) A and B exchange V pronouns; in relations of dominance where A ranks higher than B, A gives T and receives V<sup>8</sup>.

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

<sup>8</sup>According to Brown and Levinson (1978), the T/V distinction is well studied, too: in addition to the cases described by Brown and Gilman (1960) for French, German, Spanish and Italian, Friedrich (1972) provides data for Russian; Comrie (1975) for other Slavic languages and for Greek; there are also data from Hungarian, Swedish, Czech, Hindi, Quechua, Tamil, Welsh and some African languages.

According to Brown and Gilman (1960), *tu* in (47a) shows that the speaker and the hearer are intimate, and *vous* in (47b) shows either (i) that the speaker and the hearer are socially distant, or (ii) that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker. In the second case (in (ii)) the speaker expects to be addressed asymmetrically by *tu*:

- (47) a. *Tu es le professeur,*  
       b. *Vous êtes le professeur.*

Let us restate this in our theoretical framework. As we discussed in Chapter 3 (3.2.2.2.1.2) by the second-person pronoun the speaker 'points to' (refers to) a person as the one who plays the role of the hearer. 'Pointing to' a person as the one who plays the role of the hearer is further differentiated in terms of the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. 'Pointing to' the hearer by *tu* is correlated either (i) with a type of social relation where a speaker is socially close to a hearer, or (ii) with a type where a speaker is socially higher than a hearer. When the speaker utters the sentence in (47a), we cannot decide which type the speaker assigns to the present speech situation. If the speaker expects the hearer to address him symmetrically by *tu* in his turn, then we know the speaker assigns to the present situation the type in (i) where a speaker is socially close to a hearer. If the speaker expects the hearer to address him asymmetrically by *vous*, we know the speaker assigns the type in (ii) where a speaker is socially higher than a hearer. By means of the linguistic convention about *tu*, the speaker might create between him and the hearer the type of speech situation where a speaker is socially close to a hearer, hoping that the hearer accepts this type and addresses him back symmetrically by *tu*. Or the speaker might create between him and the hearer the type of speech situation where a speaker is socially higher than him, hoping that the hearer accepts this type and addresses him back asymmetrically by *vous*.

Similarly, ‘pointing to’ the hearer by *vous* is correlated either (i) with a type of speech situation where a speaker is socially distant to a hearer or (ii) with a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker. The speaker might create between him and the hearer a type of speech situation in (i), hoping that the hearer accepts this type and addresses him back symmetrically by *vous*. Or the speaker might create between him and the hearer a type of speech situation in (ii), hoping that the hearer accept this type and addresses him back asymmetrically by *tu*. Let us show the meaning expressed by the sentence in (47a) in the diagram (48) and that expressed by the one in (47b) in the diagram in (49):



By specifying the present speech situation as either type, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer. ‘Pointing to’ the hearer by, say, *tu* becomes *inappropriate* when the speaker is not close to the hearer and the speaker is not socially higher than the hearer.




#### 4.3.2.1.2 First-person pronouns in Japanese

In Japanese there are three first-person pronouns, *ore*, *boku*, and *watashi*, by which a male speaker refers to himself. Among them, *ore* and *boku* are marked for male speakers and *watashi* is used by both male and female speakers. So a Japanese male speaker has three alternatives to express one and the same proposition, ‘pointing to’ (referring to) himself by one of these first-person pronouns. Consider the following examples:

- (50) a.     *ore*           *wa*   *tookyo*       *shusshin*    *da*,  
      b.     *boku*          *wa*   *tookyo*       *shusshin*    *da/desu*,  
      c.     *watashi*       *wa*   *tookyo*       *shusshin*    *desu*.  
          I                   Tokyo       from       be  
          ‘I am from Tokyo’

The difference among *ore*, *boku*, and *watashi* concerns different ways the speaker presents himself in the speech situation. As we discussed in Chapter 3 (3.2.2.2.1.1), by the first-person pronoun the speaker ‘points to’ himself as an individual who is playing the role of the speaker. ‘Pointing to’ oneself as a speaker is further differentiated in terms of gender and formality/informality in Japanese. In uttering the sentence in (50a) with *ore*, the speaker presents himself (as a male speaker) to the hearer very informally, almost vulgarly, in the speech situation. That is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a very informal type where a male person plays the role of the speaker. In uttering the sentence in (50b) with *boku*, the speaker presents himself (as a male speaker) to the hearer informally in the speech situation. That is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as an informal type where a male person plays the role of the speaker. In uttering the sentence in (50c) with *watashi*, a speaker presents himself formally to a hearer in the speech situation. That

is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a formal type. Let us show the meanings of the sentences in (50a), (50b) and (50c) in the diagrams in (51), (52), and (53) respectively.



By specifying the present speech situation as one of these types, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer. If the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a certain type by one of these first-person pronouns, and the present speech situation is not of the type, ‘pointing’ becomes *inappropriate*. For example, if the speaker ‘points to’ himself by *ore* in the utterance to his boss in the business meeting, his utterance is *inappropriate*, since the social parameter of informality determined by the use of the pronoun (IF) is not consistent with the social

parameter permitted within the actual speech situation. The type of speech situation the speaker created between him and the hearer *inappropriately* cannot be shared by the hearer. The hearer probably thinks that the speaker is too stupid to see obvious elements which concern a type of speech situation, or the speaker lacks linguistic ability. The hearer might believe that the speaker is a rebel who ignores the importance of social relations between people or social settings.

In T/V languages and Japanese, first-person and second-person pronouns are further differentiated as to the social relations between the speaker and the hearer or formality/informality of the speech situation. Using the conventional relations between a particular first-person or second-person pronoun and a type of speech situation, the speaker of these languages specifies the present speech situation as a certain type. In doing so, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.

#### **4.3.2.2 Japanese honorifics**

Although we will discuss Japanese honorifics fully in Chapter 5, we explain in the present section one type of Japanese honorifics, which is grammaticalised meaning of  $CONTEXT_C$ .



Following Tokieda (1941), which we will discuss in detail in Chapter 5, Shibatani (1990) adopts the two-way distinction of honorifics, ‘addressee-controlled honorification’ and ‘referent-controlled honorification’:

Though very often the subject happens to be identical with the addressee, these referent-controlled honorification processes must be distinguished from addressee-controlled honorification, which is far more wide-spread. In other words, Japanese possesses two types of honorification processes along the speaker-addressee axis and the speaker-referent axis. (Shibatani, 1990, 375).





(54b) is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially higher than a speaker in a hierarchical situation, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is formal. The absence of the honorific auxiliary in (54a), on the other hand, is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is socially equal to or higher than a hearer, (ii) a speaker is socially close to a hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is informal. By using these relations between the presence/absence of the honorific auxiliaries and types of speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as one of these types. The meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence without the honorific auxiliary *mashi* in (54a) is shown in the diagram in (56), and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence with *mashi* in (54b) is shown in the diagram in (57).



With or without the honorific auxiliary *mashi*, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as one of those two types. In doing so, the speaker creates between him and the hearer either type of speech situation. Uttering the sentence without the honorific auxiliary becomes *inappropriate* when the hearer is socially higher than the speaker,

the speaker is socially distant to the hearer, and the speech situation is formal. For example, if the speaker utters a sentence without *mashi* when the hearer is his superior and they talk about a business matter, the utterance becomes *inappropriate*. In this case, since the actual social parameters of the speech situation are such that the type of speech situation the speaker creates between him and the hearer cannot be shared by the hearer. *Indicating* something about the speech situation does not affect the truth or falsity of the proposition expressed. That is, *indicating* that the speech situation is of a certain type by means of the convention about the honorific auxiliary *mashi* is independent of *asserting* that a historic situation is of a certain type. In other words, the speaker expresses meanings about  $CONTEXT_C$  independently of expressing truth-conditional meanings.

The meanings expressed by *referent-controlled honorifics* concern both the present speech situation and the historic situation. In Chapter 5, we will develop the theory to explain this type of honorific in Japanese.

#### 4.3.3 Meanings of $CONTEXT_C$ expressed by lexemes

We have claimed that meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  are either *appropriate* or *inappropriate* in terms of the social parameters of the speech situation the speaker and the hearer share. This is a crucial difference from meanings about historic situations, which are either true or false. Is it possible that meanings about historic situations are to be *inappropriate* socially? This seems to be the case. Some lexemes by which the speaker makes an assertion about historic situations also serve to typify types of speech situation.

#### 4.3.3.1 Slang: 'kick the bucket' and 'die'

As we discussed in 4.2.1, by uttering the vocative 'Sir', the speaker indicates that the speech situation he shares with the hearer is of a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. By uttering the vocative 'stupid', the speaker indicates that the speech situation he shares with the hearer is of a type where a speaker is in a position to assign stupidity to a hearer. So the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (58a) is different from the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (58b). Although the speaker expresses one and the same meaning about the historic situation uttering these sentence, he assigns different types to the present speech situation.

- (58) a. The door is open, Sir.  
b. The door is open, stupid.

Let us compare 'kick the bucket' and 'die'.

- (59) a. He kicked the bucket.  
b. He died.

These sentences do not express exactly the same meaning. The difference, however, does not concern types of historic situation: KICK THE BUCKET and DIE do not correspond to different types of action. Therefore, the following question sounds strange:

- (60) Did he kick the bucket or die?

The difference seems to concern types of speech situation, but does not directly concern types of social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer. Both 'kicked the bucket' and 'die' can be used with the vocative 'Sir', which expresses types of social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer.

- (61) a. He kicked the bucket, Sir.  
b. He died, Sir.

Although the sentence in (61a) sounds a little odd socially, it is acceptable if a soldier utters this sentence to his superior to report his fellow soldier's death in an amusing, non-serious way.

The distinction between 'kick the bucket' and 'die' does not seem to concern whether or not the speaker is in a position to assign a certain type to the hearer's attribute. As is shown in the following example, speaker's assigning stupidity to the hearer by the vocative 'stupid' seems to be independent of his assigning the type correlated by either 'kick the bucket' or 'die'.

- (62) a. He kicked the bucket, stupid.  
b. He died, stupid.

It does not concern types of social closeness between the speaker and the hearer, either. This is shown in the following example:


- (63) a. He kicked the bucket, darling.  
b. He died, darling.

What types of speech situation then does the distinction between 'kick the bucket' and 'die' concern? We should find it out in describing when and how either 'kick the bucket' or 'die' becomes *inappropriate*. If the speaker utters the sentence with 'kick the bucket' to the family of the dead man, it is very *inappropriate*. If the speaker utters it when asked how his father is in a conversation with the Queen, it is very *inappropriate*, too. This means that the utterance becomes *inappropriate* to the hearer (the family of the dead man, or the Queen) about the way the speaker describes the death. The speaker, by uttering the sentence with 'kick the bucket', assigns the present speech situation a type where death of the particular person is described very informally, almost vulgarly, with some amusing tone.

Because 'kick the bucket' expresses a very informal type of speech situation, the sentence in (61a) sounds somewhat odd. By the vocative, 'Sir', the speaker assigns the present speech situation a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, and also assigns a very informal type by the slang verb, 'kick the bucket'. Since the speech situation where social superiority matters is usually formal, the type expressed by 'Sir' and the type expressed by 'kick the bucket' crash. It is, however, possible that social superiority matters in a very informal situation, as we showed above.

Let us show the meaning expressed by (58a) in the following diagram:

(64)



By means of vocatives, the speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of a certain type, which is independent of *asserting* that the historic situation is of a certain type. On the other hand, slang words such as 'kick the bucket' are concerned both with *asserting* something about the historic situation and with *indicating* something about the present speech situation. That is, one layer of the meaning of 'kick the bucket' expresses a type of action, which is equivalent to the type expressed by 'die', and another layer of it expresses a type of speech situation. The relation between words like 'kick the bucket' and types of speech situation have been described in sociolinguistics or other fields of pragmatics as the relation between words and *registers*. By hypothesising two layers of meanings, i.e., the layer of a type of action and the layer of a type of speech situation, we can describe both truth-conditional and social meanings of these words as semantic meanings and give a unitary explanation of their meanings.

#### 4.3.3.2 Social forms of reference (1)

In 4.3.1, we have shown that vocatives with certain proper names become *inappropriate* depending on the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. Let us have those examples here again:

- (65) a. There's a car at the door, Professor Johnson,  
b. There's a car at the door, Robert,  
c. There's a car at the door, Bertie.

We have shown that by uttering the vocatives, 'Professor Johnson', 'Robert' and 'Bertie', the speaker assigns to the present speech situation different types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer, or different types of speech situation. In doing so, the speaker creates the particular type of speech situation between him and

the hearer. The utterance becomes *inappropriate* when the present speech situation is not of the type *indicated*.

Does the distinction among the vocatives ‘Professor Johnson’, ‘Robert’ and ‘Bertie’ exist when these words are used to refer to a person? It seems it does. Consider the following example:

- (66) a. Professor Johnson is tall,  
b. Robert is tall,  
c. Bertie is tall.

Just like uttering, say, the sentence in (65c) becomes *inappropriate* when the speaker is not close to the hearer, uttering the sentence in (66c) seems to be *inappropriate* when the speaker is not close to the person referred to. Uttering the sentence in (66c) also becomes *inappropriate* when the speaker and the hearer are in a formal speech situation.

When uttering the sentence in (66c) is *inappropriate*, i.e., when the speaker is not close to the person referred to by ‘Bertie’, to whom is the utterance *inappropriate*? To the hearer or the referent? Although one can claim that it is *inappropriate* to the referent, we defend the idea that it is *inappropriate* to a hearer<sup>9</sup>. Suppose little Robert goes to elementary school and utters the following sentence to his teacher, referring to himself by ‘Bertie’:

- (67) Bertie is hungry.

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
<sup>9</sup>This point concerns the classification of honorifics in Japanese, which is discussed by Tokieda(1941) and others. See 5.2.1.2.



His teacher will correct his usage on the grounds that it is *inappropriate* to speak to the teacher at school referring to himself as ‘Bertie’, not on the grounds that he and the referent are not close enough: because the speaker and the referent are one and the same person in this case, the question of closeness does not apply.

Referring to a person by a certain name can be *inappropriate* to the hearer in the sense that the speaker assigns the wrong type to the social relation between the speaker and the referent, which is misleading to the hearer. If the speaker utters, say, the sentence in (66c), the hearer reasonably assumes that the speaker is close to the referent. Referring to a person by a diminutive form is correlated with the speaker’s closeness to the person referred to. By using this relation, the speaker *indicates* that the speaker is close to the referent by referring to him by a diminutive form. So, if the speaker refers to a person by a diminutive form but does not know him personally, the speaker *indicates* something *inappropriate*, which might lead to the hearer’s misunderstanding of the social aspect of the world.

Let us show the meanings expressed by the sentence in (66a), (66b) and (66c) in the following diagrams of (68), (69) and (70) respectively:




As the overlap of the circle and the square in the diagram shows, the meanings expressed by the referring forms ‘Professor Johnson’, ‘Robert’ and ‘Bertie’ concern both the historic situation and the speech situation. The social relation between the speaker and the referent, Professor Robert Johnson, is linguistically given a type in

the speech situation. In doing so, the speaker enforces an existing social relation outside the speech situation.


Even if the speaker is socially close to the referent, the speaker has to refer to the person by title plus last name in a formal speech situation. So referring to a person by a title plus last name is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is socially distant to a referent or (ii) a speech situation is formal.

(69)



Referring to a person by his first name is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is close to a referent or (ii) a speech situation is informal.

(70)



Referring to a person by a diminutive form of the first name is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is very close to a referent or (ii) a speech situation is very informal.

The type the speaker gives to the social relation between him and the referent might be disputed by the hearer. Consider the following example:

- (71) Student A: Is Ronnie in?  
Secretary: Dr Cann is in the board meeting.

Actually, I heard this conversation at the linguistics department. The context was as follows: when an undergraduate student came in the secretary's office and asked her about a particular person, Dr Ronnie Cann, the secretary answered in the way shown in (71), putting the stress on 'Dr Cann'. It seems that she meant that the speaker, the undergraduate student, isn't socially close to the referent, the lecturer. It is possible that she meant that the present speech situation is formal, but it didn't seem to be the case. In this case the speaker gave the social relation between him and Dr Ronnie Cann a type where a speaker is close to a person referred to by referring to him by his first name. The hearer argued against this type, and *indicated* that the social relation between them is of a type where a speaker is distant to a person referred to.

#### 4.3.3.3 Social forms of reference (2)

By referring to a person by a certain word, the speaker marks a social aspect of the person referred to. 'Lady' and 'woman' are one of those pairs of words whose non-factual, social meanings differ considerably. Consider the following example, which is a part of the movie, *Howards End*.

- (72) Maid: There's a woman to see you, ma'am.  
Tibby: A woman, not a lady, Annie?  
Maid: She won't give her name.  
Margaret: Ask her to come up.


The distinction between 'woman' and 'lady' and that between 'woman' and 'man' are of different kinds. In a sense, the layer of meaning of the word 'woman' which contrasts with 'lady' differs from the layer of the meaning which contrasts with 'man'. As the above example shows, the layer of the type WOMAN which contrasts with LADY, concerns a social type. To assign a person the type WOMAN in this sense, one has to read social codes the person is sending and consider whether or not the social aspect of the person is of this type. This layer of the type WOMAN is not as obvious as the layer which contrasts with the type MAN. In most cases, it is quite obvious whether or not a person is of the type WOMAN which contrasts with the type MAN. To assign the type WOMAN, not the type MAN, is safely said to report a fact in the world.

By means of the contrast between 'woman' and 'lady', the speaker assigns a particular social type to a person referred to. And in doing so, the speaker specifies a non-factual, social layer on the top of the factual, i.e., truth-conditional, layer of the historic situation. In uttering the sentence in (73a) in contrast to the sentence (73b), the speaker not only *asserts* that a particular female person is at a particular door, but also *indicates* that the person is socially non-superior.

- (73) a. The woman is at the door,  
b. The lady is at the door.


Let us show the meanings expressed by the sentences in (73a) and (73b) in the diagram in (74) and (75) respectively:

(74)



‘Non-S(x)’ means that x is socially non-superior.


(75)



‘S(x)’ means that x is socially superior.

There are cases where the speaker assigns a person the type LADY for the reason that the speech situation is so formal that the speaker is expected to refer to a person by a word which expresses social superiority. That is, referring to a person by ‘lady’ is also correlated with a formal type of speech situation, which is shown in the following diagram:

(76)



There is a similar contrast in social meanings among words like ‘gentleman’, ‘chap’, ‘fellow’, and ‘bloke’. Vulgar words like ‘bastard’ and ‘tart’ also concern the social aspect of a referent.

The difference between ‘Japanese’ and ‘Jap’ also concerns the social aspect of a person referred to. In one layer of the word ‘Jap’ is correlated with a type of nationality, which contrasts with ‘American’, ‘English’, ‘Korean’, and so on. There is

another layer, which is correlated with an extremely negative type which concerns the nationality. In referring to a particular person by 'Jap', the speaker not only picks out the entity by his nationality, but also *indicates* a negative character of the referent concerning the nationality.

The hearer might as well argue against the type which the speaker *indicates* by referring to the person by 'Jap':

(77) A: That Jap is extremely shy.

B: Could you stop calling my friend 'Jap'?

What the second speaker argues against is to assign the negative type to the social aspect of the referent in terms of the nationality.

#### 4.3.4 Summary of types of meaning of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub>

We have defined meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> as meanings the speaker *indicates*, which concern the speech situation. By means of the descriptive conventions which correlate types of speech situation and vocatives, personal pronouns, and the honorific auxiliary, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a particular type. We have described this process as speaker's act of creating the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.

There are different linguistic devices by which the speaker specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation. Vocatives (in English) are such a linguistic device, though it is not fully grammaticalised. Addressing the hearer by a certain vocative is 'outside' referring and predicating. The speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of a certain type independently of *asserting* that the historic situation

the speaker 'points to' (refers to) is of a certain type. There are two types of vocative, proper-name type and descriptive type. The proper-name type of vocative is dominantly correlated with the hearer as a particular individual, and a speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of the social relation between the speaker and the hearer as a particular individual. The descriptive type of vocative is dominantly correlated with the hearer with a particular attribute, and the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of the relation where the speaker assigns a judgmental, social, or descriptive type to the hearer.

The T/V distinction in second-person pronouns is a grammatical device of differentiating types of speech situation. By means of the T-pronoun or the V-pronoun, the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of social closeness or distance, or social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer. Similarly Japanese first-person pronouns are differentiated in terms of (i) social closeness or distance between the speaker and the hearer, (ii) the social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer, and (iii) formality/informality of the speech situation<sup>10</sup>. *Indicating* that the present speech situation is of a certain type by means of a particular second-person pronoun in T/V languages or a particular first-person pronoun in Japanese overlaps with *asserting* that the historic situation is of a certain type. By a particular second-person pronoun, the speaker 'points to' a particular person in terms of the participant role in the present speech situation<sup>11</sup>, which is a part of *asserting*. By the second-person pronoun, a speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of a particular type. That is, one layer of the meaning of the second-person pronoun is correlated with a particular individual to whom the speaker 'points' (as a part of *asserting*), and another layer of the meaning is correlated with a type of speech situation the speaker assigns to the present speech situation (as *indicating*).

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<sup>10</sup>Japanese second-person pronouns are also differentiated in terms of types of speech situation. We will come back to this point in 5.3.3.

<sup>11</sup>See 3.2.1.1.2.1.

The addressee-controlled honorifics, which are marked by the presence or absence of the honorific auxiliary, are also a grammatical device to specify the type of the present speech situation. Unlike the second-person pronouns in T/V languages and the first-person and second-person pronouns in Japanese, the addressee-controlled honorifics do not contribute to the meaning about a historic situation which is asserted. By means of the presence or absence of the honorific auxiliary, the speaker indicates that the present speech situation is of a certain type, independently of *asserting* that the historic situation is of a type. By means of the addressee-controlled honorifics, the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of (i) social closeness or distance between the speaker and the hearer, (ii) the social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer, and (iii) formality/informality of the speech situation.

Let us summarize these linguistic devices and types of speech situation expressed by them in the following:



(78)

Linguistic devices

TYPES OF SPEECH SITUATION

- |       |                                 |   |
|-------|---------------------------------|---|
| (I)   | Vocatives (proper-name)         | A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a particular individual   |
| (II)  | Vocatives(descriptive)          | A speaker assigns a certain type to a hearer's attribute  |
| (III) | Personal pronouns               | A speaker is socially close to or distant from a hearer<br><br>A hearer is socially higher or lower than/equal to a speaker<br><br>A speech situation is formal or informal |
| (IV)  | Addressee-controlled honorifics | A speaker is socially close to or distant from a hearer<br><br>A hearer is socially higher or lower than/equal to a speaker<br><br>A speech situation is formal or informal |

We have also shown that, while *asserting* that the historic situation is of a certain type, a speaker can *indicate* something about the present speech situation. For example, by means of a slang word, the speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of an informal type. Slang like *kick the bucket*, which has a counterpart whose meaning differs only in the formality of speech, has two layers of meaning. One is correlated with a type of historic situation, and the other is correlated with a type of speech

situation. By *indicating* that the present speech situation is of an informal type, for example, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.

It is also possible that the speaker makes an indication which concerns both the present speech situation and the historic situation. For example, by 'pointing to' (referring to) a person by a diminutive form of the first name, the speaker *indicates* that the speaker (in the speech situation) is close to the referent (in the historic situation). 'Pointing to' (referring to) a person by a particular proper name is correlated, by convention, not only with picking out an individual who has the name, but also with *indicating* that the speaker and the referent are in a certain social relation. In other words, by means of the conventions which differentiate 'pointing to' a particular person in terms of the social relation between a speaker and a referent, the speaker specifies the social relation between her and the person. In doing so, the speaker enforces the existing social relation between her and the person.

We have also shown that some words are not only correlated with a factual aspect of the historic situation but with a non-factual, social aspect of the historic situation. For example, when the speaker 'points to' a person by 'that lady' in contrast to 'that woman', the speaker *indicates* that the person is socially superior. These words are correlated, by convention, not only with a type which is verifiable but with a social type.

Let us show in the following these social meanings expressed through 'pointing to' (referring to) a person and assigning a type to it (predicating something of it) by uttering a particular word:

(79)

Linguistic devices	Types of speech situation or historic situation
--------------------	---

(I)	Slang	A speech situation is informal
-----	-------	--------------------------------

(II)	Referring expressions (proper-name type)	
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(i)	Title + last name	A speaker is socially distant from a referent the speech situation is formal
-----	-------------------	---

(ii)	First name	A speaker is socially close to a referent the speech situation is informal
------	------------	---

(iii)	Diminutive form	A speaker is socially very close to a referent the speech situation is very informal
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
(III)	Referring expressions	A referent has a certain social attribute (descriptive type)
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We have so far demonstrated these meanings in three types of diagram. We show the meanings the speaker *indicates* something about the speech situation, independently of *asserting* something about a historic situation in the diagram in (80), where the circle which stands for the speech situation and the square which stands for the historic situation are separated. We show the meanings the speaker *indicates* about the social relation between the speaker (in the speech situation) and the referent (in the historic situation) in the diagram in (81), where the circle overlaps with the square. We show the meanings the speaker *indicates* something about a historic situation in the diagram in (82), where the small circle which expresses a social aspect of the referent or a social relation between the referent and another participant is in the square which expresses a historic situation. We will explain this in Chapter 5 (5.4.2.1).

(80)



(81)



(82)



We have shown that there is a type of conventional meaning which is expressed by grammatical and lexical devices, which is not truth-conditional. We call it meaning of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  and define it as a meaning which the speaker *indicates* rather than *asserts*. The meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  essentially concern the speech situation the speaker and the hearer share. Developing Austin's concepts of demonstrative and descriptive conventions, we have succeeded in describing meanings of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$  in the same coherent way as we describe truth-conditional meanings. The speaker highlights the present speech situation and, at the same time, assigns it a particular type, which is *indicating* (in which the speaker specifies the present speech situation), while the speaker 'points to' a particular entity and assigns a type to it, which is *asserting* (in which the speaker describes the entity). In *indicating* if the present speech situation is not of the type assigned to it, uttering the sentence becomes *inappropriate*, whereas in *asserting* uttering the sentence becomes *incorrect* or the assertion is false if the entity 'pointed to' is not of the type assigned to it.

In Chapter 5, we will discuss Japanese honorifics, where expressing (i) types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation, (ii) types of social relation between the speaker (in the speech situation) and the referent (in the speech situation), and (iii) types of social relation between participants in the historic situation is fully grammaticalised.

## 4.4 Indicating and Performatives

### 4.4.1 Performatives

Before we close the present chapter, we will describe performatives in our theoretical framework. We will clarify differences between performatives and constatives according to the theory, and explain how uttering a performative is performing a speech act.

Austin (1962) introduces the distinction between performatives and constatives, using the following sentences:

- (83) a. I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife),  
b. I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*,  
c. I give and bequeath my watch to my brother,  
d. I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.

Austin explains performative utterances as follows:

They do not 'describe' or 'report' or constatae anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 'just', saying something (Austin, 1962:5).

Performative sentences are (i) first person indicative active sentences in the simple present tense and (ii) can co-occur with the adverb 'hereby'. These characteristics strongly suggest a connection between performative sentences and speech situations. We defend the idea that performative sentences are about the speech situation. That is, in performative sentences, the situation the speaker 'points to' and describes is the speech situation the speaker highlights and specifies: the situation the speaker *asserts* about and the speech situation the speaker *indicates* about coincide.

In uttering a constative sentence, the speaker 'points to' a historic situation and describes it by assigning a certain type to it. In the present chapter we have shown that, by uttering a constative sentence, the speaker can *indicate* something about the speech situation. That is, while *asserting* that the historic situation is of a certain type, the speaker can *indicate*, by a grammatical or lexical device, that the present speech situation is of a certain type. In constative sentences, *asserting* and *indicating* are independent of each other, although words can be correlated both with a type of historic situation and with a type of speech situation.

In uttering a performative sentence, on the other hand, the historic situation the speaker *asserts* something about and the speech situation she *indicates* something about are one and the same situation. The action in the historic situation the speaker 'points to' and describes is the action in the speech situation, which comes into existence by the speaker's utterance. For example, in (83b) the historic situation the speaker 'points to' is the present speech situation where the speaker utters 'I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth*'. The action in the historic situation the speaker 'points to' and describes is the action the speaker is making in the speech situation by uttering this very sentence, i.e., the speech act of naming. The *indication* that the speech in the present speech situation is of a type of naming is made by saying, as an *assertion*, that the speech act is of the type.

Performative sentences are distinguished from constative sentences in terms of the relation between what is described and the act of describing. In uttering a constative utterance, the speaker describes an action or state of affairs in the situation which is outside of the speech situation and, therefore, exists independently of the speaker's act of describing it. In uttering a performative utterance, on the other hand, the speaker describes an action which comes into existence by this act of describing itself, and, therefore, there isn't any gap between what is described (*signifié*), e.g., the act of naming, and what describes (*signifiant*), e.g., 'I name'. This is why to utter a performative sentence is to perform a speech act itself, and performative sentences, according to Austin, cannot be true or false in a straightforward sense.

However, as Austin (1962) shows by the concept of 'felicity conditions', performative sentences are also subject to criticism: they can be infelicitous, or *inappropriate* in our terminology. Uttering a performative sentence is concerned not only with the demonstrative conventions by which the speaker highlights the present speech situation but also with descriptive conventions. In uttering a performative sentence, the speaker *indicates/asserts* that the speech situation is of a certain type (by means of the descriptive conventions). If the speaker assigns a wrong type to the speech situation, her utterance becomes *inappropriate*. For example, if the speaker who is not in the position to name the ship utters the sentence in (83b), the speaker assigns a wrong type to the action in the present speech situation (unless it is the act of naming for a private use). Austin calls this a case of misapplication, which is against the felicity condition that 'the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved (Austin, 1962:15)'.

According to this theory, we can explain why only first-person indicative active sentences in the simple present tense can be performative sentences. In uttering constative sentences, *asserting* that a historic situation is of a certain type does not coincide with *indicating* that the speech situation is of a certain type. In uttering the sentences in (84a) and (84b), for example, the speaker *asserts* that a historic situation is of a certain type, which is not to *indicate* that the speech situation is of a certain type. The present speech situation cannot coincide with the historic situation in the past the speaker 'points to' and describes (in (84a)), or the historic situation where Mary is, which the speaker 'points to' and describes (in (84b)).

- (84) a. I named the ship *Queen Elizabeth*,  
b. Mary bets you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.


This is because, as we discussed in 4.2.3, the speaker cannot *indicate* any speech situations but the present one she shares with the hearer.

We can also explain the co-occurrence of the adjective 'hereby' with performative sentences. Uttering the word 'hereby' the speaker explicitly 'points to' the present speech situation, more specifically her speech act in the present speech situation. So, if a speaker utters, 'hereby', we expect the speaker to *assert/indicate* that the speech act is of a certain type, i.e., to utter a performative sentence. Therefore, a constative sentence where the speaker does not *indicate/assert* about the present speech act does not co-occur with 'hereby'.

Let us show the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the performative sentence in (83b) in the following diagrams:



(85)



Since the act of naming a particular ship the *Queen Elizabeth* is performed in the speech situation, the square which expresses a historic situation is in the circle which expresses the speech situation. By assigning the type of NAMING to the speech act in the present speech situation, a speaker specifies the type of the present speech situation and, in doing so, performs the speech act in the speech situation. As for types of speech act, Austin (1962) depicts them in terms of felicity conditions, and Searle (1969, 1979), by giving more detailed description of the conditions, expresses them in the form of rules.

#### 4.4.2 Problems of Speech Act Theory

Austin's contribution is to show by performative sentences that sentence meaning concerns not only types of states of affairs (in the historic situation) but types of speech act (in the speech situation). By the concept of felicity conditions, Austin also shows that the speaker can specify the present speech act he is performing to a hearer by assigning it a particular type. However, Austin fails to develop the concept of speech situation. This is because Austin does not give a hearer an active role in communication, as his equation of 'communicatee' with 'audience' in the following shows:

If there is to be communication of the sort that we achieve by language at all, there must be a stock of symbols of some kind which a communicator (the speaker) can produce 'at will' and which a communicatee ('the audience') can observe (Austin, 1950:121).

Since a hearer is only the audience in his theory, Austin cannot develop the concept of a situation where the speaker performs a speech act to the hearer, i.e., a speech situation in our theory. Austin emphasises speech acts the speaker performs instead.

In Searle's theory the underestimation of the hearer's role becomes more obvious, and even the speaker's role is less stressed. As a result, Searle's Speech Act Theory has become a theory of meaning where the dyadic relation between types of speech act, i.e., types of illocutionary force, and linguistic procedures to perform those speech acts are studied, as we described in 2.3.1.

If logical positivism, a central tenet of which is that unless a sentence can be verified, it is strictly speaking meaningless, is a philosophical excess, Searle's theory is an excess at the other end. While logical positivists only analyse meanings which concern types of states of affairs in the world which are verifiable, Searle (1969, 1979) essentially analyses meanings which concern speech acts. Because the speech act theory has developed in the direction Searle (1969, 1979) suggested, the gap between the speech act theory and formal theories which describe meanings as types of state of affairs has never been narrowed: these two types of theories took completely different courses<sup>12</sup>. And, according to Récanati (1994), the theories which describe meanings as types of state of affairs are still dominant:

In the middle of this century so-called 'ordinary-language philosophers'-most prominently Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Austin and Peter Strawson- put forward a new, 'pragmatic picture' of language which stood in sharp contrast to the picture that had been dominant since the beginnings of analytic philosophy. Half a century later it is fair to say that the old picture which ordinary-language philosopher were opposing has been to a large extent restored to its position of dominance. ... the old picture was not abandoned, as ordinary-language philosophers had urged; it was elaborated rather than eliminated (Récanati, 1994:156).

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<sup>12</sup>The exception is Vanderveken (1990, 1991), who tries to bridge the speech act theory and formal theories of truth-conditional meaning by formalising illocutionary forces.

To have a full picture of sentence meaning, we have to describe both meaning about a historic situation and meaning about a speech situation, as we have claimed in the present thesis. We should then describe the interrelation between the two types of meaning, which we have, at least partially, shown by the relation between a square and a circle in the diagrams in the present chapter.

Throughout the present chapter, we have shown that there are linguistic conventions which correlate words with types of speech situation, types of social relation between the speaker and the referent, and social interpretations of the historic situation. By means of these conventions, the speaker highlights and, at the same time, specifies the present speech situation, or the social layer of the historic situation. We depict these acts of the speaker as creating a particular type of speech situation between him and the hearer, or enforcing existing social relations or social attributes of people in the world.

## Chapter 5

### Japanese Honorifics and Indicating

#### 5.1 Meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub>

In the preceding chapter, we developed the theoretical framework where meanings involving speech situations are analysed as meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub>: the speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of a certain type using linguistic devices. In English meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> are not fully grammaticalised. It is not the case that the presence and the absence of, say, the vocative 'Sir' are correlated with two different types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. Although the presence of 'Sir' is correlated (by the descriptive conventions) with a type of speech situation where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, the absence of it is not so correlated: the absence simply means that the social relation between a speaker and a hearer is not specified. That is, the type of social relation between a speaker and a hearer which is correlated with the vocative 'Sir' is expressed as an 'extra meaning', as is shown in the following examples:

- (1) a. The door is open,
- b. The door is open, Sir.

In other words, the meanings of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> expressed by vocatives in English are not thoroughly systematic. The type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker is expressed by the vocative 'Sir', but there isn't any vocative which is correlated with a type where a hearer is lower than a speaker, and this type is not correlated with the absence of 'Sir', either.

On the other hand, meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  are highly grammaticalised and thoroughly systematic in Japanese. The presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary *masu* are correlated (by the descriptive conventions) with two different types of speech situation. Owing to these descriptive conventions, the speaker *indicates* by the honorific auxiliary that the speech situation is of a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker (in (2a)) or a type where a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker by the absence of the honorific auxiliary (in (2b)):

- (2)    a.     *Taroo*        *ga*        *ki*        *mashi*        *ta,*  
         b.     *Taro*        *ga*        *ki*        *ta.*
- come                          past
- ‘Taro came’

As we discussed in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, by specifying the present speech situation as a particular type, the speaker creates the type between him and the hearer. If the speaker violates the descriptive conventions concerning types of speech situation, he is destined to specify the speech situation by the wrong type, and, in doing so, creates the wrong type of speech situation between him and the hearer. This may make the hearer very uncomfortable in communication. The hearer might conclude that the speaker violates the conventions; the hearer believes that the speaker is either a foreigner who has not learnt the linguistic conventions between the types of social relation and the presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary in Japanese, or a nonconformist who ignores these social conventions. Or the hearer might suspect that there is another social element in the speech situation he doesn't know of, and on the basis of it the speaker creates the particular type of speech situation.

In extreme cases, the wrong use of the honorific auxiliary may cause a speaker to make an indication about the speech situation which is incompatible with his assertion about the historic situation. Consider the following example:

- (3)    *?ore*    *wa*    *omaeno*    *buka*    *da*,  
          I                    your           inferior       be  
          'I am your inferior'

The absence of the honorific auxiliary is correlated with a type where a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker. Furthermore, as we discussed in 4.3.2.1, referring to himself by *ore* is correlated with a type where a speaker presents himself to a hearer informally, almost vulgarly, in the speech situation. Therefore, in uttering the sentence in (3), the speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of a type where a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, and a speaker presents himself informally, almost vulgarly, to a hearer. The speaker, however, *asserts* that he is the hearer's inferior. When the speaker asserts so, he is expected to assign a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker. This is because the speaker's being in a lower position than a hearer is one of the major factors which feature the speaker's social inferiority, which is linguistically marked by the honorific auxiliary. The discrepancy between the type of speech situation the speaker actually assigns to the present one and the type he is expected to assign from his assertion about the historic situation causes inconsistency.

The sentence in (3) is, however, not as bad as to be ungrammatical, meaningless, or paradoxical. Although they are interrelated, the speaker talks about two situations; the speech situation and the historic situation. Although assigning a certain type to the historic situation can strongly suggest that the speech situation is of a particular type, this does not exclude the possibility of speaker's assigning a different type to the

speech situation. Imagine that the speaker used to be the hearer's boss and was recently victimized by a malicious scandal and lost his position. The speaker might be able to utter the sentence in (3) to express his desperation: the speaker *indicates* by the use of *ore* and the absence of the honorific auxiliary that the social relation between him and the hearer belongs to a type where a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, and *asserts* the fact that he is the hearer's inferior.

In 4.3.3.2 and 4.3.3.3 we explicated another type of meaning of  $CONTEXT_C$ , which directly concerns historic situations. By 'pointing to' (referring to) a person by a diminutive form of his first name, for example, the speaker *indicates* that the speaker is very close to the referent or the speech situation is very informal. This type of meaning is interesting because it is about the historic situation, but is not *asserted* (as truth-conditional meaning is) but *indicated*. While this type of meaning of  $CONTEXT_C$  is rather limited in English and far from being grammaticalised, it is fully grammaticalised in Japanese. The meanings about a social aspect of the historic situation are expressed systematically by the distinction between honorific referring expressions and non-honorific ones, and between honorific verbs and plain verbs. Consider the following examples:

- (4)

a.

*Yamada*

*ga*

*ki*

*ka,*

b.

*Yamada-sama*

*ga*

*irrashat*

*ka*

come

past
- ‘Yamada came’

By uttering these sentences, the speaker can perform one and the same act of stating about a particular person, who is the bearer of the name ‘Yamada’: the speaker ‘points to’ the historic situation in the past where the person Yamada was, and *asserts* that he did a type of action COME. The difference between these sentences concerns types of

social relation between the person 'pointed to' and the speaker, which are marked by 'pointing to' the person either by his last name or by his last name plus *sama*, and describing his action either by a plain verb *ki* ('come') or an honorific verb *irashat*. As we will discuss in full length in 5.3.2, 'pointing to' (referring to) a person only by his last name is correlated with a type where a referent is socially much lower than a speaker, while 'pointing to' (referring to) a person by his last name plus *sama* is correlated with a type where a referent is socially much higher than a speaker. Describing the action of a referent by a plain verb is correlated with a type where a referent is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, while describing the action of a referent by an honorific verb is correlated with a type where a referent is socially higher than a speaker.

By means of these linguistic conventions, the speaker can make a specific *indication* about the social relation between him and the person referred to. By uttering the sentence in (4a), the speaker *indicates* that a particular person Yamada is socially much lower than him, while *asserting* that the person came. By uttering the sentence in (4b), on the other hand, the speaker indicates that the person Yamada is socially much higher than him, while *asserting* that the person came. There are two layers in meaning about historic situations. One is a factual layer, where it matters whether or not an entity or situation 'pointed to' is of a particular type. Meaning in this layer is truth-conditional meaning and is *asserted*. The other is a social layer, where it matters whether or not a person 'pointed to' has a particular type of social relation to a speaker. Meaning in this layer is *indicated*.

The layer in which the following sentence goes wrong is the social layer:

- (5) ?Yamada      ga      irasshat      ka.  
                                come                 past



By 'pointing to' a particular person only by his last name *Yamada*, the speaker *indicates* that the social relation between the person 'pointed to' and him is of a type where a referent is socially much lower than a speaker. The speaker, however, *indicates* something contradictory by describing the action of the person by the honorific verb *irasshat*: the speaker *indicates* that the social relation between the referent, i.e., Yamada, and him is of a type where a referent is socially higher than a speaker. As a result, a speaker *indicates* that the person, Yamada, is socially much lower than him and higher than him at the same time, which is a contradiction. The hearer might take this contradictory *indication* as an irony, because the straightforward interpretation is impossible. The hearer might take this as follows: the speaker *indicates* Yamada's inferiority as a person, which is marked by 'pointing to' him only by his last name, in spite of his high social status, which is marked by the honorific verb.

There are similar cases in English, where a speaker *indicates* something inconsistent. Consider the following examples:

- (6) a. That gentleman is a nice bloke.  
b. That lady is a tart.

Although the speaker *indicates* social superiority of the person by 'pointing to' him or her by 'gentleman' or 'lady' respectively, the speaker makes an incompatible *indication* by assigning the attribute of him/her the type BLOKE or TART, which marks social non-superiority of the referent. As a result, straightforward interpretations of these sentences are impossible, and they sound sarcastic.

In Chapter 4, we defended the idea that by means of the linguistic conventions, the speaker specifies the type of the present speech situation, and in doing so, creates the type between him and the hearer. We also defended the idea that by means of the linguistic conventions, a speaker specifies the social relation between the person 'pointed to' and the speaker, and in doing so, reinforces existing social relations and social attributes of people in the world. In the present chapter, we will describe how a Japanese speaker, using the conventions of the two types of honorific, creates a particular type of speech situation between him and the hearer, and specifies the social relation in the historic situation.

Our plan for the present chapter is as follows. In 5.2 we introduce Japanese honorifics and classifications of them. In 5.3 and 5.4, we describe Japanese honorifics as grammaticalised devices to express meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ : one type is about a speech situation (in 5.3) and the other type is about historic situations (in 5.4). Then the concluding section follows.

## **5.2 Japanese Honorifics: Classifications and Problems**

### **5.2.1 Classification of honorifics**

According to Kasuga (1977), honorifics appeared in literature as early as the 8th century. They appeared in *Manyoshu*, an anthology which includes 4,500 poems in 20 volumes, which was completed in the late 8th century. It is generally accepted that honorifics are one of the major features which characterise Japanese. However, according to Oishi (1977), it was not until the early 20th century that comprehensive studies on honorifics were published. There were only a few exceptional works on them before then, such as Rodriguez (1608).

In the early 20th century, there were two traditional Japanese linguists whose works were influential enough to be the landmarks in the history of honorific studies. One is Yamada and the other is Tokieda. In the following, we will introduce Yamada's and Tokieda's classifications of honorifics.

### 5.2.1.1 Yamada's classification of honorifics

Yamada is the first linguist to publish a comprehensive study on honorifics. In his book (Yamada, 1924), Yamada described honorifics as grammatical rules, which concern person. Yamada classified honorifics into two types: *kensho* ('humble forms') express humbleness and are used to refer to or describe the first person and his belongings; *keisho* ('honorifics') are a type which is used to refer to or describe the second and third persons to express honour to them. Nouns of *keisho* ('honorifics') are subcategorised into (i) *taisha keisho* ('second-person honorifics'), which are used to express honour to the second person; (ii) *ippan keisho* ('general honorifics') are used to refer to the third person. Many linguists have followed Yamada's three-way distinction: *kensho* ('humble form') for the first person, *taisha keisho* ('second-person honorifics') for the second person, and *ippan keisho* ('general honorifics') for the third person.

As for verbs, Yamada introduced a distinction between *zettai* ('absolute') and *kankei* ('relative') for both *kensho* ('humble forms') and *keisho* ('honorifics'). We explain the distinction between *zettai kensho* ('absolute humble forms') and *kankei kensho* ('relative humble forms') first. *Zettai kensho* ('absolute humble forms') are a type where humbleness to the first person's action is expressed, regardless of the second or third person's action. For example, when a speaker uses *moosu* ('say') or *itasu* ('do') for his action, the speaker simply expresses humbleness of his action of saying or doing. On the other hand, *kankei kensho* ('relative humble forms') are a type

where humbleness to the first person's action is expressed in relation to a co-occurring action of the second or third person. For example, when a speaker uses *itadaku* ('get/be given') or *ukagau* ('hear') for his action, the speaker expresses humbleness to his action of getting/being given or hearing in relation to the second or third person's action of giving or saying. The speaker describes his action of getting/being given or hearing by the humble verb so that the second or third person's action of giving or saying can be 'high' in relation to his action 'lowered'.

*Zettai keisho* ('absolute honorifics') are a type where honour toward the action of the second or third person is expressed regardless of the first person's action. For example, when a speaker uses *oboshimesu* ('think') for the second or third person, the speaker simply expresses honour to the action of the second or third person. On the other hand, *kankei keisho* ('relative honorifics') are a type where honour toward the action of the second or third person is expressed in relation to a co-occurring first person's action. For example, when a speaker uses *kudasaru* ('give') for the action of the second or third person, the speaker describes the second or third person's action in relation to his action of getting/being given. The speaker describes the second or third person's action of giving by the honorific verb so that his action of getting can be 'low' in relation to the second or third person's action made 'high'.

Yamada (1924)'s analysis of the honorifics is characterised by the systematic description of honorifics in their relation to the first, second, and third persons. However, because of his determination to describe all honorifics in relation to person, Yamada had to give implausible explanations of some honorific phenomena, which was later criticised by Tokieda (1941).

### 5.2.1.2 Tokieda's theory and classification of honorifics

Tokieda expressed a unique idea about Japanese and Japanese linguistics in *Kokugogaku Genron* ('The fundamental theory of Japanese linguistics') (Tokieda, 1941), which is still influential among Japanese linguists. His uniqueness lies not only in the theory itself but his way of developing it. Unlike most of his contemporaries, whose works were based on classification and description of a particular linguistic phenomenon, Tokieda took a more modern approach: he started with a hypothesis about language and analysed various phenomena to prove it. His famous theory is named as *gengo kateisetsu* ('the theory of the process of a language'): he claims that a language should be analysed as the process in which a speaker expresses his idea about the world to a hearer. This is not far from our idea put forward in the present thesis.

Tokieda hypothesises two processes in which a speaker expresses his idea about the world. One process is that a speaker describes (a part of) the outer world as an objectively conceptualised state of affairs. Roughly speaking, it is the process in which a speaker expresses a proposition. The words which are used for this purpose are called *shi*, which includes *yama* ('mountain'), *hashiru* ('run'), *ureshii* ('happy') and so on. The other is that a speaker expresses his subjective, direct attitude to the proposition. The words which are used for this purpose are called *jī*, and they include *zu/ji*, which expresses negation<sup>1</sup>, *ya*, which expresses interrogation<sup>2</sup>, and *mu*, which expresses mood<sup>3</sup> (Tokieda, 1941:231-2).

Tokieda proposes the model of sentence meaning where a speaker describes (a part of) the world as a state of affairs using *shi* words, and expresses his attitude to it using *jī*

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<sup>1</sup>We use *nai* to express negation in modern Japanese.

<sup>2</sup>We use *ka* to express interrogation in modern Japanese.

<sup>3</sup>We use *daroo* to express this type of mood in modern Japanese.

words. In his model the proposition expressed by *shi* words is encapsulated by the speaker's attitude to the proposition, which is expressed by *ji* words, as is shown in the following:

- (7) [[proposition (by *shi*)] attitude to a proposition (by *ji*)]

Using this model, Tokieda analysed sentences as follows:

- (8) a. [[*hana saku ka*]  
flower bloom question  
'Does a/the flower bloom?'

- b. [[*kare yoma mu*]  
he read mood  
'He will/may read'

- c. [[*ame ga furu*] Ø]<sup>4</sup>  
rain fall  
'Rain falls'

In (8a) the speaker expresses an interrogation of the proposition that a/the flower blooms, and in (8b) the speaker expresses a modal meaning that the referent will/may read. In (8c), a speaker asserts that rain falls without expressing his attitude to it, which is unmarked.

Following the general distinction between *shi* and *ji*, Tokieda (1941) classifies honorifics into two types; *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics. *Shi* honorifics concern

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<sup>4</sup>These are Tokieda's original examples. See Tokieda (1941:249-44).



or not-using a *ji* honorific. Types of meaning which are expressed by *ji* honorifics and *shi* honorifics are to be symbolised as follows:

(10) *shi* honorifics

honorific verbs	-----	$R > S$
plain verbs	-----	$R = / < S$

*ji* honorifics

with <i>ji</i> honorifics	-----	$H > S$
without <i>ji</i> honorifics	-----	$H = / < S$

R: referent

S: speaker

H: hearer

$X > Y$ : X is socially higher than Y

$X = / < Y$ : X is socially equal to or lower than Y

Unlike Yamada (1924), Tokieda (1941) does not think humble verbs are very different from honorific verbs, and describes them equally under *shi* honorifics. In the following a humble verb, *mairi* ('come'), makes a contrast to a plain verb *ki* ('come'):

- (11) a. [[*otooto ga tookyo he ki*] *mashi ka*]  
 b. [[*otooto ga tookyo he mairi*] *mashi ka*].  
 brother Tokyo to come past  
 '(My) brother came to Tokyo'



Uttering a sentence in (11b), which has a humble verb, a speaker means that the referent is socially lower than him<sup>5</sup>. Let us add the meaning expressed by humble verbs in the model of honorific meanings in (10):

(12) *shi* honorifics

honorific verbs	-----	$R > S$
plain verbs	-----	$R = /< S$
humble verbs	-----	$R < S$

*ji* honorifics

with <i>ji</i> honorifics	-----	$H > S$
without <i>ji</i> honorifics	-----	$H = /< S$

R: referent

S: speaker

H: hearer

$X > Y$ : X is socially higher than Y

$X = /< Y$ : X is socially equal to or lower than Y

$X < Y$ : X is socially lower than Y

Behind this classification is Tokieda's criticism of Yamada. In Yamada's analysis, humble verbs are to express humbleness of the first person, and honorific verbs are to express honour to the third person. Tokieda, on the other hand, claims that both humble verbs and honorific verbs are concerned with the speaker's understanding and description of the sociocultural aspect of the situation the speaker talks about: they are not to express directly humbleness or honor, whereas *ji* honorifics are to express

<sup>5</sup> The reason the speaker describes his brother's action of coming by a humble verb is that the hearer is an outsider of the speaker's family to whom the speaker should describe his family's action modestly. But let us pretend for the moment that we believe that the use of a humble form means that the referent is socially lower than the speaker. We will discuss this point in 5.2.1.4 and 5.4.4.

honor to the hearer directly. Tokieda (1941:440-41) uses the following examples to dispute Yamada (1924):

- (13) a.     *gohan wo itadaki nasai.*  
           meal           eat(humble)       do  
           ‘Eat/have the meal!’

- b.     *(nanji<sup>6</sup> wa) chikoo maire,*  
           you           near           come(humble)  
           ‘(You) come near!’

A mother can utter a sentence in (13a) to her child who hasn’t started eating. She describes her child’s action by the humble verb, *itadaki*. According to Yamada (1924), a humble word is used to express a first person’s humbleness of herself, her family, or her belongings. So, if Yamada (1924) is correct, the speaker expresses her humbleness of her child by describing her child’s action by the humble verb in (13a). To whom is the speaker’s humbleness of her child expressed? Obviously it is not the hearer, because the hearer is the speaker’s child. The next possibility is that the speaker’s humbleness of her child is expressed to someone/something with whom the child’s action of eating is concerned. It is, however, strange that the speaker’s humbleness is expressed to the meal or the person who cooks the meal (the cook can be the speaker herself). So there is no one to whom one can reasonably assume the speaker’s humbleness of her child is expressed.

Similarly, in (13b), the second person whose action is described by the humble verb *mairu* (‘come’) and the hearer are one and the same person. It is impossible that the speaker’s humbleness of the referent, i.e., the hearer, is expressed to the hearer. It is

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<sup>6</sup>*Nanji* is an old form of a second-person pronoun.

possible that the speaker's humbleness of the referent is expressed to a person to whom the referent comes/goes. In this case, however, it is the speaker that the referent comes/goes to. The speaker then expresses his humbleness of the referent to himself, which is strange. So there isn't anyone one can reasonably assume the speaker's humbleness of the referent is expressed to.

Tokieda (1941) argues against Yamada (1924)'s idea that the speaker expresses honor or humbleness to the second or the third person by an honorific verb or a humble verb, showing the above examples where the speaker does not express humbleness to anyone. Tokieda (1941) claims that the use of an honorific verb or a humble verb expresses the speaker's interpretation of the social aspect of the person referred to. In the example in (13a) the speaker describes the action of eating by the humble verb because the referent is her child, who is socially low. Similarly, in (13b) the speaker describes the action of coming by the humble verb because the referent is socially lower than him.

Tokieda's two-way distinction is adopted, with or without modification, by many linguists in later years. Tsujimura (1967, 1977, 1992), and Shibatani (1990) are among them. In the following section we will introduce their classifications of honorifics.

#### 5.2.1.3 Tokieda's followers

Tsujimura (1967, 1977, 1992) adopts Tokieda's two-way distinction between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics and uses the terms of *sozai* honorifics ('material honorifics') and *taisha* honorifics ('addressee honorifics') for *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics respectively. Tsujimura then classifies material honorifics into two types, *jooisha shutai go* ('upper-person words') and *kaisha shutai go* ('lower-person



(15) 1. *sozai* honorifics ('material honorifics')

a. *jooisha shutai go* ('upper-person words')

(i) *zettai* ('absolute')

honorific verbs	-----	$R > S$
plain verbs	-----	$R = / < S$

(ii) *kankei* ('relative')

honorific verbs	-----	$R > P$
plain verbs	-----	$R = P(= / < S)$

b. *kaisha shutai go* ('lower-person words')

(i) *zettai* ('absolute')

humble verbs	-----	$R < S$
plain verbs	-----	$R = / < S$

(ii) *kankei* ('relative')

humble verbs	-----	$R < P$
plain verbs	-----	$R = P(= / < S)$

2. *taisha* honorifics ('addressee honorifics')

with <i>taisha</i> honorifics	-----	$H > S$
without <i>taisha</i> honorifics	-----	$H = / < S$

R: referent      S: speaker

H: hearer      P: another participant

$X > Y$ : X is socially higher than Y.

$X = Y$ : X is neither socially higher nor lower than Y.

$X < Y$ : X is socially lower than Y<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup>Tsujimura also has a subcategory called *bikago* ('decorative words') in material honorifics, but we won't go into discussion about it.

Shibatani (1990) also follows Tokieda's two-way distinction of honorifics, and uses the terminology of 'referent-controlled honorification' and 'addressee-controlled honorification' for Tokieda's *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics, as introduced in Chapter 4. Like Tsujimura, Shibatani subcategorises referent-controlled honorification into (i) subject honorification, which is equivalent to Tsujimura's upper-person honorifics, and (ii) object honorification, which is equivalent to Tsujimura's lower-person honorifics. Shibatani, however, does not distinguish relative honorifics from absolute honorifics as Tsujimura does. Shibatani's classification is shown as follows:

(16) 1. Referent-controlled honorification

- |                           |       |        |
|---------------------------|-------|--------|
| a. subject honorification | ----- | Sb > S |
| b. object honorification  | ----- | O > Sb |

2. Addressee-controlled honorification ----- H > S

Sb: subject    H: hearer

O: object    S: speaker

As the term 'honorification' shows, Shibatani regards honorifics as a syntactic process of marking the social superiority of an agent (subject honorification), that of a beneficiary (object honorification), and a hearer (addressee-controlled honorification). Shibatani also adopts distinctions in style; formal vs. vulgar, but a discussion of this would take us too far from the current topic<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup>Harada (1976) describes honorifics in the framework of transformational grammar and also adopts a two-way distinction. Harada uses 'propositional honorifics' for Tokieda's *shi* honorifics, and 'performative honorifics' for Tokieda's *ji* honorifics. Harada (1976:503) distinguishes subject honorification from object honorification in propositional honorifics.

#### 5.2.1.4 Criticisms of Tokieda's two-way classification

Although many traditional and modern Japanese linguists adopt it, there are some criticisms of Tokieda's two-way classification of honorifics. One of them is Ishizaka's (1944). Ishizaka claims that, although Tokieda (1941) abolishes the distinction between the first person and the second person in *shi* honorifics, the distinction is still important because they are directly related to the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, with which *ji* honorifics are concerned. Consider the following examples:

- (17) a. *watashi ga soko he mairi masu,*  
b. *ore ga soko he iku.*  
I there to go  
'I('ll) go there'

- (18) a. *kimi wa soko he iku ka?*  
b. *anata wa soko he irasshai masu ka?*  
you there to go question  
'Do(Will) you go there?'

In (17), referring to himself by *watashi* (a formal form for 'I') or *ore* (an informal/vulgar form for 'I') and describing his action by *mairi* (a humble verb for 'go') or *iku* (a plain verb for 'go') are not independent of using or not using the honorific auxiliary *masu*. If the speaker refers to himself by *watashi* and describes his action by the humble verb *mairi* the speaker finishes the sentence with the honorific auxiliary *masu*. Similarly, in (18), referring to a hearer by *kimi* (a second-person pronoun which shows that the person referred to is socially lower than or equal to the speaker) or *anata* (a second-person pronoun which shows that the person referred to is

socially higher than the speaker), and describing the hearer's action by *iku* (a plain verb for 'go') or *irasshai* (an honorific verb for 'go') are not independent of using or not using the honorific auxiliary *masu*. For example, if the speaker refers to the hearer by *anata* and describes the hearer's action by the honorific verb *irasshai*, the speaker finishes the sentence with the honorific auxiliary *masu*. In these examples the social relation for which the speaker chooses a referring expression and a verb coincides with the social relation for which the speaker chooses using or not using the honorific auxiliary; the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. For this reason, the following sentences sound strange:

- (19) ?*watashi*      *ga*      *soko*    *he*    *mairu*.

I                      there    to       go

**'I'll go there'**

- (20) ? *anata*        *wa*        *soko*        *he*        *irassharu*        *ka?*

you                  there    to       go                  question

In (19), the speaker refers to himself formally using *watashi* and describes his action of going by a humble verb *mairu*, but, nevertheless, he does not use the honorific auxiliary *masu*. It is peculiar that the speaker refers to himself formally and describes his action in a humble way when he does not believe that the hearer is socially higher than him. Similarly, in (20), the speaker refers to the hearer by a pronoun *anata* which shows the referent, i.e., the hearer, is socially higher than the speaker, and describes the referent's action by an honorific verb *irassharu*. Nevertheless, the speaker does without the honorific auxiliary, which shows that the hearer is socially equal to or lower than the speaker. This shows that the speaker expresses an inconsistent belief about the social relation between him and the hearer.



According to Ishizaka, these correlations between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics cannot be explained in Tokieda's model of honorifics, where referring to a person by a certain expression and describing his action by a certain verb is independent of using or not using the honorific auxiliary: the former concerns the social relation between the referent and the speaker or the referent and another participant, and the latter concerns the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. It is, however, not clear that Tokieda's two-way classification itself is problematic as Ishizaka claims. There are cases, as Ishizaka (1944) shows, where uses of *shi* honorifics are dependent on uses of *ji* honorifics because a speaker or a hearer is referred to. In those cases, the social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation for which the speaker uses *ji* honorifics is the social relation in the historic situation, for which the speaker uses *shi* honorifics. However, this does not mean that the distinction between *shi* and *ji* honorifics does not hold.

Furthermore, the issue of interrelation between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics does not seem to be just the issue of persons, as Ishizaka would like to claim. The social relation in the situation referred to (in which *shi* honorifics are concerned) also coincides with the social relation in the speech situation (which *ji* honorifics are concerned) when a speaker's family or a hearer's family is referred to. Consider the following examples:

- (21) a.    *kinoo*            *haha ga tookyo he mairi mashi ta*  
       b.    *?kinoo*        *haha ga tookyo he mait ta.*  
           yesterday    mother        Tokyo        to        come        past  
           '(My) mother came to Tokyo yesterday'

The social relation for which the speaker uses the humble verb *mait* ('come') is in fact the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, not the social relation between

the speaker and the person referred to, i.e., the speaker's mother. It is customary that when a speaker talks to an outsider to whom she should be formal, the speaker identifies her family with herself and uses a humble word for her family, just as she uses a humble word for herself. This is why the sentence in (21b) sounds strange. Although the speaker refers to her mother by a formal word *haha* and describes her act of coming by the humble verb *maiu*, which means that the hearer is an outsider to whom she should be formal, the speaker does not use the honorific auxiliary *mashi*.

Similarly, when the speaker refers to the hearer's family, the social relation for which the speaker uses *shi* honorifics is the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, not the social relation between the speaker and the person referred to. Consider the following example:

- (22) a.     *goshisoku mo irasshai mashi ta ka?*  
           b.     ?*goshisoku mo irasshat ta ka?*  
                   son           too    come                   past   question  
                   'Did (your) son come, too?'

By referring to the hearer's son by the honorific word *goshisoku* ('son') and describing his action by the honorific verb *irashai/irashat*, the speaker expresses that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, not that the hearer's son is socially higher than the speaker. In (22b), however, the speaker does not use the honorific auxiliary *mashi* to show that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, which makes the sentence strange. There are also cases where a speaker identifies a member of the company or organization she belongs to with herself, and a member of the company or organization the hearer belongs to with the hearer<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>10</sup>We will discuss this further in 5.4.4.

Contrary to what Ishizaka says, these interrelations between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics are not a problem for Tokieda's classification. They can be explained within Tokieda's classification. When a speaker refers to the hearer, the social relation for which the speaker chooses *shi* honorifics is the social relation between the speaker and the referent, i.e., the hearer. As a result, the social relation for which the speaker chooses *shi* honorifics coincides with the social relation for which the speaker chooses *ji* honorifics. When a speaker refers to herself, the social relation for which the speaker chooses *shi* honorifics cannot be the social relation between the speaker and the referent, because the referent is the speaker herself. As we discussed in 4.3.2.1, for a speaker to refer to herself is to present herself in the speech situation she shares with the hearer. Similarly for a speaker to describe her action is to present her action in the speech situation she shares with the hearer. So it is the social relation between the speaker and the hearer that the speaker is conscious of when referring to herself and describing her action. It is not difficult to imagine that this has become a convention: a speaker expresses the social relation between her and the hearer by *shi* honorifics when the speaker refers to herself and describes her own action. Then the social relation for which the speaker chooses *shi* honorifics coincides with the social relation for which she chooses *ji* honorifics. When the speaker refers to her own family or the hearer's family, the speaker identifies her family with herself, or the hearer's family with the hearer<sup>11</sup>.

Under Tokieda's classification we can expand the analysis of correlation between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics into a wider area. Kikuchi (1997) reports a new usage of the humble verb, *(verb)-(sa)sete-itadaku*. The humble verb *(verb)-(sa)sete-itadaku* originally means 'be allowed or given the right to do something by someone who is socially higher'. Consider the following example:

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<sup>11</sup>This may come from Japanese culture where an individual is identified with the social group she is a member of. See Nakane (1967).

- (23) *sensei no hon wo tsukawa-sete-itadake masu ka?*  
 teacher book use question  
 'Am (I) allowed to use the teacher's book?'

Using the humble verb, *tsukawa-sete-itadaku*, the speaker describes her action of using the book as an action which is to be allowed by a person who is socially higher than her, i.e., the teacher. In doing so, the speaker expresses that the teacher is socially higher than her. Kikuchi (1997:40-47) reports the cases where *(verb)-(sa)sete-itadaku* is used for the action in which allowance or permission doesn't apply in a straightforward sense.

- (24) *watashidomo wa kono tabi shinseihin wo kaihatsu*  
 we(pl) this time new product produce  
*-sasete-itadaki mashi ta.*  
 past  
 'We were allowed to have produced a new product this time'

- (25) *watashidomo wa shoogatsu wa hawai de*  
 we(pl) New Year Hawaii in  
*sugo-sasete-itadaki masu.*  
 spend  
 'We are allowed to spend the New Year in Hawaii'

According to Tsujimura (1997), the humble verb *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* is losing its original meaning of 'being allowed or given the right to do something by a socially higher person', and getting what he calls a meaning of *absolute humble word*. By

uttering the sentence in (24), the speaker simply expresses humbleness to his and his colleague's act of producing a new product, which is to show his humbleness to the hearer. Similarly, by uttering the sentence in (25), the speaker simply expresses humbleness to the hearer by describing her and her family's plan to spend the New Year in Hawaii by the humble verb.

We can explain this change of the meaning of *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* as a case of correlation between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics. The humble verb *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* is a *shi* honorific which expresses a type of social relation between a person referred to and another participant, which Kikuchi calls meaning of *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* as a relative humble word. In (23), for example, the verb expresses a type social relation between a referent (the speaker) and the owner of the book (the teacher), i.e., the referent is socially lower than the owner. The verb *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* is also correlated with the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, because, when the speaker describes her action, the speaker presents her own action in the speech situation. So, using the verb *(verb)-sasete-itadaku*, the speaker describes her action as something which is allowed by someone socially higher (although there may be no such person in these cases), and tries not to give the hearer an impression that she is boasting of producing a new product (in (24)) or spending the New Year in Hawaii (in (25)). This is the use of *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* as an absolute humble word. In this use, the verb *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* gets the function of *ji* honorifics as well as that of *shi* honorifics, and concerns the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. The use of *(verb)-sasete-itadaku* as a *ji* honorific, however, has not been fully accepted yet.

Miyaji (1971) also criticises Tokieda's distinction between *shi* honorifics and *ji* honorifics. According to Tokieda, using *shi* honorifics the speaker describes the social aspect of a person or situation referred to, while the speaker expresses honour to the

hearer by *ji* honorifics. Casting doubt on the idea that *ji* honorifics express honor, Miyaji says that we can claim that, just as *shi* honorifics are used to describe the social aspect of a person or situation referred to, *ji* honorifics are used to describe the social aspect of the speaker's uttering something to the hearer in the speech situation. That is, while types of social relation between a speaker and a referent are expressed by *shi* honorifics, types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer are expressed by *ji* honorifics.

However, under the definition of *ji* honorifics proposed by Miyaji, we cannot explain a performative function of *ji* honorifics. By using the honorific auxiliary, the speaker does not *just* describe the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. The speaker creates a certain type of speech situation between the speaker and the hearer. This is made possible by the mechanism of *ji* honorifics where highlighting the present speech situation and assigning a type to it are amalgamated. Highlighting the present speech situation (by means of the demonstrative conventions) and assigning a certain type to it (by means of the descriptive conventions) are performed as one and the same act, and, as a result, the speaker highlights the present speech situation with the assigned type, while communicating in the very speech situation. In doing so, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between her and the hearer. For example, when I utter a sentence without the honorific auxiliary to my colleague after talking to her with it for many months, I do not just describe the social relation between us. I highlight the present speech situation and assign it a close type of social relation while communicating in the very speech situation. As a result, I have made a case of communicating in the close social relation with my colleague, hoping that she will accept this type of social relation as our social relation in the present speech situation. To explain this performative function of *ji* honorifics, we should not describe *ji* honorifics just as expressions of types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. It seems that Tokieda (1941) describes *ji* honorifics as the speaker's direct

expression of honor to the hearer to explain the performative function of *ji* honorifics. We will come back to this point in 5.3.1.

In the present section, we have shown that Ishizaka's (1944) and Miyaji's (1971) criticisms of Tokieda's classification of *shi* and *ji* honorifics are not valid. In the rest of the present chapter, we will analyse meanings and functions of Japanese honorifics following Tokieda's classification of *shi* and *ji* honorifics. We will show what meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  are expressed by *shi* and *ji* honorifics, and how Japanese speakers, by using them, specify the social aspect of the world, and incorporate it into the factual aspect of the world.

#### 5.2.1.5 Types of social meaning expressed by honorifics

We have so far explained meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  about speech situations expressed by the presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary, i.e., *ji* honorifics, in terms of (i) social superiority and equality/inferiority between the speaker and the hearer, (ii) social closeness and distance between the speaker and the hearer, and (iii) formality and informality of the speech situation. As for the meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  about historic situations expressed by an honorific or non-honorific referring expression and a plain, honorific, or humble verb, i.e., *shi* honorifics, we have described social superiority, equality, and inferiority between a speaker and a referent. Let us examine the ranges of meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  expressed by Japanese honorifics.

Tsujimura (1977:50-58) classifies social relations expressed by honorifics into four types; (i) social superiority and inferiority, (ii) relation between benefactors and benefactees, (iii) power, and (iv) social closeness and distance. Tsujimura subcategorises social superiority and inferiority into (a) hierarchy in the same organization, (b) social status, (c) age, and (d) experience. For example, as for social



superiority and inferiority, a person uses an honorific for his boss (hierarchy in the same organization), a person in the street uses an honorific for an MP (social status), a person uses an honorific for an older person (age), and a person who has just started a new job uses an honorific for a person who has been doing the job for a long time (experience). As for the relation between benefactors and benefactees, a patient uses an honorific for his doctor, and as for power, an examinee uses an honorific for an examiner. As for social closeness and distance, a person uses an honorific for a stranger. Tsujimura also points out that formality and informality of the speech situation concern honorifics: in formal occasions, one uses honorifics.


We use social superiority and inferiority as general terms which also include the relation between benefactors and benefactees and power in Tsujimura's classification. That is, a benefactor is socially higher than a benefactee, and a person with power is socially higher than a person without it. There are then three types of meaning expressed by honorifics; (i) social superiority and inferiority, (ii) social distance and closeness, and (iii) formality and informality of the speech situation. The general rules are: (i) if the hearer or the referent is socially higher, the speaker uses an honorific, and if the referent is socially lower, the speaker uses a humble word; (ii) if the speaker and the hearer or the referent are socially distant, the speaker uses an honorific; and (iii) if the speech situation is formal, the speaker uses an honorific.

There seems to be no way to express separately social superiority, social distance and formality, which means that they are related concepts, and there might be a hyper-concept. The strongest candidate for it would be social distance: vertical social distance is social superiority, horizontal social distance is social distance (in the opposite sense of social closeness), and social distance itself is correlated with formality. The wider the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, or the speaker and the referent is, the more heavily the speaker marks the social relation with honorifics (or humble




forms). The inside of the circle in the following diagram stands for the distance where the speaker does without honorifics (or humble forms), and the rest stands for the distance where the speaker marks with honorifics (or humble forms).

(26)



There are a few points to mention. Under the democratic Constitution after the war, many Japanese speakers have become reluctant to use a humble form to mark social inferiority, except in the business environment where social hierarchy is clearly fixed. Those speakers do not mark social distance when they refer to a person who is socially lower, and describe his action, as shown in the following diagram:


(27)



The second point concerns influence from the actual setting of communication. When a speaker is in a business meeting where the company's business policy is discussed, the speaker marks social distance very rigidly. The same speaker might not do so when he is in a friendly drinking session afterwards, in referring to and addressing the

same people. This shows that, although the principles of marking the distance with honorifics and humble forms are the same, application is affected by outer elements. As a result, a point beyond which a speaker marks the relation as 'socially distant' moves, as shown in the following diagram:

(28)



The next question is how to illustrate types of meaning of honorifics. The choice is between (i) describing both *ji* and *shi* honorifics by social distance as a general term (say,  $[+/-D]$ ) and (ii) describing them by superiority or inferiority ( $[H(x,y)]$   $[E/L(x,y)]$ ), social distance or closeness ( $[D(x,y)]$  and  $[C(x,y)]$ ), and formality or informality ( $[F]$  and  $[IF]$ ), as we have been doing. Although the former representation has an advantage of formalizing types of meaning of Japanese honorifics simply and clearly, we choose the latter representation for the following reasons. First, our present purpose is to show what types of meaning the speaker expresses about the social relation between him and the hearer, and between him and the referent in various situations, rather than to formalize those meanings. Second, this representation makes cross-linguistic comparison easier: we can compare meanings expressed by honorifics in Japanese with the meanings expressed by other linguistic devices in other languages, where social superiority, social distance, and formality might not be conjoined into one concept.

Before we close the present section, let us show Tokieda’s categorization of *shi* and *ji* honorifics and our ways of presentation of each category.

(29)		Tokieda’s	ours
	<i>shi</i> honorifics		
	honorific verbs	--- R > S	HI(R,S) or D(S,R) or F
	plain verbs	--- R = /< S	E/L(R,S) or C(S,R) or IF
	humble verbs	--- R < S	L(R,S)

	<i>ji</i> honorifics		
	with <i>ji</i> honorifics	--- H > S	HI(H,S) or D(S,H) or F
	without <i>ji</i> honorifics	--- H = /< S	E/L(H,S) or C(S,H) or IF

- R: referent
- S: speaker
- H: hearer

### 5.3 *Ji* honorifics: meaning of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> which concerns speech situations

#### 5.3.1 Meaning about speech situations

Before we start analysing *ji* honorifics, let us go back to the point Miyaji (1971) makes, which we introduced in 5.2.1.4. Tokieda (1941) bases *shi* and *ji* distinction on the ‘difference’ between the speaker’s description of the social aspect of the person or situation referred to and the speaker’s direct expression of honour to the hearer. According to Miyaji, however, one can claim that by *ji* honorifics the speaker

describes the social aspect of his utterance, just as he describes the social aspect of the person or situation referred to by *shi* honorifics.

In one sense, Miyaji (1971) is right. To utter a *ji* honorific, say, the honorific auxiliary *masu*, is to assign a certain type to the present speech situation. There are cases where a speaker does not express her honour to the hearer in the strict sense of 'honour'. When the speaker uses *masu* in an opening speech of the conference, for example, she does not seem to express her personal honour to the hearers.

It is, however, also true that there is a direct, immediate impact of uttering a *ji* honorific on the speaker-hearer relation in the speech situation, which does not exist between uttering a *shi* honorific and the relation between the speaker and the referent. One utters a *ji* honorific to do something, not just to describe the speech situation. It is like uttering a performative sentence such as 'I declare a war' or 'I sentence you to life in prison', which is to perform declaring or sentencing, not just to describe the present speech act. Or it is like uttering a sentence of phatic communion such as, 'Good morning', which is to greet, not just to describe the historic situation or the speech situation. In short *ji* honorifics are performatives, which is an important difference between *shi* and *ji* honorifics.

We have been saying that the speaker creates a particular type of speech situation by means of *ji* honorifics, but we should explain it a bit more. In 4.2.2, we define communication as two people's creating and sharing the speech situation where they are willing to accept the changing roles of the speaker and the hearer and exchange opinions about the world. In this sense, a speech situation is a mental entity, not a physical space where a speaker and a hearer are. How does the speaker create a speech situation as a mental entity between him and the hearer? We have shown that uttering a word or a sentence to someone does not always guarantee creating a speech situation.

In fact there are many ways in which the speaker's effort is in vain: the hearer might not understand the language, or might be too hostile to the speaker to respond, cannot or might not hear what the speaker says, and so on. Although he is aware of the possibility to fail, the speaker talks to a hearer anyway: the speaker takes a 'gamble' by making a case of communicating in the speech situation. If the speaker gets a reasonable response from the hearer, the preceding utterance of the speaker is counted as a part of communication, and the speaker has succeeded in creating the speech situation.

It matters not only whether or not the speaker creates a speech situation between him and the hearer, but also what type of speech situation he creates. There is a comfortable distance between people in communication, and the speaker wants to be close to some and distant to others. Since the social distance is crucial in communication, it is reasonable to hypothesise that language is equipped with a device by which the speaker creates a type of speech situation where a speaker has a particular social distance from a hearer. Types of speech situation are language specific, although it is more than possible that many languages develop similar types of speech situation. We have shown in Chapter 4 that vocatives in English and T/V distinction in some languages are such a device to create different types of speech situation. So are Japanese *ji* honorifics. Using the conventional relation between *ji* honorifics and types of speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation she shares with a particular hearer, considering actual social parameters of the speech situation and their importance, and, in doing so, creates the particular type of speech situation between her and the hearer.

To describe this direct impact of speaker's use of *ji* honorifics to the present speech situation, it is not too bad to say, 'a speaker expresses an honour to a hearer', as Tokieda (1941) puts it. To do so, the term 'honour' should be used in a widest

possible sense. However, we do not take Tokieda's idea of the honour-expressing function of *ji* honorifics. We stick to the idea that *ji* honorifics are performatives to create a certain type of speech situation.

### 5.3.2 *Ji* honorifics

As we have repeatedly shown in the present thesis, the presence of the honorific auxiliary *masu* is correlated with a distant type of speech situation, where (i) a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker and a hearer are socially distant, or (iii) a speech situation is formal. The absence of it, on the other hand, is correlated with a non-distant type, where (i) a hearer is socially equal to or lower than a speaker, (ii) a speaker and a hearer are socially close, or (iii) a speech situation is informal. By means of these linguistic conventions, the speaker assigns either type of speech situation to the present speech situation, and, in doing so, creates the type of speech situation between her and the hearer. The meanings the speaker expresses by uttering the sentences in (30a) and (30b) are shown in the diagrams in (31) and (32) respectively.

- (30)

a.

Yamada

san

ga

ki

mashi

ta

b.

Yamada

san

ga

ki


ta

come


past

'Mr Yamada came'

(31)



(32)



There are other *ji* honorifics. The honorific auxiliary *desu* is used for a copula sentence. Another honorific auxiliary, *gozaimasu*, is also for a copula sentence, and it is correlated with a wider social gap between a speaker and a hearer. The type of speech situation correlated with *gozaimasu* is that (i) a hearer is socially much higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker and a hearer are socially very distant, or (iii) a speech situation is very formal. The following is a copula sentence without an honorific auxiliary (in (33a)), one with *desu* (in (33b)), and one with *gozaimasu* (in (33c)).

- (33) a. Yamada san ga shachoo da,  
b. Yamada san ga shachoo desu,  
c. Yamada san ga shachoo de gozaimasu.
- president copula

‘Mr Yamada is the President’

If the present speech situation is not of the type the speaker assigns, the speaker’s assigning is *inappropriate*, which makes the speaker’s creating the type of speech situation between her and the hearer *inappropriate* or even a failure. Imagine the speaker uttering the sentence in (33c) to his wife during the dinner. The speaker assigns the intimate and informal speech situation he shares with his wife at present a very *inappropriate* type, where (i) a hearer is socially much higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker and a hearer are socially very distant, or (iii) a speech situation is very formal. Since this type cannot be obtained in any of actual social parameters of the present

speech situation, the speaker's wife would not understand why the speaker specifies the present speech situation by this type (unless he says it as a joke).

There are cases where the social relation between the speaker and the hearer is on the borderline of two types, or there are competing elements in the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. In such a case, the speaker chooses the most important element of the present speech situation and creates a particular type of speech situation accordingly. This shows in turn what social relation the speaker wants to develop between her and the hearer, or what aspect of the social relation the speaker finds crucial for the present speech situation. Let us take an example. Between my supervisor at college, Professor Ueda, and me, there is more than one type of social relation. She is my former supervisor, so we have a teacher-student relation. And she is older than me, so we have a senior-junior relation. For these, I would create a distant type of speech situation. However, since I graduated from the college a long time ago and we have been friends since then, we have a friend relation. And, furthermore, Professor Ueda and I are interested in the same area in linguistics, so we have a colleague relation, too. For these I would create a non-distant type of speech situation. Therefore, when I think of our social relation to choose an appropriate *jī* honorific, I have to decide which aspect of our social relation is more crucial for the present speech situation. The setting matters: when I have tea with her at home, I would assume the friends aspect is crucial for the present speech situation, and create a non-distant type between us. The topic also matters: when we talk about linguistics, I would assume the colleague aspect is crucial for the present speech situation, and create a non-distant type. The presence of other discourse participants also matters: if other students of Professor Ueda are present, I would assume the teacher-student aspect is crucial for the present speech situation, and create a distant type between us. In each case, Professor Ueda would know what social factor I find crucial for the speech situation.



## 5.4 *Shi* honorifics: meaning of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> which concerns historic situations

### 5.4.1 Meaning of CONTEXT<sub>C</sub> about historic situations

As we discussed 5.1, there is a type of meaning about a historic situation which is not truth-conditional. We have described this as there being two layers of meaning about a historic situation. One is a factual layer, where a person or situation is 'pointed to' and his/her/its action or state is described. Truth-conditional meaning concerns this layer. The other is a social layer, where the social aspect of a referent or situation is described as a social relation between the referent and the speaker, or the referent and another participant. Honorifics which concern this layer are *shi* honorifics.

A speaker creates a social layer of historic situation by constantly differentiating social aspects of the referent or situation. We can hypothesise that 'pointing to' a person and describing his action become subject to further differentiation in terms of social distance, and that such differentiation has become a linguistic convention. When the differentiation is grammaticalised and the speaker cannot describe a fact of the historic situation without marking social distance, a social layer of the historic situation comes into existence as real as a factual layer of the historic situation. *Shi* honorifics are correlated with this type of differentiation, and, by using them, the speaker specifies social relation in the historic situation. In doing so, the speaker reinforces existing social relations in the world or emphasises social aspects of people in the world.

The social layer of the historic situation is expressed as a relation between a referent and a speaker (or another participant). A person is 'pointed to' by an honorific

expression and his action is described by an honorific verb by some speakers, and the same person is referred to by a non-honorific expression and his action is described by a plain verb by other speakers. The social aspect of the referent is not expressed as the referent's attributes, say, being a member of the superior social class. That is, *shi* honorifics represent types of *relative* social distance between a person referred to and a speaker (or another participant). This is the reason Fillmore (1971) defines honorifics as social deixis. *Shi* honorifics express the referent's *relative* social distance from the deictic centre, which is often identified with a point of social scale where the speaker occupies.

Since the Meiji period (1868-1912), when rigid differentiation of social classes which was conventionalised in the Edo period (1603-1868) started to lose its importance<sup>12</sup>, the differentiation of social distance by *shi* honorifics has become more important than before. The formality and informality of the speech situation can be also expressed by *shi* honorifics. For example, there are cases where a speaker 'points to' a person by an honorific expression and describes his action by a polite verb not because the person 'pointed to' is socially higher than the speaker or socially distant to the speaker, but because the speech situation is formal. This relation between *shi* honorifics and the formality or informality of the speech situation is similar to the relation between slang words and the informality of the speech situation, which we discussed in Chapter 4. In both cases, 'pointing to' a person and describing his action by certain words are correlated with types of present speech situation.


#### 5.4.2 *Shi* honorifics

We classify *shi* honorifics into two types. One is absolute honorifics, which concern (i) types of social relation between a person referred to and a speaker, (ii) types of

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
<sup>12</sup>See Shibatani (1990).

social distance between a person referred to and a speaker, and (iii) formal or informal types of speech situation. These types of relation or speech situation are expressed by honorific or non-honorific referring expressions and plain, humble, or honorific verbs. We will illustrate meanings the speaker expresses by absolute *shi* honorifics using the following diagram:



The circle which stands for a speech situation overlaps with the square which stands for a historic situation. This is because meanings of absolute *shi* honorifics concern a social relation or distance between a speaker in the speech situation and a referent in the historic situation. By assigning a type to the social relation or distance between him and the referent, the speaker specifies a social layer of the historic situation.

The other type is relative honorifics, and the meanings of relative *shi* honorifics concern types of social relation between a person referred to and another participant in the historic situation. These types of social relation are expressed by humble or honorific verbs. We will illustrate meanings the speaker expresses by relative *shi* honorifics using the following diagram:



The circle in the square stands for the social layer of the speech situation, where the social relation between a referent and another participant in the historic situation is specified<sup>13</sup>.

#### 5.4.2.1 Absolute honorifics

Let us start with referring expressions. 'Pointing to' a person only by his last name is correlated by convention with a type where (i) a referent is socially much lower than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is very close, almost vulgar, to a referent, or (iii) the speech situation is very informal. 'Pointing to' a person by his last name plus *kun* is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially lower than a speaker, or (ii) a speaker is close to a referent (referring to someone by *kun* does not seem to be specified in terms of formality or informality of the speech situation). 'Pointing to' a person by his last name plus *san* is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially equal to or higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially a little distant to a referent or (iii) the speech situation is formal. 'Pointing to' a person by his last name plus *sama* is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially much higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially very distant to a referent, or (iii) the speech situation is very formal.

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<sup>13</sup>Let us mention morphology of honorific and humble verbs. The following are some of the pairs of a plain verb and an honorific verb (the former of each pair is a plain verb and the latter an honorific verb): *iu* and *ossharu* ('say'), *suru* and *nasaru* ('do'), *taberu* and *agaru* ('eat'), and *kureru* and *kudasaru* ('give'). Apart from these, verbs can be made into honorific verbs in the following structures: *o/go*-(verb)-*ni-naru*, *o/go*-(verb)-*nasaru*, (verb)-*nasaru*, *o/go*-(verb)-*kudasaru*, and (verb)-*reru/rarer*. For example, a verb *warau* ('laugh') becomes *o-warai-ni-naru*, *o-warai-nasaru*, *warai-nasaru*, *o-warai-kudasaru*, and *warawa-reru*. Some of the pairs of a plain verb and a humble verb are in the following (the former of each pair is a plain verb and the latter a humble verb): *taberu* and *itadaku* ('eat'), *tazuneru* and *ukagau* ('visit'), *ageru* and *sashiageru* ('give'), *iu* and *mooshiageru* ('say'), and *miru* and *omenikakaru* ('see'). Like honorific verbs, verbs become humble verbs in the following structures: *o/go*-(verb)-*suru*, *o/go*-(verb)-*mooshiageru*, and *o/go*-(verb)-*itasu*. For example, a verb *tasukeru* ('help') becomes *o-tasuke-suru*, *o-tasuke-mooshiageru*, and *o-tasuke-itasu*. See Ogawa (1982:260-65) and Kikuchi (1994:114ff).

The conventions which concern describing the referent's action by a humble, plain, or honorific verb are explained in the following. Using a humble verb for the action of a person except a speaker himself or a member of the speaker's social group<sup>14</sup> is correlated by convention with a type where a referent is socially much lower than a speaker. Since marking social inferiority of a referent by a humble verb is not a common practice any more and is restricted in hierarchical environment, it is not correlated with a type where a speaker is close to a referent, or a speech situation is informal. Using a plain verb for the action of a person is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially close to a referent, (iii) the speech situation is informal. Using an honorific verb for the action of a person is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a referent, or (iii) the speech situation is formal.

Using these linguistic conventions, the speaker specifies the social relation between him and the person in the historic situation as a certain type or the present speech situation as a certain type. For example, while 'pointing to' a particular person Yamada and describing his past action by assigning it a type COME, the speaker specifies the social relation between him and the person or the present speech situation as a particular type by uttering one of the following sentences (where *mairi* is a humble verb, *ki* a plain verb, and *irasshai* an honorific verb) :


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<sup>14</sup>For the meanings the speaker expresses by using a humble verb for the action of himself or a member of his social group, see 5.4.4.




The potential type where a speech situation is informal expressed by the plain verb is excluded by the referring form of the last name plus *kun*.

(39)



(40)



By means of the conventions of absolute *shi* honorifics, the speaker specifies the social aspect of the person 'pointed to' (or the present speech situation) by assigning it a particular type. If the person 'pointed to' (or the present speech situation) is not of the type, the speaker's utterance becomes *inappropriate*. If, for example, the speaker utters the sentence in (36d) in friendly gathering and Yamada is his colleague of the same rank to whom he is close, his utterance is *inappropriate*. The type of social relation (or speech situation) correlated with the sentence in (36d) cannot be obtained in actual social parameters in the relation between Yamada and the speaker (and actual social parameters in the present speech situation).


#### 5.4.2.1 Relative honorifics

Describing a referent's action to another participant by an honorific verb is correlated with a type where a referent is socially higher than another participant. Consider the

following example where the speaker uses the honorific verb *kudasat* ('give') for the action of the teacher (agent) to the child (beneficiary):

- (41) *sensei ga sono kodomo ni hon wo kudasat ta,*  
 teacher that child to book give past  
 'The teacher gave a/the book to that child'

The following is the diagram which shows the meaning of the sentence in (41):




Describing a referent's action to another participant by a humble verb is correlated with a type where a referent is lower than another participant. The following is the case where the speaker uses the humble verb *sashiage* ('give') for the action of a child (agent) to the Emperor (beneficiary):

- (43) *kodomo ga tennooheika ni hana wo sashiage ta.*  
 child emperor to flower give past  
 'A child gave flowers to the Emperor'

The meaning of the sentence in (43) is shown in the diagram in the following:



(44)



Using these conventions, the speaker specifies the social relation between the person 'pointed to' and another participant in the historic situation. In doing so, the speaker expresses a differentiated social relation in the historic situation, together with a fact in the historic situation. If the social relation in the historic situation is not of the type the speaker assigns to it, the speaker's indicating is *inappropriate*<sup>15</sup>.

#### 5.4.3 The cases where the social relation in the speech situation coincides with that in the historic situation

As we discussed 5.2.1.4, when a speaker 'points to' himself or a hearer, the social relation in the historic situation for which the speaker uses *shi* honorifics coincides with the social relation in the speech situation for which the speaker uses *ji* honorifics. Consider the following examples:

<sup>15</sup>Let us mention the scope of tense. In the diagrams in (42) and (44) the circle which stands for the social relation between a referent and another participant is in the square which stands for a historic situation in the past. This does not mean, however, that the scope of tense is over the social relation between a referent and another participant. As we have claimed repeatedly in the present chapter, the social relation in the historic situation is in a different layer from the factual layer of the historic situation. 'Pointing to' a historic situation at one point in time and place and describing it by assigning a type to it is independent of assigning a type to the social relation between a referent and another participant, and vice versa.

- (45) a. *ore ga soko he iku.*  
 b. *boku ga soko he iku,*  
 c. *watashi ga soko he mairi masu,*  
 I there to go  
 'I('ll) go there'

A male speaker has a choice of 'pointing to' himself by *ore*, *boku*, and *watashi*, each of which is correlated with a different type of (in)formality of speech situation, as we discussed in Chapter 4 (4.3.2.1.2). The speaker also has a choice of describing his own action by a humble verb or a plain verb, each of which is correlated with a different type of social hierarchy or social distance between a speaker and a hearer, or (in)formality of speech situation, as we described in 5.2.1.4.

Describing one's own action by an honorific verb, which is potentially correlated with one's social superiority over a hearer or social distance from a hearer, is not conventionalised. The following example, where the speaker describes his own action by an honorific verb *irassharu* ('go') sounds strange unless it is uttered as a joke:


- (46) *?ore ga soko he irassharu.*  
 I there to go  
 'I('ll) go there'

By 'pointing to' himself by a particular pronoun and describing his own action by either a humble verb or a plain verb, the speaker presents himself and his action to a hearer in a particular way. This has almost the same function as that of *ji* honorifics; to *indicate* that the present speech situation is of a particular type. For example, to present himself formally to the hearer in the speech situation by a pronoun *watashi* is almost the same as to *indicate*, by the *ji* honorific auxiliary *masu*, that the social relation


between the speaker and the hearer is formal. To present his own action by a humble verb, *indicating* that (i) the speaker is socially lower than the hearer, (ii) the speaker is socially distant to the hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is formal is the same as to *indicate*, by the *ji* honorific auxiliary, that (i) the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, (ii) the speaker is socially distant to the hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is formal.

Let us show the meanings the speaker expresses by uttering the sentences in (45a), (45b) and (45c) in the diagrams in (47), (48), and (49) respectively.


(47)



(48)



(49)



When a speaker 'points to' the hearer by a pronoun and describes her action by a humble, plain or honorific verb, the social relation the speaker *indicates* by *shi*


honorifics also coincides with the social relation the speaker *indicates* by *ji* honorifics. 'Pointing to' the hearer by *omae* is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially much lower than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially very close to a hearer, or (iii) a speech situation is very informal. 'Pointing to' the hearer by *kimi* is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker or (ii) a speaker is socially close to a hearer (formality or informality of the speech situation does not seem to be correlated with 'pointing to' the hearer by *kimi*). 'Pointing to' the hearer by *anata* is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a hearer, or (iii) a speech situation is formal.

Describing the hearer's action by a humble verb is correlated with a type where a hearer is socially lower than a speaker. Describing the hearer's action by a plain verb is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially close to a hearer, or (iii) a speech situation is informal. Describing the hearer's action by an honorific verb is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a hearer, or (iii) a speech situation is formal.

Let us show the meanings of the following sentences in (50a) with a humble verb *mooshi* ('say'), (50b) and (50c) with a plain verb *it*, and (50d) with an honorific verb *osshai* in the diagrams in (51), (52), (53) and (54) respectively.


- (50) a.     *omae ga soo mooshi ta,*  
           b.     *omae ga soo it ta,*  
           c.     *kimi ga soo it ta,*  
           d     *anata ga soo osshai mashi ta.*  
               you           so       say                   past  
               'You said so'

(51)




Meanings of social closeness and informality which are potentially expressed by the pronoun *omae* and the absence of the honorific auxiliary are denied by the use of the humble verb, *mooshi* ('say').

(52)




(53)



Because 'pointing to' the hearer by *kimi* is not correlated with either a formal type or an informal type of speech situation, the possible meaning of informality of the speech situation which is expressed by the absence of the honorific auxiliary is excluded.

(54)



By a particular first-person or second-person pronoun, the speaker can *indicate* the type of the social relation between him and the hearer or the present speech situation very directly and strongly. This is because ‘pointing to’ himself or the hearer by a particular first-person or second person pronoun is a part of the speaker’s assertion to the hearer. This is good when the speaker creates a comfortable speech situation for the hearer. However, if he doesn’t, the speaker might endanger the communication between him and the hearer. For example, if the speaker ‘points to’ the hearer by *omae*, the hearer might accept it positively as a sign of the speaker’s strong intention to build an informal, close relationship. But it is also possible that the hearer takes it as an insult believing the speaker means that the hearer is socially much lower. If the speaker ‘points to’ himself by *watashi*, the hearer might accept it positively as a sign that a speaker is formal and non-intruding, or take it as the speaker’s indifference about building a friendly relationship for communication.

It seems that Japanese speakers tend to avoid ‘pointing to’ themselves or the hearer by pronoun. They often drop a subject. If there is no other person introduced in the discourse, it is not difficult to guess that the speaker talks about himself. When a speaker is putting a question to the hearer, it is a reasonable guess that the speaker talks about the hearer. Or a speaker ‘points to’ the hearer by first name or last name plus *san*, or his position or vocation, which are usually used for ‘pointing to’ the third person. For example, a speaker ‘points to’ a hearer by *Yuko san* (first name plus *san*), *Suzuki san* (last name plus *san*), *shachoo* (‘president’) (the hearer’s position), and *sensei* (‘teacher’) (the hearer’s vocation). We need a socio-linguistic survey to

conclude that there is a correlation between the speech-situation-sensitive nature of ‘pointing to’ the speaker himself or the hearer by a pronoun and dropping a subject or using other referring expressions. This is, however, strongly implied.

#### 5.4.4 The cases where the insider-outsider distinction overrides honorifics


As we suggested in 5.2.1.4, when a speaker ‘points to’ a member of her family to an outsider, the speaker identifies him/her with him/herself. That is, just as a speaker ‘points to’ himself and describes his action humbly or non-humbly, *indicating* the type of the social relation between him and the hearer or the type of the present speech situation, the speaker ‘points to’ a member of his family and describes his action humbly or non-humbly. In doing so, the speaker *indicates* that the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, not the social relation between the speaker and the member of her family, is of a certain type. In the following examples, whether the speaker uses *haha*, a formal word for ‘mother’, or an informal one *okaasan*, and whether the speaker describes her mother’s action by a humble verb *mairi* or a plain verb *ki* depend on the social relation between the speaker and the hearer.

- (55) a. *haha ga tookyo he mairi mashi ta*  
       b. *okaasan ga tookyo he ki ta.*  
           mother           Tokyo   to   come       past  
           ‘(My) mother came to Tokyo’


‘Pointing’ one’s mother by *haha* is correlated with a type where a hearer is an outsider to whom the speaker is formal. And ‘pointing to’ one’s mother informally by *okaasan* is correlated with a type where a hearer is an insider to whom a speaker is informal. For a speaker to describe the action of the member of his family by a humble verb is

correlated with a type where a hearer is an outsider to whom a speaker is formal. For a speaker to describe the action of the member of his family by a plain verb is correlated with a type where a hearer is an insider to whom a speaker is informal.

Let us demonstrate the meanings the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (55a) and that in (55b) in the diagrams in (56) and (57) respectively:



‘O(H,S)’ means that the hearer is an outsider of a speaker’s social group.



‘I(H,S)’ means that the hearer is an insider of a speaker’s social group.

If I utter the sentence in (55a) to my brother, my *indicating* is *inappropriate*. Since ‘outsiderness’ cannot be obtained in the actual social parameters in the present speech situation, the hearer, i.e., my brother cannot understand why I ‘point to’ my mother, who is also his mother, by *haha* and describe her past action by the humble verb *mairi*.

The insider-outsider distinction is also expressed when the speaker ‘points to’ a member of the organization he belongs to, and whether the hearer is an insider or an



outsider of the organization is marked by *shi* honorifics. Let us compare the following sentences:

- (58) a.     *Yamada san wa odekake-ni-nari mashi ka,*  
           b.     *Yamada wa dekake mashi ta.*  
   go out   past  
   ‘(Mr) Yamada went out/has gone out’

If the speaker communicates with his colleague about another colleague of him who is senior to him, he might utter the sentence in (58a): he ‘points to’ the person Yamada by his last name plus *san*, and describes his action by an honorific verb, *odekake-ni-nari* (‘go out’). When the same speaker communicates with an outsider of the company about the same person, Yamada, he utters the sentence in (58b). Identifying Mr Yamada with himself and talking humbly about him, the speaker ‘points to’ Yamada by his last name only and describes his action by a plain verb<sup>16</sup>. By doing so, the speaker *indicates* that the hearer is an outsider.

One can also utter the sentence in (58b) to *indicate* that the person ‘pointed to’ is socially lower than the speaker or the speaker is socially close to the person (the possibility of the speech situation being informal is excluded because of *ji* honorific of *mashi*). So if a bystander overhears someone uttering the sentence in (58b), he does not know which social type the speaker *indicates*. This means that some *shi* honorifics are not specific enough to distinguish the *indication* of a type of social hierarchy or distance between a speaker and a referent from the *indication* of ‘outsiderness’ of a hearer.

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<sup>16</sup>There isn’t a humble verb for ‘go out’ which is commonly used.

## 5.5 Conclusion

In the present chapter, we have described (i) how Japanese honorifics are correlated with types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer, and a speaker and a referent and a referent and another participant, and types of speech situation, and (ii) how a speaker by means of those conventions creates a particular type of speech situation or specifies a social layer of the historic situation. *Ji* honorifics stand for grammaticalisation of the correlations between the presence or absence of honorific auxiliary and types of social relation or distance between a speaker and a hearer in the speech situation or formality or informality of the speech situation. By using conventions of *ji* honorifics, a speaker creates a particular type of speech situation between him and the hearer in specifying the present speech situation as a particular type.

*Shi* honorifics represent grammaticalization where honorific and non-honorific referring expressions, and humble, plain, and honorific verbs are correlated with types of social relation between a speaker and a referent, and a referent and another participant in the historic situation, and types of speech situation. By using conventions of *shi* honorifics, the speaker specifies the social aspect of the referent in terms of his relation to the speaker or another participant. As a result, social relations in the world are expressed together with the facts in the world which are expressed by the speaker's act of 'pointing to' a person and describing his action or state. By using *shi* honorifics, the speaker reinforces existing social relations in the world or emphasises a certain element of those social relations. We have also discussed the interrelations of *ji* and *shi* honorifics when the speaker 'points to' himself, the hearer, or a member of his or the hearer's social group.

Japanese is one of the languages which are equipped with fully systematic devices to mark social aspects of the world and communication linguistically. Using this device, a Japanese speaker expresses social meanings independently of expressing meanings about a factual aspect of an entity or historic situation, and creates a particular type of speech situation, or reinforces existing social relations in the world or emphasises a certain element of them. By applying Austin's concept of the *demonstrative* and *descriptive* conventions to them, we have succeeded in describing these social meanings and meanings about a factual aspect of an entity or historic situation in a coherent manner: just as the speaker 'points to' an entity or situation (by means of the demonstrative conventions) and describes it by assigning it a type (by means of the descriptive conventions), the speaker specifies the social relation by highlighting it (by means of the demonstrative conventions) and assigning it a type (by means of the descriptive conventions). In doing so, we have added a social layer of the picture of meaning, which is necessary to get a full grasp of what language users are doing by using a language.

## Chapter 6

### Conclusion

In the present thesis, we have shown that the speech act approach to meaning gives richer explanations for various types of meaning, from referring and predicating to honorifics. When interpreted in a wider sense, the speech act theory represents a semantic theory where meanings are described as conventional acts which the speaker performs to the hearer about the world using linguistic conventions. In this theory of meaning, to describe meaning is to describe those linguistic conventions, some of which are universal and others of which are language-specific. Our final goal is to give a full description of language as a complex system of linguistic conventions which are interrelated.

We defined conventionality of meaning in terms of independence from a particular context: a particular meaning is conventional if it can be interpreted without any information from a particular context. This is the definition we give to semantic meaning in this thesis. By this definition, grammatical meanings, lexical meanings, and socially established meanings (such as referring forms) are included in the semantic domain, leaving context-specific meanings and meanings which are not fully conventionalised such as conversational implicature and inferences based on conversational structure in the pragmatic domain. In the proposed dichotomy, some of the meanings which are defined as pragmatic meanings in the Gazdar-Levinson definition of semantics and pragmatics are in the semantic domain.

In the present thesis we have described two types of semantic meaning. One is truth-conditional meaning and the other is what we call meaning of  $\text{CONTEXT}_C$ . We

explained what aspect of meaning philosophers and linguists have been trying to capture as truth-conditional meaning, and have shown that it can be described successfully in the theory put forward in the present thesis: truth-conditional meaning can be seen as a type of conventional meaning which concerns the factual aspect of the entity or situation in the world. Following Austin (1950), we have hypothesised two types of linguistic conventions: the *demonstrative* conventions and *descriptive* conventions. *Demonstrative* conventions correlate words with a particular entity or historic situation, and *descriptive* conventions correlate words with types of entity or situation. Using these conventions, a speaker expresses different types of meaning about entities or situations in the world. Following Austin (1952), we have hypothesised four types of speech act the speaker can potentially perform by uttering a sentence with subject-predicate structure. Truth-conditional meaning is a type of meaning the speaker expresses in performing one of those types of speech act: the speaker 'points to' a particular entity or situation by means of the demonstrative conventions and describes it by assigning it a type by means of the descriptive conventions. We described the other types of act correlating them with linguistic factors such as generics, referential and attributive use of the definite expressions, and A-type and B-type utterances. By describing meaning the speaker expresses by uttering a sentence with subject-predicate structure as the speaker's conventional speech acts about the world, we succeeded in analysing sentence meaning with wider scope than that of straightforward truth-conditional meaning.

By the concept of meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ , which concern types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer in the speech situation, types of speech situation, and types of social relation between a referent and a speaker or another participant in the historic situation, we have clarified the other important semantic meaning. That is a type of meaning where social relations in the world are recognised and linguistically expressed, whilst meanings about entities or situations which include truth-conditional

meanings are a type of meaning where entities or situations in the world are recognized and linguistically expressed. Meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$  can be *appropriate* or *inappropriate* whilst meanings about entities or situations in the world can be *true* or *false* (or *correct* or *incorrect* in our terminology). We have described both types of semantic meaning in a coherent manner by applying Austin's two types of linguistic conventions to the description of meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ . Just as the speaker 'points to' an entity or situation by means of the demonstrative conventions and describes it by giving it a type by means of the descriptive conventions, the speaker highlights, say, the present speech situation between him and the hearer by means of the demonstrative conventions and, at the same time, specifies it by giving it a type by means of the descriptive conventions. In other words, whilst the speaker *asserts* that a particular entity or situation is of a certain type, the speaker *indicates* that the present speech situation is of a certain type. *Asserting* and *indicating* are independent of each other, as they are associated with different layers of meaning.

In the final part of the present thesis, we described Japanese honorifics, which are grammatical devices to express meanings of  $CONTEXT_C$ . Under the Gazdar-Levinson dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics, Japanese honorifics are 'miscast' as a pragmatic meaning. Since the honorifics are analysed as pragmatic meanings, context independent meanings the honorifics express as grammatical devices are not fully described. Japanese honorifics strongly suggest the necessity of a criterion of semantic meaning which is wider than truth-conditional meaning, by which grammatical meanings which concern non-factual aspects of the world are included as semantic meanings. We give the conventionality of meaning as a new criterion, and we have proved that Japanese honorifics are successfully described in the theory where semantic meaning is what the speaker expresses by conventional devices about states of affairs or social relations in the world. In such a theory Japanese honorifics are a conventional device which correlates words with types of social relation, by which a

Japanese speaker specifies the social relations. We have shown that there are two types of honorifics in Japanese; *ji* honorifics and *shi* honorifics. In *ji* honorifics the presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary are correlated with types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer, and using *ji* honorifics, the speaker highlights the present speech situation and specifies its type. In *shi* honorifics, referring expressions and verbs are correlated by convention with types of social relation between a speaker and a referent or a referent and another participant. Using *shi* honorifics, the speaker highlights and specifies the social relation between him and the referent, and the referent and another participant. By *indicating* that the present speech situation or the social relation between him and the referent or the referent and another participant is of a certain type, the speaker creates a particular type of speech situation or enforces existing social relations in the world.

Meanings are multi-layered. In the present thesis, we have clarified two layers of meaning, a factual layer and a social layer, and described the linguistic conventions by which the speaker expresses meanings of those layers. Using these conventions, a speaker describes an entity or situation in the world and, at the same time, specifies the social relation between him and the hearer, him and the referent, or the referent and another participant. Languages might be also equipped with lexical or grammatical devices by which the speaker expresses meanings of other layers, which include possibility/probability or negativity/positivity. These will be topics of my future research. Other areas of my interest include extended research on (i) genericity in terms of the act of *placing*, and (ii) correlation between referring expressions and the speaker's understanding of the hearer's background knowledge. Although we have not mentioned the diachronic aspect of meaning, the convention-based theory of meaning put forward in the present thesis can well incorporate diachronic changes of meanings: such changes can be analysed simply as changes of conventions. When linguistic conventions change, some semantic meanings which existed in one time in



history cease to exist at another time, or some meanings which existed as context-dependent pragmatic meanings at one time become semantic meanings at another time. Analysing diachronic changes of meaning will be also one of the topics of my future research.

To describe the multi-layered nature of meaning, it seems very promising to adopt the theory where meanings are analysed in terms of speech acts the speaker performs to the hearer using linguistic conventions. In such a theory, we have a broader picture of semantic meaning than the picture truth-condition semantics offers, and we can describe different aspects of meaning the speaker expresses by uttering a sentence.



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